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Abstract
This thesis investigates the mechanisms applying in the interpretation of syntactic
chains. The theoretical background includes a translation of syntactic forms into se-
mantic forms and a model theoretic explication of the meaning of semantic forms.
Simplicity considerations apply to all three stages of the interpretation process: syn-
tactic derivation, translation into semantic forms, interpretation of semantic forms.
Three main results are achieved. The ﬁrst is that trace positions can have
semantic content beyond what is needed for the semantic dependency of trace and
binder. This extra content is some or all of the lexical material of the head of the
chain, as expected on the copy theory of movement. Two independent arguments
support this conclusion. One, discussed in chapter 2, is based on the distribution of
Condition C eﬀects, where novel interactions between variable binding, antecedent
contained deletion and Condition C are observed. The second, developed in chapter
3, is based on conditions on the identity of traces observed in antecedent contained
deletion constructions. Both arguments lead to the same generalizations about what
lexical material of the head is interpreted in the trace position.
The second main result is that lambda calculus is superior to both standard
predicate logic and combinatorial logic as the mathematical model for the seman-
tic mechanism mediating the dependency of trace (or bound pronoun) and binder.
Chapter 4 argues this on the basis of the distribution of focus and destressing in
constructions with bound pronouns.
The third main result is that quantiﬁcation must be allowed to range over
pointwise diﬀerent choice functions. Chapter 5 shows that quantiﬁcation over indi-
viduals is insuﬃcient, and that pointwise diﬀerent choice functions are required. The
result entails that the syntactic diﬀerence of A-chains and A-bar chains predicts a
semantic diﬀerence in the type of the variable involved, which is argued to explain
weak crossover phenomena.
Chapters 6 argues that the interpretation procedures developed in the pre-
ceeding chapters account for all cases. It is shown that only traces of the type of
individuals arise, and that scope reconstruction is a phonological phenomenon. The
latter result also supports the T-model of syntax.Acknowledgments
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12Chapter 1
Introduction
Chains are dependencies between two or more positions of a syntactic structure which
are created by the syntactic computation, and the making of chains is an extensively
researched topic in syntax. Why is the meaning of chains interesting? For one, the
meaning of chains just like that of bound pronouns is, at least in an intuitive sense,
not compositional: the meanings of two disjoint pieces of structure, the head and the
tail of a chain, seem intimately related. For this reason, the study of the semantics
of chains promises to provide insight into the interpretation processes that apply to
syntactic structures. Little research has been done on the semantics of chains, and
the semantic dependency in a chain is standardly treated exactly parallel to pronoun
binding. This assumption, in particular, this thesis sets out to refute.
Some fundamental questions to ask about the semantics of chains are the
following: What aspects of the syntactic representation of a chain are relevant for
the semantics? What is the independent contribution of the head of a chain to the
meaning of the whole? What is the independent contribution of the tail of the chain?
13What are the semantic processes applying to link the two (or more) positions of a
chain together? Are there diﬀerences between the semantic processes interpreting
bound variables and those interpreting chains? Are diﬀerences between syntactic
types of chains (A/A-bar) reﬂected in their semantics? This thesis tries to answer
the fundamental questions about the interpretation of chains using new diagnostics,
in particular focus semantics. While it in some cases provides new arguments for
classic assumptions like the use of λ-calculus, it argues in many cases for a substantial
revision of the semantics of chains.
The remainder of the introduction brieﬂy clariﬁes the set of background as-
sumptions in which this thesis is embedded in section 1.1, and then provides an
overview of the thesis in section 1.2.
1.1 Background Assumptions
This thesis is intended as a contribution to a growing body of work that attempts
to account for the contribution of syntactic structure to sentence meaning by taking
both syntactic insights concerning structure forming and modifying processes seri-
ously, and at the same time, providing fully explicit model-theoretic statements of
the semantic rules involved. This research project with only minor diﬀerence is in-
troduced in two recent semantics textbooks by Larson and Segal (1995) and by Heim
and Kratzer (1998). The account of the meaning of structures within this project
can involve both (covert) syntactic operations that apply for purely semantic reasons
and semantic interpretation rules in whichever combination that leads to the simplest
14overall account.
One insight of this research project, which I adopt, is that a clearer state-
ment of both the syntactic computation and the semantic mechanisms is achieved if
a third mechanism is hypothesized that translates the output of the syntactic com-
putation at the syntactic level of logical form into another representation to which
the semantic mechanisms apply. For example, von Stechow (1993:section 8) discusses
this assumption using the term transparent logical form for this intermediate level
of representation. I will sometimes use the term semantic form, but when it’s un-
ambiguous, I will often refer to this level of representation as logical form, as well.
Obviously, simplicity considerations also apply to the translation of logical forms into
semantic forms. I assume, in particular, that this translation procedure can delete
parts of phrases, but also insert new pieces of structure that are necessary to represent
dependencies semantically as discussed in chapter 4.
Within the three step interpretation procedure sketched in the previous para-
graph, the last step, the semantic mechanism, is the least tangible. Along with most
research on the topic, I content myself with stating semantic rules to deﬁne a model-
theoretic concept of truth for the semantic form structures. I assume that the notion
of truth in a model deﬁned in this manner is related to semantic intuitions, in the
intuitive way that is commonly assumed in the ﬁeld and has proved fruitful. The
semantic rules are split into lexical rules and a composition rule C interpreting com-
plex phrases. The composition procedure C is deﬁned by recursion over the syntactic
structure. As for the basic operation that combines the interpretations of two phrases
into the meaning of one branching node, I assume with Heim and Kratzer (1998) that
15there are two clauses to C, namely functional application and predicate intersection,
and that whichever of the two clauses that is compatible with the semantic types of
the two sub-phrases is the one that applies.
I start out with one assumption speciﬁc to the ﬁrst step of the account of
chains, their syntactic derivation. Namely, I assume that the syntactic process that
creates chains is copying of the lexical material from the tail position of a chain to
the head position as endorsed for example by Chomsky (1995). This assumption is
strongly supported by reconstruction facts like those discussed in chapters 2 and 3
and in the references cited there. The other two stages of the interpretation of chains
are the main subject of the investigation.
The main tool used in this thesis to study the meanings of dependencies is
the semantics of focus and destressing/deletion. It is known that the explanation
of these phenomena involves sentence internal entailment relationships. Hence, they
can be used to test for the meaning of parts of a sentence, in particular a part that
contains a dependent element, but not its antecedent. Since the semantics of focus
and destressing is not so widely known, I introduce aspects of it as they become rele-
vant: the relationship between destressing and ellipsis in section 3.2, the concept of a
presuppositional skeleton and its relevance in section 3.3.2, focus indices and domains
in 3.3.3, the contrastiveness requirement in 4.1.1, and the relationship between pitch
accent and focus in 4.1.2. For readers who prefer a concise introduction, Kratzer
(1991) and Rooth (1996) provide a good overview of the basics of focus semantics.
The work of Rooth (1992b) is particularly relevant below for the account of sloppy
interpretations and the relationship between focus and ellipsis. Schwarzschild (1998)
16presents some ideas that are used and modiﬁed in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.
1.2 Overview
The thesis is structured in three parts. The ﬁrst part, consisting of chapters 2 and
3, concerns the content of a trace position in a chain. The second part, chapters 4
and 5, studies the semantic mechanisms linking a trace and its antecedent. The third
part, chapter 6, provides evidence for the completeness of the solution given for the
semantics of chains in the other two parts.
The main point of chapters 2 and 3 is that a trace position in a chain can
contain lexical material of the head of the chain. Chapters 2 and 3 develop two
independent arguments in favor of this conclusion; chapter 2 looks at the distribution
of Condition C eﬀects, chapter 3 looks at the identity requirement of two traces in
ellipsis constructions. Not only do these two chapters both argue for the presence
of lexical material in some cases; it’ll also be shown that both argue for the same
generalizations about when and what parts of the lexical material of the head of the
chain is represented in the trace position.
The discussion in chapter 2 is guided by the proposal of Chomsky (1993) that
whenever an R-expression in the head of a chain triggers a Condition C violation with
respect to a pronoun that c-commands only the tail position of the chain, this means
that the R-expression is lexically represented in the tail position. For example, the
R-expression John in (1a) is part of a wh-movement chain and triggers a Condition
C violation in the trace position of this chain. Therefore, I assume a semantic form
17representation like (1b), where a part of the moved phrase including the R-expression
is lexically represented in the gap position. The correspondence between chapters 2
and 3 argues that lexical representation in the trace position of a chain is the right
approach to the distribution of Condition C phenomena.
(1) a. W ∗Which argument of Johni’s father did hei defend.
b. [Which] did he defend [argument of John’s father]
Assuming representations like (1b), the distribution of Condition C eﬀects shows
that DPs seem to split into independent parts that can be represented in diﬀerent
positions of the chain at the level of semantic form, while the parts themselves cannot
be divided. I use the term segment for a part of a DP that seems to be always
represented in the same position. Segments are the NP-part, which I deﬁne as the
lowest NP-projection of the complement of D (excluding all adjoined modiﬁers), and
each modiﬁer adjoined to the NP-part. The terminology is exempliﬁed in (2), which
is a DP with two segments, the NP-part and one modiﬁer.
(2) which
      
Det.
argument of John’s
      
NP-part
that Mary had criticized
      
modiﬁer
      
segments
The following factors are shown to aﬀect the presence of segments in the trace position
of a DP-chain in chapter 2: the surface position, the A/A-bar status of the chain, the
impossibility of self-contained reference in Antecedent Contained Deletion (ACD),
and the requirement that bound variables must be in the scope of their binder. In
18particular the following two results are new: For one, while an ACD-relative must
be represented in a higher position of a chain (Fox 1995b), the NP-part must always
be represented in the trace position, as shown in section 2.1. Secondly, extending
arguments of Lebeaux (1992, 1995), section 2.2 presents evidence that a segment
containing bound variable must be represented in the scope of its binder, while other
segments of the same DP can be represented in a higher position. In section 2.3, the
ﬁrst result together with other observations from the literature supports the claim
that the distinction of A-bar from A-chains can be reduced to the claim that the NP-
part must be represented in the tail position of an A-bar chain. Section 2.4 shows that
lexical material of the relative clause head is also present in the relative clause internal
trace position, but, depending on the semantic properties of the relative clause, the
representation is less direct than in chains. The result of chapter 2 is summarized in
section 2.5 as a set of ranked constraints.
The argument from the identity of traces in chapter 3 is based on paradigms
like (3), where the interpretation of elided material intended is indicated by a para-
phrase in angle brackets. Kennedy (1994) ﬁrst observed that examples like (3a) are
ungrammatical. The observation that (3b) contrasts with (3a) is new, and not pre-
dicted by any existing account of (2a).
(3) a. P ∗Polly visited every town that’s near the lake Eric did  visit .
b. Polly visited every town that’s near the town Eric did  visit .
The examples in (3) involve ACD where the head of the ACD-relative is diﬀerent from
19the DP in the antecedent that corresponds to the trace in the elided VP. Contrasts
like (3) show that, for the acceptability of the construction, the NP-parts of the two
DPs involved—the head of the relative clause and the correspondent in the antecedent
of the trace in the elided VP—must be lexically identical. The account of (3) argued
for relies on the semantic form representations in (4). In (4), ACD is resolved by
quantiﬁer raising of the DP corresponding to the trace, such that the elided VP and
its antecedent both contain a trace position. If the NP-part of the antecedent is
lexically represented in both trace positions as in (4), the paradigm (3) follows from
the identity requirement of VP-ellipsis. In (4a), the elided VP and its antecedent are
not identical and, therefore, (4a) is predicted to be bad. In (4b), however, the elided
VP and its antecedent are identical.
(4) a. ∗[every town that’s near the lake Op E.
elided VP       
visited [lake]] P.
antecedent       
visited [town]
b. [every town that’s near the town Op E.
elided VP       
visited [town]] P.
antecedent       
visited [town]
The account of (3) sketched here is developed in section 3.1. It’s also shown
there that the amount of lexical representation argued for by this account of Kennedy’s
observation is the same as that argued for by the distribution of Condition C. Section
3.2 slightly extends the paradigm in (3) and shows that the semantic properties of
the material lexically represented in the trace position aﬀect the severity of the ill-
formedness in the case of mismatch. This is seen to argue that the lexical content of
a trace position at semantic form is indeed interpreted in the trace position. Section
203.3 shows why the eﬀect of the identity requirement on traces is usually not observed
in cases of wh-movement other than ACD. Furthermore, the account there predicts
one exception where the eﬀect is found in examples with wh-movement; namely, (5)
shows a contrast just like (3).
(5) a. I know which cities Mary visited, and now I would like to know the cities
Sue did  visit 
b. I ∗I know which cities Mary visited, but I would like to know the lakes she
did  visit 
Also in section 3.3, I present an argument that the lexical material in the trace position
is also represented in the head position of a chain, unless it contains a pronoun that
isn’t bound in the higher position. That is, I assume the semantic representation of
(6a) to be (6b) where the NP-part of the wh-phrase is represented in both positions
of the wh-chain.
(6) a. Which book does he like?
b. [which book] does he like [book]
The second part of the thesis considers the question how both positions of a
chain are interpreted together. As mentioned already, the interpretation of a chain,
and also that of a bound pronoun, is in a sense not compositional—the interpretation
of two positions, the binder and the bound phrase, is intimately connected. A number
of mathematical models has been proposed for the semantic mechanism that is at
21work in such dependencies and the question is whether and how these views can
be empirically distinguished. In chapter 4, I present several arguments in favor of
λ-calculus as the model of the semantic mechanism underlying dependencies. The
result applies both to chains and to pronoun binding. But, the content of the trace
position, which is established in chapter 2 and 3, raises additional questions about
the interpretation of chains. Chapter 5 considers the case of a chain headed by a
quantiﬁcational DP, and develops a complete set of interpretive mechanism for this
case. The main claim there is that the quantiﬁcation ranges not over individuals, but
over pointwise diﬀerent choice functions.
The three mathematical models for the mechanism creating the semantic link
in a chain that chapter 4 compares are λ-calculus, combinatorial logic, and predicate
logic extended with restricted quantiﬁcation. Since, as mentioned, pronoun binding
seems to involve the same concept of semantic link as chains, the simplest assumption
is that the same mechanism is involved in chains and pronoun binding. Because of
this assumption, some of the arguments of chapter 4 (which are based on examples
involving pronouns) carry over to chains as well.
Section 4.1 presents two arguments in favor of those models that involve vari-
ables (λ-calculus and extended predicate logic) and against combinatorial logic. Both
arguments revolve around the abstract conﬁguration sketched in (7). Consider the
meanings of the two domains A and B, which both include a dependent element, but
not the binder of it. I show that the contribution of the dependent elements to the
meaning is identical for both domains on the combinatorial logic view. On the views
that use variables, however, the two dependents could contribute diﬀerent variable
22names (or indices).
(7) binder ...
domain A       
... dependent ... ... binder ...
domain B       
... dependent ...
How can the meaning of such domains that aren’t full sentences be investigated? Fo-
cus semantics has been argued to involve inference relationships between constituent
domains smaller than sentences. Hence, if it can be determined which domains are
considered in the licensing of focus and destressing, the meaning of domains like those
in (7) can be studied. Section 4.1.1 presents an argument along these lines based on
example (8) and on the fact that a focussed phrase must be contrastive to the cor-
responding phrase in the antecedent of its focus domain. In (8), the pronoun his in
the second conjunct can optionally be focussed and, therefore, must diﬀer in meaning
from the pronoun his in the antecedent to be contrastive. If the focus structure of (8)
is as indicated, the two pronouns can be diﬀerent in meaning on the variables view,
namely they can be interpreted as diﬀerent variables. On the combinatorial view, on
the other hand, the contrastiveness requirement cannot be satisﬁed by (8). Since the
focus on the pronoun is optional in (8), other focus structures must be possible for
(8). Section 4.1.2 presents a second argument for the variables view, based on a case
where the focus structure is unambiguous, and therefore the focus on the dependent
required.
(8) Every boy
antecedent       
called his father and every TEAcher
focus domain       
called HIS father
Section 4.2 attempts to draw a distinction between the λ-calculus view and the
23extended predicate logic view. One argument for λ-calculus shows that the diﬀerent
variables of the tails of two chains are not contrastive when the domains considered
are the sisters of the moved constituents. This result is expected if the variables are
bound within the sisters of the moved constituents by corresponding λ-operators, but
it’s unexpected if the two moved constituents themselves bind the variables as on the
predicate calculus view. A second argument presented in section 4.2 for λ-calculus
comes from the distribution of i-within-i reference. I conclude therefore that the
semantic form of (6a) is (9), where the translation from the syntactic logical form to
the semantic form might contribute the variable index and the λ-operator.
(9) [which book] λx that he likes [x,b o o k ]
Chapter 5 addresses the question how the lexical content of the trace position,
for example in (9), contributes to the interpretation of a chain. I consider exclusively
the case of a chain headed by a quantiﬁcational determiner, and argue later that this
might be the only case that arises. The approach developed is guided by the assump-
tion that the semantic mechanisms should apply in the same manner to all chains
headed by a DP. Speciﬁcally, no diﬀerence should be made between interrogative and
non-interrogative DPs. Because of this assumption, examples like (10a), where the
fronted DP contains a pronoun that’s bound in the trace position, are an important
case to account for. The semantic representation of (10a), that was argued for in
the preceding chapters, is given in (10b). For the semantics, I adopt and extend the
choice function approach of Engdahl (1980), which also relies on representations like
24(10b).
(10) a. Which friend of heri’s did every student invite?
b. which λx did every student invite [x,f r i e n do fh e r i’s]
To extend the choice function proposal to non-interrogative, non-existential quanti-
ﬁers, it turns out that it must be modiﬁed. The modiﬁcation that proves most fruitful
is a restriction of quantiﬁcation to only pointwise diﬀerent choice functions, instead
of all choice functions, where the deﬁnition of pointwise diﬀerent is given in (11).
(11) f is pointwise diﬀerent from g if and only if ∀x:f(x)  = g(x)
One prediction of the approach that seems desirable is discussed in section 5.2. It
predicts that all DP-chains with lexical material in the trace position involve quan-
tiﬁcation over choice functions, while chains with no lexical material in the trace
involve quantiﬁcation over individuals. Since it was argued in 2.3 that the chains of
the former type are most A-bar chains, while all A-chains are of the latter type, a
type diﬀerence between A-bar chains and A-chains follows. If pronouns are of the
type of individuals, it follows that the head of an A-bar chain cannot bind a pronoun,
while the head of an A-chain can. In this way, the type diﬀerence is seen to predict
the distribution of weak crossover eﬀects.
The third part of the thesis is the shortest and most tentative. Chapter 6
presents two results that go some way towards establishing the claim that the semantic
mechanisms developed in the previous part can account for the interpretation of all
25chains that actually arise. Section 6.1 addresses a limitation of the mechanism of
chapter 5, namely its restriction to DP-chains. I present arguments from the literature
and one new argument based on facts from quantiﬁer ﬂoat in Japanese to show that
only chains where the type of the trace is the type of individuals occur at LF. This
implies that all occurring cases of chains are accounted for by the mechanisms already
developed, where the variable ranges over choice functions and the type of the entire
trace is that of individuals.
Section 6.2 addresses cases of so-called scope or total reconstruction, where
a moved quantiﬁcational phrase takes scope in its trace position. In such cases, all
lexical material of the chain is interpreted in the trace position, and none in the
head. This, however, seems to require me to partially withdraw the claim of section
4.2 that the sister of a moved phrase is interpreted as a predicate. If the head of a
chain is semantically empty, nothing would serve as the argument of this predicate.
Though the required modiﬁcation is rather trivial, section 6.2 presents an argument
that the modiﬁcation might not be needed at all. It is argued there that scope
reconstruction phenomena should instead be analyzed as cases of movement in the
phonological component of the grammar, which therefore doesn’t have any semantic
eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, it’s shown that the PF-movement proposal together with the
assumption that movement must always target a c-commanding position makes a
correct prediction; namely, the generalization that scope reconstruction is blocked
in examples like (12) from Barss (1986) where the moved quantiﬁer some politician
doesn’t c-command its trace.
26(12) [How likely to tQP address every rally]wh is [some politician]QP twh?( s o m e  likely,
∗likely some)
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Binding into Traces
At least since Ross (1967) and Lakoﬀ (1968), it’s been known that dislocated phrases
can behave as if they were in their base position for the purposes of binding the-
ory as in (1) and (2) below. This phenomenon, Binding Reconstruction, still re-
mains only incompletely understood in many ways, but some signiﬁcant proper-
ties of it have been discovered over the years: a correlation with the A/A-bar (or
NP-movement/wh-movement) distinction (Wasow 1972:66,142,147–57, 1979:157–75,
Riemsdijk and Williams 1981:204, Chomsky 1981),1 a distinction between arguments
and adjuncts of the moved phrase (Freidin 1986, Lebeaux 1988 with observations in
Riemsdijk and Williams 1981, Chomsky 1981:144), a diﬀerence between overt and
covert movement (Brody 1979, Chomsky 1981:196–197), a correlation between bind-
ing reconstruction for Condition C and for variable binding (Lebeaux 1992, 1995,
1In the literature on scrambling (e.g. Tada 1993), diﬀerences with respect to binding reconstruc-
tion are often the only criterion for the A/A-bar distinction. Hence, it may seem strange to speak
only of a correlation. But, the A/A-bar distinction is needed independently for the statement of
locality conditions on movement, in particular for overlapping paths (see Chomsky 1977, Rizzi 1990,
Takano 1993, M¨ uller 1993, 1998).
291998, Tada 1993:66-68, Chierchia 1995:129–170), and a correlation between narrow
scope and binding reconstruction (Heycock 1995, Romero 1996, 1997, Fox 1996, 1997,
1998b, Sportiche 1996).
(1) [Which friend of herj’s]i did every studentj invite ti?
(2) [ ∗[Which pictures of Johnj]i did hej like ti?
This chapter discusses facts that demonstrate that some parts of a moved phrase
show binding reconstruction eﬀects, but other parts of the moved phrase don’t seem
to reconstruct. Two kinds of evidence are new: One novelty is evidence that shows
that the covert movement that resolves Antecedent Contained Deletion shows some
binding reconstruction eﬀects. The other is evidence that, when variable binding
forces binding reconstruction of some part of the moved phrase, other parts of the
antecedent can still escape binding reconstruction.
In the discussion of binding reconstruction phenomena, I adopt the assumption
that binding reconstruction is syntactically represented by lexical material occupying
the trace-position at the level where binding theory applies. Throughout, I use the
notation exempliﬁed in (3a) and (4): The relation between the lexical material that
is represented in the trace position and the lexical material in the top position of
the chain is expressed by a variable, x in the examples, which is part of the complex
trace and bound in the position marked by the λ-operator, that marks the sister of
the moved operator as a derived predicate. The use of λ-calculus as the mechanism
mediating the dependency of operator and trace is argued for in chapter 4. For the
30moment though, it should be seen as a typographically more convenient version of
a notation like (3b) which is agnostic about the semantic mechanism mediating the
dependency.
(3) a. Which
      
operator
λx
    
binder
did every studentj invite [x,f r i e n do fh e r j’s]
      
complex trace
?
b. Which did every studentj invite [friend of herj’s]
The bound variable her’s in (3) must be in the scope of its binder, and therefore
I assume that in this case some of the lexical material is represented only in the
trace position, as shown in (3). For (2), it’s not clear whether to represent the
lexical information picture of John only in the tail of the chain as in (4a), or to
represent it doubly, in the head and the tail of the chain as in (4b) as suggested by
Danny Fox (p.c.). To block coreference between he an John in (2), however, either of
the representations in (4) suﬃces, since in both the pronoun he c-commands the R-
expression John. (4b) may seem redundant, but on the other hand, it’s more natural
on the assumption that the syntactic operation underlying movement phenomena is
copying, since it doesn’t require as much deletion as (4a). In section 3.3.3, I present
an empirical argument in favor of the latter view.
(4) a. W ∗Which
      
operator
λx did hej like [x, pictures of Johnj]
      
complex trace
?
b. [ ∗[Which picture of Johnj]
      
operator
λx did hej like [x, pictures of Johnj]
      
complex trace
?
31In (3b) and (4b), binding reconstruction is represented by syntactic material
that occupies the trace position. It is debated, though, whether the evidence neces-
sitates this syntactic view (cf. Lebeaux 1992, 1995, 1998 Chierchia 1995, Fox 1998b,
Romero 1997, Lechner 1998, Sharvit 1998 for discussion). An alternative view de-
veloped in detail by Barss (1986) assumes that a the head of a chain can be in the
semantic scope of a phrase that c-commands its trace under certain conditions. On
this view, the evidence in this section would be relevant towards stating restrictions
on this chain-binding strategy. For now, I use lexical material in the trace position
in the discussion of binding reconstruction as working hypothesis, though I suspect
that it’s less elegant to state the generalizations on the semantic reconstruction view.
I refer the reader to Fox (1998b) for an overview of arguments in favor of the syn-
tactic approach. The arguments in chapter 3 provide an additional argument for the
syntactic approach taken here, and in chapter 5 I make a proposal as to how the
lexical material in both the head and the tail position of a chain contributes to its
interpretation.
The goal of this chapter is to investigate what parts of the head of a chain
undergo binding reconstruction when the chain itself exists at the level of logical form.
In other words, since I assume that binding reconstruction is represented by lexical
material in the trace position, the goal of this chapter is to ﬁnd out where what parts
of the lexical material of a chain are at the level where binding theory applies. In
particular, I present new arguments that the lexical material of a DP-chain can in
some cases be split between the top and the bottom position, in ways other then the
split between the quantiﬁcational D-head and its NP-complement postulated in (3)
32and (4). This kind of situation is sketched in (5).
(5) [D ‘some lexical material’]
      
operator
λx...[x, ‘other lexical material’]
      
trace
The derivation of LF-representations like (5) is straightforward assuming the copy
theory of movement (Wasow 1972, Chomsky 1981, Burzio 1986, Chomsky 1995). If
syntactic movement creates representations where all positions of a chain contain
all the lexical material of the moving phrase, the distribution of lexical material in
representations of the kind sketched in (5) can be derived by the application of deletion
in the positions of a chain. The goal of this chapter is then to ﬁnd the conditions
under which this deletion operation applies.
Engdahl (1980:131–144) was the ﬁrst to articulate the claim that binding re-
construction can cooccur with wide scope. The empirical evidence she gives for the
LF in (6a) (I discuss her semantics in Chapter 5) is of the type in (1): wh-questions
where the wh-phrase contains a bound variable pronoun. Her argument therefore re-
lies on two assumptions: that bound variable pronouns must be in the scope of their
antecedents and that wh-phrases take sentential scope. There’s hardly any alternative
to the ﬁrst assumption (Though, see the discussion of Skolem-functions in Engdahl
(1986) and Chierchia (1993)). The second assumption is much harder to argue for,
and indeed not universally assumed—for example Hamblin (1973), Cresti 1997 and
Rullmann and Beck (1997) entertain LF-representations like (6b) for (1) where the
wh-chain of the overt form is not represented at all. Ultimately, I believe Engdahl’s
(1980) interpretation of (1) is correct, but it will take some eﬀort to get there.
33(6) a. which λx did every studenti invite [x,f r i e n do fh e r i’s]?
b. did every studenti invite which friend of heri’s       
wh-phrase
?
To sharpen Engdahl’s argument, we need better tests for the location of the expression
heading the chain that don’t reconstruct. In addition to variable binding, the three
tests relevant for this chapter are Quantiﬁer Scope, Antecedent Contained Deletion
(Sag 1976, May 1985, Larson and May 1990), and Condition C of the Binding Theory
(Ross 1967, Langacker 1969, Lasnik 1976, Chomsky 1981).
2.1 Scope, Condition C and Antecedent Contained Dele-
tion
Before applying Condition C to test for the LF-position of syntactic material, I’ll
summarize an argument from Fox (1995b) that Condition C applies at LF only. His
argument relies on the contrast in (7) (from Fiengo and May 1994:296 with some
modiﬁcations). (In (7) and in the following, I indicate the interpretation of a VP-
ellipsis site by a paraphrase given in angle brackets   .)
(7) a. You introduced himi to everyone Johni wanted you to  introduce himi to 
b. I ∗I introduced himi to everyone Johni wanted you to dance with.
In both examples in (7), the pronoun him c-commands the R-expression John
in the surface form. While Condition C rules out coreference between him and John
in (7b), Condition C doesn’t seem to apply in (7a) despite the surface c-command
34of John by him. In (7a), coreference between the pronoun and the R-expression is
acceptable. Fox’s (1995b) as well as Fiengo and May’s (1994) account of (7) relies on
the account of Antecedent Contained Deletion (henceforth ACD) of Sag (1976:73),
May (1985) and Larson and May (1990). Sag and Larson and May, in particular,
argue, based on an interaction between scope and ACD, that quantiﬁer movement is
required for the resolution of ACD. This is displayed by the LF-representation in (8).
(8)
 
everyone [λy Johni wanted you to introduce himi to [y]]
 
λx you introduced himi to [x].
In the LF-representation (8), the R-expression John is no longer in the c-domain of the
pronoun him, and therefore Condition C is not violated. If Condition C doesn’t apply
to the surface representation (7a), but to the LF-representation (8), it’s expected that
coreference between him and John is possible. I leave the question why quantiﬁer
movement cannot obviate Condition C in (7b) for the next paragraph. Assuming
that there’s an answer to this question, the contrast in (7) is a strong argument that
Condition C applies only at LF (see Fox 1995b for arguments against the account of
(7) in Fiengo and May 1994).
Why quantiﬁer raising doesn’t always bleed Condition C, for example not
in (7b), is the remaining question. It turns out that (7b) is actually not a good
example to raise the question for because (7b) doesn’t control for the scope of the
universal quantiﬁer and, if Fox (1995a) is right, quantiﬁer movement is blocked in (7b).
However, it is well known that even when a universal quantiﬁer takes wide scope,
35quantiﬁer movement usually doesn’t obviate Condition C (Brody 1979, Chomsky
1981:196–7). This is shown by (9), where even on the ∀ ∃ wide scope reading, the
pronoun him cannot be coreferent with the R-expression John. The contrast between
(9) and (7a) cannot be explained by conditions on whether quantiﬁer movement
applies.2 Rather, the contrast must be explained by an interaction between ACD and
Binding Reconstruction, namely that ACD blocks Binding Reconstruction.
(9) S ∗Someone introduced himi to everyone Johni wanted you to dance with.
As Fox (1995b) points out, the Copy Theory of Binding Reconstruction to-
gether with standard theories of ACD predict that ACD blocks Binding Reconstruc-
tion: The relevant standard assumption about ACD and VP-ellipsis in general is
that an elided VP must be (almost) identical to its antecedent (Sag 1976, Williams
1977, May 1985, Tancredi 1992, Rooth 1992b, Wold 1995, Fiengo and May 1994).
For now, I assume that exact lexical identity is required except for tense morphology
(see section 3.2 and 3.3 though). Consider (10) which is the LF-representation of
(7a) where the elided VP and its antecedent are indicated. In (10) without Binding
Reconstruction, the elided VP and its antecedent are identical.
2To maintain the view that it is the application of quantiﬁer movement that accounts for the
contrast between wide scope as shown by scope and wide scope for the resolution of ACD, the
following assumptions would need to be postulated: There is a second scope taking mechanism in
addition to quantiﬁer movement which yields wide scope, but doesn’t resolve ACD. Furthermore,
quantiﬁer movement applies only to resolve ACD, while the other mechanism applies yields wide
scope when there’s no ACD. A mechanism with exactly these properties has been formulated in the
literature, namely Quantiﬁer Storage (Cooper 1983), though not for this particular problem. But,
consistent though it is, such an account is quite clearly not more than a restatement of the facts.
36(10)
 
operator
      
everyone [λy Johni wanted you to introduce himi to [y]
      
elided VP
]
 
λx you introduced himi to
trace
    
[x]
      
antecedent
.
But if there’s a copy of the lexical material of the relative clause in the bottom
position of the chain of quantiﬁer movement as indicated in (11), the elided VP and
its antecedent do not satisfy the identity condition. Hence, the representation (11) is
not possible for the sentence (7a). This way, the identity requirement on an elided
VP and its antecedent blocks Binding Reconstruction into traces that are part of the
antecedent in ACD constructions.
(11)
operator
      
e ∗everyone [λy Johni wanted you to introduce himi to [y]
      
elided VP
]
λx you introduced himi to
trace
      
[x,[ λy Johni wanted you to introduce himi to [y]
      
elided VP (copy)
]
      
antecedent
.
In (9), on the other hand, Binding Reconstruction is possible. The represen-
tation corresponding to Binding Reconstruction is given in (12), which then violates
Condition C. If the representation (12) is actually the only one available for (9), the
contrast between quantiﬁer raising for ACD resolution and for wide scope alone is
accounted for.
(12)
 
∗
 
everyone [λy Johni wanted you to dance with [y]]
 
λx someone introduced
himi to [x,[ λy Johni wanted you to dance with [y]]]
37To this end, Fox (1995b) adopts the assumption argued for in Chomsky (1993:36-37)
that there is a preference for A-bar chains to represent all lexical material except for
the D-head in the trace position—in eﬀect, a preference for Binding Reconstruction.
After Chomsky (1993), this is often referred to as the Preference Principle; it states a
preference between two representations: the one with the lexical material interpreted
at the top of the chain, and the one with the lexical material interpreted at the
bottom of the chain. Fox (1995b) reformulates the Preference Principle as a economy
condition and adds that it can be overridden by the requirement of ACD that the
relative clause containing the elided VP must be represented outside of the antecedent
for deletion. Condition C is diﬀerent from the requirement of ACD in that it doesn’t
motivate a violation of the Preference Principle. The interaction between ACD and
the preference principle is discussed further at the end of section 3.2.
In addition to the argument that Condition C applies at LF, Fox’s (1995b)
analysis has implications concerning what are possible LF-representations of A-bar
chains, and what preferences exist between them. At least two representations are
possible for an A-bar chain consisting of a quantiﬁcational operator and lexical mate-
rial restricting the operator: a representation where the entire restrictor occupies the
trace position of the A-bar chain, and a representation where at least a relative clause
modifying the restrictor doesn’t occupy the trace position, but only occupies the head
position. Of these, the former representation is preferred by the grammar and the
second one is only used in case ACD blocks the ﬁrst one.3 As for the structure of the
3As Danny Fox (p.c.) pointed out to me, this view predicts that quantiﬁer movement should
always obviate Condition C if the R-expression triggering Condition C is part of the quantiﬁcational
determiner. It’s very diﬃcult to construct relevant examples, but a weak preference in the predicted
38representation in the case of ACD, Fox’s (1995b) analysis of (7a) gives us information
about the LF-position of the R-expression, which is the subject of the ACD relative
clause. Namely, it must be in a position higher than its surface position. This follows
from the assumption that the entire relative clause must be in a position higher than
its surface position, which is required in the ACD-cases for ACD resolution. The
evidence, however, leaves it open whether all lexical material of the DP that moves
for ACD resolution is represented in the top position of the A-bar chain or only as
much as is needed for ACD-resolution. In eﬀect, Fox (1995b) develops both views.
Consider now the contrast in (13), which resolves the open issue. (13a) is
comparable to (7a): The R-expression that is in a Condition C conﬁguration in the
surface form is the subject of an ACD relative clause just like in Fiengo and May’s
(1994) example above: Condition C is bled by ACD-resolving Quantiﬁer Movement.
In (13b), on the other hand, the R-expression is part of the noun phrase that has to
move for ACD-resolution, but it’s not inside of the ACD relative clause. The new
discovery is that the Condition C eﬀect remains in (13b).
(13) a. In the end, I did ask himi to teach the book of Irene’s that Davidi wanted
me to  ask him to teach .
direction seems to be detectable in (i). In (ia), it seems that Condition C is obviated on the reading
where John’s every takes scope over someone. In (ib), quantiﬁer raising of John’s every to a position
above the subject is blocked because the subject is not a scope bearing element (Fox 1995a). As
expected, Condition C cannot be obviated in (ib).
(i) a. Someone must’ve fed himi Johni’s every move over earphones.
b. K ∗Kasparov must’ve fed himi Johni’s every move over earphones.
39b. I ∗In the end, I did ask himi to teach the book of Davidi’s that Irene wanted
me to  ask him to teach .
Merchant (1998a) independently discovered similar facts and makes the same point.
I give his three examples in (14). In each of them, Condition C applies to block coref-
erence between the object pronoun and the R-expression that occurs in the external
head of the ACD-relative clause.
(14) a. I ∗Ig a v eh i m i every report on Bobi’s division you did  give himi .
b. I ∗I reported heri to every cop in Abbyi’s neighborhood you did  report heri
to .
c. I ∗Is h o w e dh e r i every picture from Abbyi’s mantlepiece you did  show heri 
The examples in (15) show that coreference is possible if Merchant’s (1998a) examples
are modiﬁed such that the R-expression is inside of the ACD-relative clause. In (15b)
and (15c), the R-expression is part of the subject of the ACD-relative, like in (7a),
while, in (15a), the R-expression is part of the material pied-piped with the relative
operator. Note that, while in (13) the two sentences compared diﬀer with respect
to the amount of material intervening between the pronoun and the R-expression
relevant for Condition C, the contrast among (14b) and (14b) could not be explained
in terms of such a diﬀerence.
40(15) a. I gave himi every report whose section on Bobi’s division you asked me to
 give himi .
b. I reported heri to every cop Abby’s neighbors allowed me to  report heri
to .
c. I showed heri every picture Abbyi’s agent forgot to  show heri 
Example (13b), and also Merchant’s (1998a) examples in (14), show that ACD
doesn’t block binding reconstruction of lexical material that is not part of the ACD rel-
ative clause. On the Copy Theory of Binding Reconstruction, this lexical material—
book of David’s in the example (13b)—must therefore occupy the trace position, and
thereby causes a Condition C violation. In fact, a structure with such a complex trace
must be forced in the the examples in (13), since the Condition C violating structure
is the only one available for (13b).
As (16), a tentative LF-representation for (13a), illustrates, if we assume that
only quantiﬁer movement leaves such a complex trace, the elided VP is not identical to
its antecedent anymore, because the relative clause internal trace is a simple variable
while the QR-trace is complex. At least if VP-ellipsis requires identity of lexical
material (see chapter 3), (16) cannot be the LF representation of (13a).
(16)
 
t h eb o o ko fI r e n e ’ sλy Davidi wanted me to ask himi to teach [y]
      
elided VP
 
λx I asked himi to teach [x, book of Irene’s]
      
antecedent
41Since (13a) allows VP-ellipsis, the relative clause internal trace must be lexically
complex, containing lexical material of the noun phrase it attaches to. I present
further arguments towards this conclusion in section 2.4. For (13a), this allows the
LF representation in (17), which satisﬁes the identity condition of VP-ellipsis.
(17)
 
t h eboo ko fI r e n e ’ sλy Davidi wanted me to ask himi to teach [y, book of Irene’s]
      
elided VP
 
λx I asked himi to teach [x, book of Irene’s]
      
antecedent
For (13b), these consideration force the LF representation in (18). In (18), the quan-
tiﬁer movement that resolves ACD left the noun phrase part book of David’s in the
trace position, where the pronoun him c-commands it. Therefore, Condition C is
violated in (18), and coreference between him and David is correctly ruled out.4
(18)
 
∗
 
t h eboo ko fD a v i d i’s λy Irene wanted me to ask himi to teach [y,b o o ko fD a v i d i’s]
      
elided VP
 
λx I asked himi to teach the [x,b o o ko fD a v i d i’s]
      
antecedent
In the contrast in (13), the oﬀending R-expression was an argument of the head
noun the determiner takes as complement. The examples in (19) exhibit a similar
contrast to (13), but the oﬀending R-expression is part of an adjunct in (19b). This
shows that there’s no diﬀerence between adjuncts and arguments in the construction
4Actually, Condition C seems to actually be violated twice in (17): not only the instance of David
in the trace of quantiﬁer raising, but also the instance of David in the relative clause internal trace
is c-commanded by a coreferent pronoun. While this extra violation causes no problem in (17), in
general no Condition C reconstruction eﬀect is found in a relative clause, as (i) exempliﬁes. I address
this issue in section 2.4.
(i) The book of Billi’s that hei was working on since 1971 ﬁnally appeared.
42we’re considering here.
(19) a. In the end, we did advise himi to buy the computer compatible with Bev’s
that Noami hoped we would.
b. I ∗In the end, we did advise himi to buy the computer compatible with
Noami’s that Bev hoped we would.
The two results of this section are worth repeating once again: One, an argu-
ment of Fox (1995b) was summarized which shows that Condition C of the Binding
Theory applies at LF only. Secondly, an argument was presented that even when
some of the material of the covertly A-bar moved phrase is missing from the trace
position, other lexical material still seems to occupy the bottom position of the A-bar
chain.
2.2 Variable Binding and Condition C
In this section, I’ll present more arguments that structures with part of the lexical
material of an A-bar chain interpreted in the bottom position and other parts inter-
preted only in the top position are possible LF-representations. The evidence here
will be based on interactions between variable binding and Condition C, which I from
now on assume to apply at LF only following Fox (1995b).
In fact, if Condition C applies at LF only, the distribution of Condition C
eﬀects alone with overt A-bar movement is evidence for representations where the
lexical material is split between two positions. The relevant observation is the well
43known contrast between (20a) and (20b) (Riemsdijk and Williams 1981, Freidin 1986,
Lebeaux 1988), which is usually seen as an argument-adjunct distinction. The fact is
that the R-expression inside an argument of the noun head causes a Condition C viola-
tion by Binding Reconstruction into the trace position, making (20a) ungrammatical.
The R-expression in (20b), however, which is contained in an adjunct, doesn’t cause
a Condition C eﬀect in the trace position.
(20) a. [ ∗[Which argument that Johni was wrong]j did hei accept tj in the end?
b. [Which argument that Johni had criticized]j did hei accept tj in the end?
The contrast in (21) makes the same point as (20), but controls for structural diﬀer-
ences between the wh-phrases.5 The only diﬀerence between (21a) and (21b) is that
in (21a) the R-expression John occupies an argument position of argument and Mary
is the subject of the adjoined clause, but in (21b) the two are switched around. Only
when the R-expression is in the argument position in (21a), does it cause a Condition
C violation via Binding Reconstruction into the trace position.
(21) a. [ ∗[Which argument of Johni’s that Mary had criticized] did hei omit tj in
5However, (20) controls for the depth of embedding better than (21). It’s known that the strength
of a Condition C violation correlates with the distance and depth of embedding (Chomsky 1981:196–
7). Diﬀerences in the severity of Condition C as illustrated in (i) are expected on the basis of
general processing conditions and in addition the fact that examples like (ia) might also constitute a
Condition B violation (Kuno 1997). Therefore, it’s important to control for the depth of embedding
whenever possible.
(i) a. H ∗Hei liked Johni.
b. H ∗?Hei liked that Mary bought a picture of Johni.
c. H ∗?Hei liked that Johni’s grandfather’s stories were popular.
44the ﬁnal version?
b. [Which argument of Maryi’s that John had criticized] did hei omit tj in
the ﬁnal version?
The LF-representations the Copy Theory would assign to (21a) and (21b) are given
in (22a) and (22b) respectively. Condition C is violated only in (22a), where the lower
trace contains the R-expression John.6
(22) a.
 
∗
 
Which argument of Johni’s [λy that Mary had criticized [y]]
 
λx hei omit
[x, argument of Johni’s] in the ﬁnal version
b.
 
Which argument of Mary’s [λy that Johni had criticized [y]]
 
λx hei omit
[x, argument of Mary’s] in the ﬁnal version
The representations in (22) show that whether a Condition C violation is incurred
or not is a function of where in the fronted DP the R-expression appears. If the R-
expression is inside the NP that’s the complement of which, it triggers Condition C in
the trace position. If the R-expression occurs inside a relative clause that modiﬁes this
NP, it doesn’t trigger Condition C in the trace position. In stating this generalization,
it is useful to have a term for the part of a DP that is the complement of the determiner
excluding relative clauses and other adjuncts that are adjoined to it: Henceforth, I
call this the NP-part of a DP. In (23), I have marked the determiner, the NP-part
and modiﬁers to it of the wh-phrase of (21a). Using this terminology, the contrast in
6I’m not representing the lexical content of the relative clause internal trace at this point because
it’s irrelevant here.
45(21) argues that the NP-part of a wh-movement chain must reconstruct to the trace
position for Condition C. This is stated as a preliminary generalization in (24).
(23) which
      
Det.
argument of John’s
      
NP-part
that Mary had criticized
      
modiﬁer
(24) The NP-part must occupy the position of an A-bar trace. A modiﬁer may,
occupy the position of an A-bar trace.7
The generalization in (24) assumes that only modiﬁers adjoined to the NP-part itself,
but not modiﬁers internal to the NP-part, can escape binding reconstruction in wh-
chain. Based on diﬀerent assumptions, Tada (1993:65) arrives at this conclusion
and presents evidence for it from Japanese. In (25), though the R-expression John
occurs inside a relative clause and outside the c-domain of the pronoun kare in the
surface form, coreference is blocked by Condition C. (25) is predicted if only modiﬁers
adjoined to the NP-part of the moving phrase itself can escape Condition C.8
(25) [ ∗?[Johni-ni
[JohnDAT
ki-ta
came
tegami-o
letterACC]j
suteru-yooni]j
throw-away
karei-ga
heiNOM
tsumani
wifeDAT
tj
tj
miji-ta
ordered.
‘To throw away the letter that came to John, he told his wife.’
7Lebeaux (1988) proposes counter-cyclic adjunction of relative clauses as an explanation for the
Condition C obviation of overt movement. Recall though from the previous section, that covert
movement also displays obviation of Condition C with relative clauses, if the covert movement is
required for Condition C resolution. Hence, Lebeaux’s (1988) explanation is at least incomplete. I
come back to the question Lebeaux’s proposal at the end of this section.
8Note that Tada’s account predicts that, for a relative clause inside a fronted predicate, overt
movement won’t obviate Condition C. That this prediction is correct is shown by the examples in (i)
from Takano (1995:(12)) (see also Heycock (1995)). Since Tada’s explanation of (i) isn’t dependent
on the VP-internal trace hypothesis, I conclude contrary to Takano (1995) and Heycock (1995) that
examples like (i) don’t bear on this hypothesis.
(i) a. Criticize a student that Johni taught, hei said Mary did.
b. How proud of a student that Johni taught did hei s a yM a r yi s ?
46However, Tada (1993:fn. 25) doubts the existence of a diﬀerence between modiﬁers
to the NP-part and modiﬁers internal to the NP-part for English because of (26a)
(attributed to Noam Chomsky, p.c.). In (26a), Condition is obviated even though
the relative clause containing the R-expression John is adjoined to the lower NP
book. This argument isn’t convincing because the lower NP itself could be part of
an modiﬁer if we assume that the for-PP is an modiﬁer to book. The obviation of
Condition C in (27a) shows that the for-PP is an adjunct, as does the separability in
the copular paraphrase in (27b) (see Sch¨ utze 1995).
(26) a. The award for the book that Johni wrote, hei never received.
b. The award for the book that Johni received, hei never cashed.
(27) a. Which award for Titanici did everybody agree iti deserved.
b . T h ea w a r dw a sf o rt h eb o o k .
The contrast in (28) shows that only modiﬁers adjoined to the NP-part of the moved
phrase can escape binding reconstruction. The R-expression Bill occurs inside a
relative clause in both, (28a) and (28b). However, there’s a contrast depending on
whether this relative clause is part of an argument inside the NP-part of the fronted
phrase as in (28a), or a modiﬁer to this NP-part.
(28) a. W ∗Which book of the woman
rel. clause
      
Billi admires
      
NP-part
did hei give to hisi parents.
b. Which book       
NP-part
about the woman
rel. clause
      
Billi admires       
modiﬁer
did hei give to hisi parents.
47Another way to enforce binding reconstruction is variable binding, which
brings us back to Engdahl’s paradigm mentioned at the beginning. As is well known,
overt wh-movement allows a binding of variable inside the moved material by a quan-
tiﬁer that c-commands the trace position, as in (29a). The ungrammaticality of (29b)
shows that c-command of the trace position is indeed necessary.
(29) a. [Which paper of hisj]i did every studentj plan to revise ti?
b. [ ∗[Which paper of hisj]i ti earned every studentj praise?
On the copy theory of binding reconstruction, the LF-representation this leads us to
postulate for (29a) is (30). The variable his is interpreted in the bottom position of
the A-bar chain where it’s c-commanded by the quantiﬁer every student.
(30) Which λx every student λy [y] planned to revise [x, paper of hisy]
That the representation (30) is correct is shown by the interaction between Binding
Reconstruction for Variable Binding and Binding Reconstruction for Condition C
Lebeaux (1992) observes.9 The contrast in (31), which is from Lebeaux (1992) with
minor changes, shows this interaction.
(31) a. [Which paper that hek gave to Maryj]i did every studentk think t 
i that shej
would like ti?
9Tada (1993:66-68) discusses an interaction between temporal dependencies and Condition C
that makes the same point as Lebeaux’s data. Chierchia (1995:129-170) shows data with fronted
conditionals that supports Lebeaux’s conclusion as well.
48b. [ ∗[Which paper that hek gave to Maryj]i did shej think t 
i that every studenti
would like ti?
In (31a), variable binding can be satisﬁed via reconstruction in the position t 
i, which is
c-commanded by the antecedent of he,n a m e l yevery student, but not c-commanded by
the pronoun she. Therefore, she doesn’t trigger a Condition C eﬀect in this position,
and she and the R-expression Mary can be coreferent. The interaction observed by
Lebeaux is predicted by the Copy Theory view of reconstruction, as is shown by the
LF-representation in (32). The relative clause which contains both the bound variable
pronoun and the the R-expression is interpreted in the intermediate trace position
that is not c-commanded by the R-expression Mary.
(32) [Which paper]
      
operator
λx every studenti think [x,p a p e r ,λz hei gave [z]t oM a r y j]
      
intermediate trace
λy
shej would like [y,p a p e r ]
      
lowest trace
In (31b), on the other hand, all reconstruction positions c-commanded by every stu-
dent are also c-commanded by the R-expression Mary. If Binding Reconstruction for
variable binding always forces Binding Reconstruction for Condition C to take place
as well, variable binding is correctly predicted to be blocked in (31b). The Copy
Theory captures the interaction observed; namely, that Binding Reconstruction for
variable binding forces Binding Reconstruction for Condition C as well. The repre-
sentation in (33) illustrates that e.g. interpreting the copy of the relative clause in
the lowest trace position leads to a Condition C violation.
49(33) [ ∗[Which paper]
      
operator
λx shej thinks [x,p a p e r ]
      
intermediate trace
λy every studenti would like
[y,p a p e r[ λz hei gave [z]t oM a r y j]]
      
lowest trace
As we also saw in the interaction of ACD-resolution and Condition C above, Lebeaux’s
(1992) data demonstrate that a relative clause cannot be split among diﬀerent posi-
tions of a chain. Otherwise it should be possible to interpret the bound variable in a
position lower than the the R-expression Mary and thereby accomplish variable bind-
ing without violating Condition C. To ﬁnd out whether variable binding can also be
satisﬁed by binding reconstruction of a part of a fronted constituent, we need to test
cases where we know the relevant parts of the fronted constituent can be interpreted
in diﬀerent positions of the A-bar chains. Such cases have not been studied in the
previous literature.
The contrast in (34) shows that it is possible to accomplish variable binding
by reconstructing only parts of a fronted constituent. (34b) has the same structure
as Lebeaux example in (31b) and, as above, variable binding into the relative clause
brings about a Condition C violation. In (34a), on the other hand, the bound variable
is not part of the relative clause, and therefore reconstruction of the relative clause
isn’t forced. Therefore, (34a) doesn’t violate Condition C. Example (35) makes the
same point as (34).
(34) a. [Which paper of hisk that Maryj was given]i did shej tell every studentk to
revise ti?
50b. [ ∗[Which paper that hek gave to Maryj]i did shej tell every studentk to revise
ti?
(35) a. [Which of hisk pictures that Maryj was shown]i did shej return to ti every
studentk.
b. [ ∗[Which picture that hek showed to Maryj]i did shej return ti to every
studentk.
The LF-representation of (34a) is shown in (36). The bound variable his is
interpreted in the bottom position of the A-bar chain, while the R-expression Mary
with the relative clause is interpreted in the top position, such that Condition C isn’t
violated.10
(36)
 
Which [λz Maryj was given [z]]
 
λx did shej tell every studenti to revise [x,
paper of hisi]?
A second case of variable binding taking place in a lower position than the
interpretation of the relative clause is found when there are two relative clauses.
(37b) shows that it is possible to interpret one relative clause in a low position to
achieve variable binding, and at the same time represent the second relative clause
only in a higher position, such that Condition C isn’t violated.
10Notice that here the NP-part paper of hisi cannot be represented inside the relative clause
because the bound variable his would not be bound. In section 2.4, I present an analysis of relative
clauses that predicts this.
51(37) [Which computer
inner modiﬁer
      
compatible with hisj
outer modiﬁer
      
that Maryi knew how to use]k did shei
tell every boyj to buy tk.
While (37) conﬁrms the claim that two modiﬁers can be represented at LF in diﬀerent
positions of a chain, (38a), where the position of bound variable and R-expression
is exchanged, points to a complication. Here, Condition C is violated even though
the bound variable and the R-expression relevant for Condition C occur in diﬀerent
relative clauses. Given the contrast to (37), it seems as if reconstruction of the outer
relative clause forces reconstruction of the inner relative clause to take place as well.
(38) [ ∗[Which computer
inner modiﬁer
      
compatible with Maryi’s
outer modiﬁer
      
that hej knew how to use]k did shei
tell every boyj to buy tk?
It is hard to decide whether the presence of a bound variable in the outer modiﬁer
in (38) is among the causes of the Condition C eﬀect. Even (39) is not very good
though here the outer modiﬁer doesn’t contain a bound variable. But, there seems
to be a slight contrast between (39) and (38).
(39) [ ??[Which computer
inner modiﬁer
      
compatible with Maryi’s
outer modiﬁer
      
t h a tIk n e wh o wt ou s e ] k did shei
tell Tom to buy tk?
In (40), an example where the R-expression is part of the NP-part is used as an
additional item of comparison. It seems that (40b), where the R-expression is part
52of an inner modiﬁer and the outer modiﬁer doesn’t contain a bound variable, allows
coreference more easily than (40a), where the R-expression occurs in the NP-part, or
(40c), where the the outer modiﬁer contains a bound variable.
(40) a. T ∗Tell me which descriptions of Kanti’s views that were published every
w o m a ns a i dh e i agreed with?
b. T ?Tell me which books describing Kanti’s views that were published every
w o m a ns a i dh e i agreed with?
c. T ∗Tell me which books describing Kanti’s views that shej published every
womanj said hei agreed with?
Therefore, I conclude that the ordering eﬀect between (37) and (38) is real,
though it isn’t predicted by anything said so far. I think the eﬀect might shed light on
the question why relative clauses can escape binding reconstruction with overt move-
ment. Namely, the eﬀect is predicted on a modiﬁcation of Lebeaux’s (1988) proposal
Tada (1993:63-70) develops. Lebeaux’s (1988) proposal is that relative clauses can
adjoin to a wh-phrase after it has undergone wh-movement and for this reason need
not reconstruct for binding to the bottom position of an A-bar chain. Essentially,
Lebeaux proposes that adjunction need not obey the syntactic cycle at all. Tada
(1993), however, proposes rather than to abandon the cycle, to modify it to accom-
modate Lebeaux’s cases. In eﬀect, Tada proposes that adjunction obeys the cycle,
but that adjunction to the speciﬁer of the current cyclic domain is consistent with
the cycle. On Tada’s proposal, modiﬁers adjoining to a moved phrase must obey the
53cycle with respect to the phrase they are adjoining to. Then, the ordering eﬀect is
predicted: The cycle then makes sure that the inner relative clause must be adjoined
before the outer relative clause. If reconstruction to the position where a relative
clause was ﬁrst adjoined is forced, the order of adjunction determines that the inner
relative clause must reconstruct at least as low as the outer relative clause. Note that
this account of (40) supports the central claim of Lebeaux’s (1988) account that the
reason Condition C can be obviated with overt movement is late adjunction. In the
previous section, we saw that also deletion of adjuncts at LF can cause obviation of
Condition C. Because of (40), I conclude that both mechanisms are needed.
The main point of this section, however, is that even in cases where variable
binding forces binding reconstruction of parts of a chain, others parts of the chain
don’t have to reconstruct. More speciﬁcally, example (34) showed that even the
NP-part of a wh-phrase can reconstruct while a relative clause adjoined to it can still
occupy a higher position. Cases like (34) will be important for the semantics of chains
in chapter 5, because in these cases the dependency between the two positions of the
chain must be more complex because the meaning of the complex trace depends on
the value of the bound variable.
2.3 The A/A-bar Distinction
The previous two sections were concerned with covert quantiﬁer movement chains and
overt wh-movement chains. While there were diﬀerences between overt and covert
A-bar movement with respect to relative clause modiﬁers, the NP-part of the moved
54phrase was always represented in the trace position. Recall that an R-expression
that is part of the NP-part always triggers a Condition C eﬀect in the trace position,
as illustrated by (41a): The pronoun he that c-commands the trace position cannot
be coreferent with the R-expression Kai. It is well known that A-chains diﬀer from
A-bar chains in this respect. Namely, an R-expression that is part of the NP-part of
an A-moved phrase doesn’t trigger a Condition C eﬀect in the trace position. This
is illustrated in (41b), where the R-expression Kai and the pronoun him, which c-
commands the A-trace ti, can be coreferent. (I’m concerned with the interpretation of
(41b) where one takes scope over seem.I nc a s eseem takes scope over one—the case
of Scope Reconstruction—, a Condition C eﬀect is found as Fox (1997) and Romero
(1997) show. See also section 6.2.)
(41) a. [ ∗[Which relative of Kaij’s]i did hej say ti likes Kazuko.
b. [One relative of Kaij’s]i seemed to himj to ti like Kazuko.
On the view that binding reconstruction is represented by lexical material in the trace
position, the fact (41b) indicates that in A-chains no lexical material of the head is
represented in the trace position. On the copy theory of movement, the behavior of
A-chains seems unexpected, since nothing seems to motivate deletion of the lexical
material in the trace position. Recall though from the previous section that, while the
NP-part was always represented in the trace position in A-bar chains, relative clause
modiﬁers generally weren’t required to be represented in the trace position in chains
created by overt wh-movement. Then, (41b) shows that the NP-part in an A-chain,
55which is created by overt movement, behaves in the same way that modiﬁers behave
with overt A-bar chains.
At this point, there are various ways to state the diﬀerence between A-chains
and A-bar chains. It seems to me that the diﬀerence between the NP-part and
modiﬁers in an A-bar chain is unexpected because semantically both the NP-part
and the modiﬁers are alike: they contribute predicates that form the restrictor of
the quantiﬁcational determiner which is heading the moving DP. Hence, I propose to
capture the diﬀerence between A-chains and A-bar chains by means of the condition
in (42), which stipulates the unexpected behavior of the NP-part in A-bar chains.
(42) In A-bar chains, the NP-part of the moving DP must be represented in the
lowest trace position.
Obviously it’s desirable to derive (43) from something, but, at this point, I must
relegate the issue to future research. I hope to show, however, that the diﬀerence
between A and A-bar chains at the level of logical form can be reduced to the condition
in (42). In the remainder of this section, I present some tentative results that relate
to this project concerning the distribution of Condition C eﬀects with modiﬁers in
A-chains. Obviously there are other diﬀerences between A-chains and A-bar chain.
In section 5.2, I show that diﬀerences with respect to weak crossover follow from
(42). For the diﬀerent behavior with respect to the licensing of parasitic gaps, I
refer the reader to Nissenbaum (1998). Nissenbaum shows that this diﬀerence can
be derived from syntactic locality diﬀerences between diﬀerent types of movement,
56namely whether intermediate adjunction is required. For the diﬀerences with respect
to locality, I again refer the reader to the respective literature (Rizzi 1990, Chomsky
1995, Takano 1993, 1994, M¨ uller 1993, 1996), which reduces main diﬀerences between
diﬀerent movement types to . The open question remaining, is how the diﬀerence with
respect to intermediate adjunction sites are captured on this approach. However, this
problem doesn’t directly relate to the issue of the LF-representation of chains, and
hence is not crucial for the following.
The position I take above is that the NP-part of an A-chain is subject to the
same principles that determine the distribution of modiﬁers in all chains. These are
discussed in the previous two sections; namely, a preference for the surface position
which can be overridden by variable binding or ACD. The interaction with variable
binding, leads us to expect cases with A-chains where the determiner of the moving
DP is separated from the NP-part. It is diﬃcult to determine whether this expectation
is fulﬁlled, as we see in (43) and (44).
In (43), I tried to force reconstruction of the NP-part of the A-moved phrase.
The question we’re interested in is whether (43) has the LF-representation in (44a),
where one takes scope in its surface position, but himself is interpreted as bound by
everybody. However, since (43) deﬁnitely allows the representation in (44b), where
one takes scope below seem and everybody, it is impossible to discern whether there
are also readings with wide scope for one. The kind of reading we might expect
(44a) to have—and it’s not so clear what this might be—could also be a speciﬁc or
wide-scope reading of (44b) (see Fodor and Sag 1982, Reinhart 1997, Kratzer 1995)
57(43) [One picture of himselfj]i seemed to everybodyj to ti be too small.
(44) a. [One] λx seemed to everybodyj to [x, picture of himselfj] to be too small.
b. seemed to everybodyj to [one picture of himselfj] to be too small.
A better test are interactions between variable binding and Condition C. The
paradigm in (45) resembles that in (34) and the judgment is similar, though the
contrast seems to be less sharp.11
(45) a. [ ∗[A picture that hek showed to Maryj]i seemed to herj to have been given ti
to every studentk.
b. [A picture of hisk that Maryj was shown]i seemed to herj to have been ti
given to every studentk.
c. [ ∗[A picture of hisk meeting with Maryj]i seemed to herj to ti have been given
to every studentk.
In (46), a slight contrast in the predicted direction is found, though again even the
better example (46b) is not perfect. Here the reason might be the complexity of the
construction, and the fact that it’s generally hard to reconstruct in an A-chain if an
overt full DP intervenes.
11One problem with the examples in the text might be a minor violation of weak crossover.
However, in examples like (i), weak crossover is even weaker than it usually is (Burzio 1986:203,
Pesetsky 1994:221-223, Pica and Snyder 1994).
(i) A ?A picture of hisj mother seemed to have been given to every studentj.
58(46) a. [ ∗[A letter that hisk mother sent to Maryj]i seemed to herj to appear to every
studentk to be ti interesting.
b. [A letter of hisk mother that Maryj had received]i seemed to herj to appear
to every studentk to be ti interesting.
Another prediction of the assumption that the A/A-bar diﬀerence reduces to
(42) is that covert A and A-bar chains should behave alike (except if ACD is in-
volved) because in covert A chains the preference to represent the NP-part in its
surface position also predicts it will be represented there. Most cases discussed as
covert A-movement in the older literature, namely movement to replace an exple-
tive, don’t exhibit any of the semantic eﬀects associated with movement, therefore
aren’t regarded as covert A-movement at this point. However, there’s one case in
Modern Greek which seems to disconﬁrm my prediction. Namely, Alexiadou and
Anagnastopoulou (1997) argue that certain cases of clitic doubling in Greek involve
covert A-movement, and are hence similar to overt scrambling in languages like Ger-
man and Japanese. As we see in (47) (Alexiadou and Anagnastopoulou 1997:147),
Condition C is obviated by the covert A-movement in (47b), which indicates that
there the NP-part of the A-chain doesn’t occupy its surface position, but the top
position of the A-chain.12 This could be a problem for the approach taken here, and
deﬁnitely deserves further study. The fact alone that this construction in Modern
12Alexiadou and Anagnastopoulou (1997) also present a contrast similar to (47), but using weak
crossover. Since it’s known thought that severity of weak crossover is aﬀected by Pesetsky’s (1989)
D-linking and since clitic doubling seems to bring about a discourse eﬀect similar to D-linking, I
consider Alexiadou and Anagnastopoulou’s (1997) weak crossover facts unconvincing.
59Greek might be the a case of covert A-movement, the only one known to me, is in-
teresting. However, Sabine Iatridou (p.c.) ﬁnds the contrast in (47) less clear than
Alexiadou and Anagnastopoulou (1997) indicate, and therefore I ignore (47) for now.
(47) a. O ∗O
the
Janis
John
tisi
she
epestrepse
gave back
[to
the
vivlio
book
tis
of
Mariasi]j
Mary
simiomeno
with notes
b. O ?O
the
Janis
John
tisi
she
toj
it
epestrepse
gave back
[to
the
vivlio
book
tis
of
Mariasi]j
Mary
simiomeno
with notes
In sum, despite the tentative nature of the evidence presented, it seems feasible
to ﬁt A-chains into the picture developed for A-bar chains in the previous two sections.
I adopt the assumption that the diﬀerence between A and A-bar chain can be reduced
to (42). I come back to the A/A-bar distinction in section 5.2 with a discussion of
weak crossover.
2.4 Relative Clause Internal Traces
The relationship between the head of a relative clause and the relative clause internal
trace position is puzzling, as was ﬁrst pointed out by Munn (1994): As shown in (48a)
and with more examples below, no Condition C eﬀect is triggered in this position.
On the other hand, as shown by (48b) and more examples below a variable contained
in the head can be bound in the relative clause internal trace position.
(48) a. Which is the picture of Johni that hei likes?
b. Which is the picture of himselfi that everybodyi likes?
60This section is concerned with the absence of Condition C eﬀects in relative
clauses. More speciﬁcally, only restrictive relative clauses are considered. Relative
clause formation obviously involves A-bar movement as the locality restrictions move-
ment show. But, as evidenced by (48) and further examples below, the relation be-
tween the relative clause head and the relative clause internal trace is diﬀerent from
that between the head of a wh-chain and its trace in a question. The conclusion I
argue for in section 2.4.1 is that the proposal of Carlson (1977) is essentially correct:
There are two possible LF-structures for relative clauses, a matching structure and a
raising structure, and the two can be distinguished by means of their interpretation.
In section 2.4.2, I show that the two structures have many things in common and I
propose a derivation that can generate both the matching and the raising structure.
The result of this section not only solves the puzzle (48), but is also important for
chapters 3 and 5 where additional evidence for this analysis of relative clauses will be
achieved.
As already mentioned, the relation between the external head and the trace
inside the relative clause seems to be less direct than with wh-movement in questions
with respect to Condition C, as pointed out by (Munn 1994, Saﬁr 1998)13 In examples
like (49a) (repeated from (48a)), (50a), and (50a) no Condition C eﬀect if observed
even though the R-expression John occurs inside the NP-part of the relative clause
head. In the wh-questions, in the corresponding b)-examples attest coreference is
blocked by Condition C.
13In some examples, though, a Condition C eﬀect is observed with relative clauses, as I also show
below. In particular, I address examples of this kind that are due to Schachter (1973) in footnote
14 below.
61(49) a. Which is the picture of Johni that hei likes?
b. W ∗Which picture of Johni does hei like?
(50) a. The pictures of Marsdeni which hei displays prominently are generally the
attractive ones.(Saﬁr 1998:(38a))
b. W ∗Which pictures of Marsdeni does hei display prominently.
(51) a. I have a report on Bob’s division he won’t like.(Merchant 1998a:fn.1)
b. W ∗Which report on Bobi’s division will hei not like.
The Condition C evidence seems to show that there is no material of the
external head in the relative clause internal position. In other respects though, the
relation between the external head and the relative clause internal trace position
seems to be just as tight as that in a wh-chain. One such case, ﬁrst observed by
(Jackendoﬀ 1968, Schachter 1973:32-33), are examples where the head of the relative
clause contains a variable that is bound by an expression inside the relative clause as
in (52). While an example like (52b) might not require c-command for the binding,
the fact that in (52c) her can be interpreted as a bound variable indicates that in this
case her must be able to occur in the scope of every professor.
(52) a. The interest in each otheri that John and Maryi showed was ﬂeeting.
(Schachter 1973:43a)
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a
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hier.
yesterday
(Vergnaud 1974:256)
c. The book on heri desk that every professori liked best concerned model
theory.
A second case are examples where the head of the relative clause forms an idiom
together with other lexical material inside the relative clause (Brame 1968). The
noun headway in (53a) cannot appear in any other environment than as part of the
idiom make headway. This suggest the position where headway is interpreted in (53a)
is the complement position of make. (53b) allows both an idiomatic interpretation (the
pictures John made with a camera) and a non-idiomatic interpretation (the pictures
John grabbed). For the idiomatic interpretation, the same point could be made, as
for (53a).
(53) a. The headway John made proved insuﬃcient.
b. All the pictures John took showed the baby.
Finally, Irene Heim (p.c.) mentions examples where a part of the head of the relative
clause seems to take scope below a relative clause internal scope taking element. The
preferred interpretation of example (54a) is one that can be paraphrased as “Gina
needs so many books for vet school such that no linguist would read that many
books”. In this paraphrase, many takes scope below need. Similarly, (54b) prefers an
interpretation paraphrasable as: there is a number such that Mary can take n-many
63drinks, but she shouldn’t even have n-many drinks. In this paraphrase as well, the
quantiﬁer n-many drinks takes scope below the relative clause internal modal can.
(54) a. No linguist would read the many books Gina will need for vet school. (need
  many)
b. Mary shouldn’t even have the few drinks that she can take. (can   few)
In the evidence so far, the relationship between the relative clause internal
trace position and the external head is alike to that between head and trace in an
A-chain: While there is usually no reconstruction and hence no Condition C eﬀects,
binding and scope can force reconstruction. By contrast, the relationship between the
relative clause operator and the trace position is exactly like that in a wh-movement
chain. Not only the locality restrictions and weak crossover point in this direction,
but the A-bar nature of the relative clause internal movement can also be shown using
Condition C as a test. As Saﬁr (1998) observes, lexical material that is pied-piped
by the movement of the relative clause operator behaves exactly like lexical material
in wh-chains with respect to Condition C. (55) shows the contrast between material
pied-piped with the relative clause operator and the external head. The pronoun he,
which c-commands the relative clause internal trace position, cannot be coreferent
with the R-expression John that is part of the material pied-piped with the operator
in (55a). In (55b), where the R-expression is part of the external head, on the other
hand, coreference is possible.
64(55) a. I ∗I respect any writer whose depiction of Johni hei’ll object to. (Saﬁr
1998:34a)
b. I respect any depiction of Johni hei’ll object to.
The pairs in (57) and (58) show that a familiar argument/adjunct contrast with
respect to the relative clause internal operator movement. No Condition C eﬀect is
found in (56a) and (57a), where the the R-expression is part of an adjoined modiﬁer
to the constituent moved in the relative clause. (56b) and (57b) show a Condition C
eﬀect just like (55a).
(56) a. There’s a singer whose picture in Johni’s oﬃce hei’s very proud of. (Saﬁr
1998:(34b))
b. T ∗There’s a singer whose picture of Johni’s oﬃce hei’s very proud of.
(57) a. Max is a prince Johni’s description of whom hei varies when spies are
around. (Saﬁr 1998:(34c))
b. M ∗Max is a prince whose description of John hei varies when spies are around.
The well-behaved nature of this chain internal to the relative clause, makes the rela-
tionship between the external head and the internal trace all the more interesting.
2.4.1 Two LF-Structures for Relative Clauses
What explains the diﬀerence between the examples with Condition C and those in-
volving binding, idioms and scope? The explanation, I pursue is based on the idea of
65Carlson (1977) that relative clauses are structurally ambiguous at LF. I’ll ﬁrst con-
sider only the LF-structures. Following Carlson (1977), I call the two LF-structures
for relative clauses the matching analysis (Lees 1960, 1961, Chomsky 1965) and the
raising analysis (Schachter 1973, Vergnaud 1974). The diﬀerences between the two
LF-structures and the main prediction of Carlson’s ambiguity view—that Condition
C reemerges when the raising analysis is forced—are spelled out in this section. In
the section 2.4.2, I then look at the matching analysis in more detail and show how
the derivation of the two LF-structures could be uniﬁed. The details of the semantic
procedures that interpret the structures proposed in this section are left to chapter 5.
The two structures are sketched in (58) for an example that forces the match-
ing analysis and in (59) for and example that forces the raising analysis. On the
matching structure in (58b) and (59b), the external head and the internal trace are
I assume not related via movement. Therefore, the external head is represented in
the relative clause external position at LF, but at least not literally in the relative
clause internal position. In (58b) and (59b), none of the lexical material of the ex-
ternal head is represented in the relative clause internal position. Notice that to
capture the Condition C evidence, the structures in (58b) and (59b) represent only
one possibility. In section 2.4.2, I present an argument that the relative clause ex-
ternal head is represented in some sense in the relative clause internal trace position
on the matching analysis, and revise the matching structures accordingly. As shown
in (58b), the matching structure assumed here is predicted to obviate Condition C.
On the other hand, the position of the external head at LF in (59b) rules out the
matching structure in case it contains a variable bound by a quantiﬁer inside the
66relative clause (unless we assume that the quantiﬁer can move to a position outside
of the relative clause). Similarly, the matching analysis is ruled out in the examples
(53) with idioms and (54) with scope.
(58) a. the picture of Johni hei likes
b. the
head
      
picture of Johni

λx hei likes [x] (matching)
c. t ∗the

picture of John λx hei likes [x,
head
      
picture of Johni] (raising)
(59) a. the picture of himselfi everybodyi likes
b. t ∗the
head
      
picture of himselfi

λx everybody likes [x] (matching)
c. the

λx everybodyi likes [x,
head
      
picture of himselfi] (raising)
The raising analysis is sketched in (58c) and (59c). Here, I assume that the relation
between the internal trace position and the external head is one of movement. There-
fore, the R-expression John must be represented in the trace position in (58c), just
like in the case of wh-movement. Hence, (58c) violates Condition C. On the other
hand, it is possible to delete all but the lowest copy of the NP-part of this chain as
in (59c), and therefore it’s possible to completely delete any relative clause external
appearance of the relative clause head. This is in fact required for binding in (59c),
as well as for idiom interpretation in examples like (53) and for narrow scope as in
the examples in (54).
As shown by (58), Condition C can be used to enforce the matching analysis of
67a relative clause, while (59) shows that variable binding enforces the raising analysis
of a relative clause. By the same logic as that of (59), idiom interpretations and
scope can also be used to ensure that the raising analysis is forced. The ambiguity
analysis immediately makes one prediction, namely that factors forcing one analysis
are incompatible with factors forcing the other, and raises one question, namely which
of the two analyses is chosen when none of the factors seen to choose one analysis is
at work. I address the question ﬁrst, and then demonstrate the prediction.
The question is which analysis of a relative clause is chosen if none of the
factors mentioned determines the analysis. Part of the answer can be found in the
previous work on relatives (Carlson 1977, Heim 1987, Grosu and Landman 1998),
who argue that there is a diﬀerence in interpretation between the two analysis. For
the raising analysis at least four diﬀerent interpretations should be entertained: an
amount reading (Carlson 1977, Heim 1987, Grosu and Landman 1998) as in (60a), a
multiple individual reading (Geach 1964, Sharvit 1996a, Sharvit 1996b) as in (60b),
a possibility modal reading (Hackl and Nissenbaum 1998) as in (60c), and maybe
also a kind reading in (60d) similar to the one Heim (1987:27–33) observes for what-
questions. The cases of raising relatives noted above can be subsumed under these
four types, namely the idiom cases seem to have either an amount reading as argued
by Carlson (1977) or a kind reading, the binding cases clearly have the multiple
individual reading, and the scope cases all have an amount reading.
(60) a. It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne they spilled
that evening. (Heim 1987:(40))
68b. The woman every man invited is waiting in the lobby.
c. Sabine has come up with many problems for us to work on. (Hackl and
Nissenbaum 1998:(1))
d. The beer that there was for sale was too expensive for John.
The availability of the four diﬀerent readings seems to be subject to a number of
diﬀerent constraints: for example, the amount reading and the possibility reading are
only available with certain determiners, and the multiple individual reading is most
easily possible for the argument of a copular construction. However, in general the
restrictions on the four readings are only incompletely understood. Unfortunately, the
detailed investigation of the semantics of the diﬀerent readings and the restrictions on
them are beyond the scope of the current investigation (see chapter 5). Despite this
lack of precise understanding, I think it’s safe to proceed with the assumption that
the raising structure is only chosen in cases with one the above four interpretations.
Speciﬁcally, I assume that the raising analysis is only chosen if the NP-part must be
deleted in all positions but the relative clause internal trace position. As shown in
section 2.4.2, this allows a fairly uniform derivation of both the matching and raising
structures. This is obviously required if it NP-part contains a variable that is only
bound in this position, or if it’s an idiom chunk that can only be interpreted in this
position, or if it takes scope below another relative clause internal quantiﬁer. For the
cases in the category kind relative, I suggest that they involve some form of binding
as well, for example of an event argument.
69The remainder of this section demonstrates two predictions of the analysis of
relative clauses pursued here. First, consider the prediction mentioned above: The
analysis of relative clauses as structurally ambiguous pursued here makes the clear
prediction that the factors forcing one analysis are incompatible with those forcing
the other analysis. The one factor that, on this account, deﬁnitely forces the matching
analysis is obviation of Condition C. In the following examples we see that in all the
constructions that motivated the raising analysis, Condition C cannot be obviated.
First consider variable binding in (61) and (62). In both (61a) and (62a), the pronoun
her is interpreted as a variable bound by a quantiﬁer in the relative clause.14 As
discussed above, this forces the raising analysis and therefore the Condition C eﬀects
observed in (61a) and (62a) between the R-expression John in the external head and
the pronoun that c-commands the relative clause internal trace position conﬁrm the
analysis.15
14Schachter (1973:32) discusses the examples in (ia) and (iia), where a Condition C eﬀect is
observed. These might fall into place here under the assumption that nouns like opinion and portrait
have an implicit subject argument that in (ia) and (iia) is bound from a relative clause internal
position (Jackendoﬀ 1972).The examples in (ib) and (iib), which don’t show a Condition C eﬀect,
don’t have this confound.
(i) a. T ∗The (proj) opinion of Johni that hei thinks that Maryj has is unfavorable. (Schachter
1973:(41b))
b. The opinion of Johni that hei thinks that Maryj has refute is described in hisi letter to
her.
(ii) a. T ∗The (proi) portrait of Johni that hei painted is extremely ﬂattering. (Schachter
1973:(42b))
b. The (proj) portrait of Johni that hei ordered two years ago was ﬁnally delivered.
15The contrast between (62a) and (i) is unexpected so far. It indicates that even when the external
head must stand in a movement relationship with an intermediate position of the relative clause
internal chain, it can nevertheless stand in the more indirect matching relationship with the lowest
trace of the same chain. This might indicate that, in fact, not only the relationship of the lowest
trace to the external head, but in fact every link of the relative clause internal chain is ambiguous
between a raising and matching analysis.
(i) A ?A review of Johni’s debate with herj that every senatorj wanted himi to read landed in the
garbage instead.
70(61) a. T ∗The letters by Johnj to heri that hej told every girli to burn were published.
b. The letter by himj to heri that Johnj told every girli to burn were published.
(62) a. A ∗A review of Johni’s debate with herj that hei wanted every senatorj to read
landed in the garbage instead.
b. A review of hisi’s debate with herj that Johni wanted every senatorj to read
landed in the garbage instead.
The use of idioms is another way to enforce the raising analysis. As Munn
(1994) already observes, the prediction that Condition C eﬀects reemerge is conﬁrmed
as shown by the pairs in (63) and (64).
(63) a. t ∗the picture of Billi that hei took (Munn 1994:(15c))
b. the picture of himselfi that Billi took
(64) a. T ∗The headway on Mary’s project she had made pleased the boss. (Nis-
senbaum, p.c.)
b. The headway on her project Mary had made pleased the boss.
Also, narrow scope of many in (65a) and few in (65b) seems to cause a Condition C
eﬀect in the expected fashion.
(65) a. T ∗The many books for Ginai’s vet school that shei needs will be expensive.
(need   many)
71b. T ∗The few coins from Billi’s pocket hei could spare weren’t enough for all the
needy. (could   few)
In fact, a Condition C eﬀect is found also with other amount readings, as expected. In
(66), the amount reading is forced because the relative clause internal trace occurs in
a there-existential construction (Carlson 1977). This, as proposed by Carlson (1977)
and above, forces the raising analysis, and therefore the Condition C eﬀect in (66a)
is expected.
(66) a. I ∗It would have taken us all year to read the letters for Johnj hej expected
there would be.
b. It would have taken us all year to read the letters for himj Johnj expected
there would be.
The second prediction of the analysis of relative clauses is more intricate. It is
made by the position of the lexical material of the head at LF in the raising analysis.
What we saw just now, is that the lexical material of the head occupies a raising
relative clause internal position, and triggers a Condition C eﬀect there. In section
2.1 above, I showed for examples like (13b), which is repeated in (67a), that the head
of the relative clause can occupy a position outside of the relative clause and trigger
a Condition C eﬀect there. The LF-representation in (67b), which was argued for
above, can obviously only hold for matching relatives. I therefore predict that raising
relatives will not show the Condition C eﬀect noticed in (67a).
72(67) a. I ∗In the end, I did ask himi to teach the book of Davidi’s that Irene wanted
me to  ask him to teach .
b.
 
∗
 
t h eb o o ko fD a v i d i’s [λy Irene wanted me to ask himi to teach the [y,b o o k
of Davidi’s]]
 
λx I asked himi to teach the [x,b o o ko fD a v i d i’s]
To verify the prediction, we need to look at examples where covert movement of the
DP containing the relative clause is forced by ACD, as it is in (67a), but where the
head of the relative clause must occupy a relative clause internal position at LF.16
The examples in (68a) and (69a) demonstrate that the prediction is correct. Both
contrast with (68b) and (69b), where there is no ACD to block binding reconstruction
of the relative clause. They also contrast with (68c) and (69c), where there is ACD,
16Wold (1995:26) shows that sometimes ACD is incompatible with binding reconstruction into the
relative clause, as for example in (ib) and in (iib), where the judgment is actually stronger as Danny
Fox (p.c.) observes.
(i) a. Sue likes every picture of himselfi that Johni painted.
b. S ∗Sue likes every picture of himselfi that Johni does.
(ii) a. Sue likes every picture of himselfi that every boyi painted.
b. S ∗Sue likes every picture of himselfi that every boyi does.
Wold’s (1995) eﬀect can be explained by the lack of identity between the elided VP and its antecedent
in the LF-representation (iva) of (iib). For the test in the text, however, we can circumvent it, because
Danny Fox (p.c.) also shows that Wold’s (1995) eﬀect isn’t found if there is a relative clause internal
trace position outside of the elided VP, where the variable binding can be satisﬁed as in (iii). The
LF-structure of (iii) is shown in (ivb). The examples in the text have an intermediate position just
like (iii). Notice, however, that this analysis conﬂicts with the main proposal of section 2.4.2 in an
interesting way.
(iii) Sue likes every picture of himselfi that every boyi hoped she would.
(iv) a. [ ∗[every λx every boyi likes [x, picture of himselfi]
      
elided VP
] λy Sue likes [y]
      
antecedent
b.
 
every λx every boyi hoped [x, picture of himselfi] λz Sue would like [z]
      
elided VP
 
λy Sue liked [y]
      
antecedent
73but the relative clause isn’t forced to have a raising analysis.17
(68) a. John asked himi for the pictures of herj mother meeting Clintoni every girlj
wanted him to  ask Clintoni for .
b. J ∗John asked himi for the pictures of herj mother meeting Clintoni every girlj
had published.
c. J ∗John asked himi for the picture of the woman meeting Clintoni every girlj
wanted him to  ask Clintoni for .
(69) a. The host introduced himi to the writers of herj replies to Casanovai every
girlj refused to  introduce himi to .
b. T ∗The host introduced himi to the writers of herj replies to Casanovai every
girlj had hired.
c. T ∗The host introduced himi to the writers of the letters to Casanovai every
girlj refused to  introduce himi to .
The LF-representation I propose for the example (68a) is sketched in (70), where
irrelevant details about the lowest relative internal trace position are omitted. Since
the head of the raising relative clause occupies a relative clause internal position, it
escapes Condition C for the same reason that material inside a raising relative was
found to do so earlier. Namely, ACD forces deletion of the copy of the relative clause
17The judgement in these cases is made easier, if they’re put in the context of a little story. For
(a), for example, the story might say that John is investigating girls whose mothers had aﬀairs with
Clinton. It’s known that Clinton maintains photographic records of his aﬀairs, and the girls each
would like to see some of the pictures of their mothers with Clinton from his archives, but are afraid
to ask him. Therefore, John asks Clinton for the pictures.
74in the QR-trace position, and therefore the R-expression occurs only in a position in
the head of the QR-chain in (70).
(70)
 
the [λx every girlj wanted him [x, pictures of herj mother meeting Clintoni]
to ask Clintoni for [x]
      
elided VP
 
λy John asked himi for [y]
      
antecedent
The case in (71) makes the same point as (68) and (69), but the raising analysis of
the relative clause is forced by enforcing an amount reading of the relative clause.
Again, ACD-resolution in (71a) obviates Condition C even when the R-expression
occurs outside of the relative clause on the surface.
(71) a. The company will send her to any fan clubs of Mary there are requesting
it  that the company send Mary to them 18.
b. T ∗The company will send her to any fan clubs of Mary there are.
2.4.2 The Internal Head of Matching Relatives
In this section, I look at the matching analysis of relative clauses in more detail. The
LF-representation of a matching relative clause assumed in (58b) above is repeated
in (72b). In this section, I argue that the representation is instead that in (72c),
where the internal position contains an elided NP the antecedent of which is the
external head. The argument in this section is based on data from Saﬁr (1998);
18Obviously the it in this case is not the usual VP-ellipsis of the textbook cases. However, as
David Pesetsky (p.c.) pointed out to me, such antecedent contained anaphora are expected to and
do indeed behave exactly like ACD.
75an additional argument for (72c) is given in section 3.1. Recall that also that the
discussion of example (13) lead us to propose the structure (17), which is essentially
like (72c). The proposal (72c) takes the term matching seriously: At some point of
the derivation the internal head must be (almost) identical to the external head. This
raises the question at what point of the derivation matching must be satisﬁed. I argue
that the point of the derivation where this matching requirement must be satisﬁed is
LF. As I show below, this assumption also allows us to (almost) reduce the raising
analysis to a special case of the matching analysis.
(72) a. the picture of Johni hei likes
b. the
head
      
picture of Johni

λx hei likes [x]
c. the
overt NP
      
picture of Johni

λx hei likes [x,
elided NP
      
picture of himi]
Consider ﬁrst what the absence of Condition C eﬀects tells us about the matching
analysis. As we saw already above (examples (55) to (57)), the trace position inside
the relative clause must at least contain a representation of the NP-part of the material
that is pied-piped with the relative clause operator. The question here is to what
extent the external head is represented in the trace position in a matching relative
clause. The fact that the external head triggers no Condition C eﬀects inside a
matching relative could be explained by various degrees of indirect representation,
for example the relationship between the pronoun and its antecedent in (73a) is
such that no Condition C eﬀect is obtained, or that between the elided VP and its
76antecedent in (73b).
(73) a. John drew a picture of Maryi, but shei didn’t like it  the picture of Maryi .
b. Mary loves Johni and hei thinks that Sally does  love Johni , too. (Fiengo
and May 1994:220)
To explain the latter observation, Fiengo and May (1994) propose that the identity
relationship between the elided VP and its antecedent is satiﬁed, even when an R-
expression in the antecedent corresponds to a coreferent pronoun in the elided VP
(see also sections 3.2 and 3.3 on the identity relationship). Fiengo and May (1994)
introduce the term Vehicle Change for such cases where exact identity of syntactic
form is violated. The structure (74) is the LF-representation Fiengo and May (1994)
propose for (73b). I adopt Fiengo and May’s (1994) proposal, as is already indicated
in the structure in (72c).
(74) Mary love Johni       
antecedent
and hei thinks that Sally loves himi       
elided VP
The argument I present for the claim that the internal trace contains an elided
representation of the external head is based on the observation of Saﬁr (1998:(35)) in
(75). In (75a), it’s impossible for the quantiﬁer anyone in the external head to bind
the pronoun he in the relative clause. In (75b), on the other hand, binding of him by
anyone is possible. As the similar contrast in (76) conﬁrms, the relevant diﬀerence
is whether the pronoun in the relative clause is c-commanded by the relative clause
internal trace.
77(75) a. P ∗Pictures of anyonei which hei/hisi mother displays prominently are likely
to be attractive ones.
b. Picture of anyonei that put himi/hisi mother in a good light are likely to
be attractive ones. (Saﬁr 1998:(35))
(76) a. M ∗Mary exhibited the picture of every boyi that hei/hisi sister brought.
b. Mary exhibited the picture of every boyi that was brought by himi/hisi
sister.
Since the quantiﬁer in all four examples in (75) and (76), doesn’t c-command the
pronoun it binds in the surface structure, all examples might be expected to be weak
crossover violations. But, at least since Gabbay and Moravscik (1974), Hintikka
(1974), Reinhart (1976), and May (1977:61-124), it’s known that DP-internal quanti-
ﬁers can bind a pronoun outside quite easily, as long as they take scope over it. This
is illustrated in (77). In fact, the status of (75b) and (76b) seems comparable to the
examples in (77). On an analysis, where the external head is not represented at all
in the relative clause internal position, however, (75a) and (76a) would incorrectly be
expected to be as good as the examples in (77), as well.
(77) a. One picture of everyonei is displayed by himi prominently.
b. Somebody from every cityi despises iti. (May 1985:68)
Saﬁr (1998) proposes that the bad examples of the contrasts in (75) and (76)
should receive the same explanation as the badness of the examples in (78), which
78display strong and weak crossover.
(78) a. H ∗Hei is displaying a picture of everyonei.
b. W ∗Which picture of everyonei is hei displaying?
c. H ??His mother is displaying a picture of everyonei.
d. W ??Which picture of everyonei is hisi mother displaying.
For a raising relative, of course, any account of (78) carries over to the cases
under discussion. However, there’s no evidence that Saﬁr’s examples must receive a
raising analysis. Moreover, the examples in (79) where the raising analysis is ruled
out by Condition C shows the same contrast as Saﬁr’s example.
(79) a. T ∗The Times will generally publish pictures of any womani visiting Clintonj
that hej told heri about.
b. The Times will generally publish picture of any womani visiting Clintonj
that hej thinks will oﬀend heri.
I believe that any account of Saﬁr’s discovery on the matching analysis has
to propose a representation of the external head in the internal position, but not
one related by movement to the external head. The particular version of this I
assume here is that the internal head contains a phonologically deleted version of the
external head. Implicit in this proposal is that the external head and the internal
head must match at the level of LF, and there only, since this is generally the case
for phonological deletion, for example in ACD. If we furthermore assume that the
79quantiﬁer in the external head undergoes quantiﬁer raising to position outside of the
DP, the LF-representation of (75) can be sketched as in (80), where I assume that
the anyone leaves the NP-part one in its trace position. In (80), the copy of [x, one]
in the relative clause internal trace is c-commanded by the pronoun hex. Therefore,
(80) is predicted to be a case of strong crossover.
(80) a ∗anyone λx
 
pictures of [x, one]
      
external head
[which picture of [x, one]
      
internal head
] λy hex displays
prominently [y, pictures of [x, one]]
      
internal trace
 
are likely to be attractive ones.
One more revision of the structure in (80) is required: Though the analysis
of (75) in (80) successfully predicts a strong crossover violation, it’s not generally
the case that an elided correspondent of a trace in the antecedent shows strong
crossover eﬀects, as shown by (81a) from Fiengo and May (1994:279). Assuming
exact identity of syntactic form between the elided VP and its antecedent, (81b) is
the LF-representation of (81a). To resolve ACD, the to-object of (81) must undergo
quantiﬁer raising to a position outside of the VP. But, since the direct object, every
guy, binds a varialbe in the relative clause adjoined to the to-object, it must undergo
quantiﬁer raising as well to a position where it c-commands the raised to-object.
But, then (81b) violates the strong crossover condition: The antecedent VP contains
a trace of quantiﬁer raising in the direct object position, and therefore the elided VP
in the relative clause does as well if we assume identity of syntactic form. This trace
in the elided VP, however, is c-commanded by a coreferent pronoun hex. Therefore,
(81b) violates strong crossover.
80(81) a. Mary introduced every guy to every woman he wanted her to  introduce
him to 
b. [ ∗[every guy] λx [every woman λz hex wanted her to introduce [x,g u y ]t o[ z, woman]
      
elided VP
]
λy Mary introduced [x,g u y ]t o[ y, woman]
      
antecedent
But, the obviation of strong crossover in (81a) is not surprising on a view where
strong crossover is reduced to Condition C, since Condition C violations disappear
under ellipsis as was shown by (73). Extending their notion of vehicle change, Fiengo
and May (1994) propose that a trace in the antecedent in the antecedent of VP-
ellipsis, just like an R-expression, can correspond to a pronoun in the elided material
(see also Merchant 1998b). Adopting this assumption, the LF representation of (81)
is given in (82), where the direct object in the ACD-relative clause is a pronoun. Since
pronouns are not subject to strong crossover, (82) doesn’t violate strong crossover.
(82) [every guy] λx [every woman λz hex wanted her to introduce himx to [z, woman]
      
elided VP
]
λy Mary introduced [x,g u y ]t o[ y, woman]
      
antecedent
Fiengo and May (1994) point out the contrast between (83a) and (81a), which
lends strong support to their account of (81a). It seems that in (83a) a strong crossover
eﬀect is maintained, though the potentially violating trace is also part of an elided
VP. As Fiengo and May (1994) argue, the apparent strong crossover eﬀect in (83a)
should be analyzed as a Condition B violation. Assuming that the correspondent of
the trace in the elided material is a pronoun, the LF-representation of (83a) in (83b)
81violates Condition B since the this pronoun himx is in the local domain of another
pronoun himx. In (82), on the other hand, the pronoun himx that corresponds to the
trace is far enough away from the other pronoun, such that Condition B is satisﬁed
in (82).19
(83) a. M ∗Mary introduced every guy to every woman she wanted him to  introduce
him to 
b. [ ∗[every guy] λx [every woman she wanted himx to introduce himx to] λy
Mary introduced [x,g u y ][ y, woman]
Condition B suﬃces to rule out Saﬁr’s example (75), which is repeated in (84a).
(84b) shows the LF-representation of (84a) assuming that the trace of quantiﬁer
raising of anyone in the elided occurence of the head is changed to a pronoun. This
pronoun is expected to violate Condition B, just like the pronoun in (85) which is
part of the fronted wh-phrase.
(84) a. P ∗Pictures of anyonei which hei/hisi mother displays prominently are likely
to be attractive ones.
19In other examples of strong crossover under ellipsis, like (ia) and (iia) it seems the eﬀect remains
even when the distance of the trace and the c-commanding pronoun is big enough to satisfy Condition
B. The illformedness of these examples is explained by the parallel dependencies condition (45) on
122 (see also Fox (1998c)).
(i) a. T ∗The mani whoi Mary said that she likes and whoi hei did  say that hei likes  too.
(Ristad 1990:144)
b. T ∗The mani whoi Mary said that Sue likes and whoi hei did  say that Sue likes  too.
82b. a ∗anyone λx
 
pictures of [x, one]
      
external head
[which picture of himx       
internal head
] λy hex displays
prominently [y, pictures of himx]
      
internal trace
 
are likely to be attractive ones.
(85) W ∗Which picture of himi does everyonei display prominently.
The explanation of Saﬁr’s observation (75) as a violation of Condition B,
makes new predictions concerning the locality of the the eﬀect. The prediction is
that the eﬀect should be obviated if more material intervenes between the trace in the
relative clause internal head and the pronoun that triggers the Condition B violation.
That this prediction is correct is evidenced by the contrasts in (86) and (87). (86a)
(repeated from (76a)) and (87a) display the same degree of illformedness as Saﬁr’s
observation. (86b) and (87b), where the quantiﬁer is embedded more deeply in the
relative clause head, however, are markedly better.
(86) a. M ∗Mary exhibited the picture of every boyi that hei bought.
b. Mary exhibited the picture of every boyi’s mother that hei bought.
(87) a. J ∗John bought a picture of every girli that shei chose.
b. John bought a picture of every girli’s father that shei chose.
The improvement exempliﬁed by (86b) and (87b) is predicted by my account of
Saﬁr’s observation. Because the quantiﬁer is more deeply embedded, the pronoun
corresponding to the trace inside the relative clause internal head is not in the local
domain of its antecedent, and therefore doesn’t violate Condition B. The contrast
83between (86a) and (86b) is hence analogous to that between (88a) and (88b).
(88) a. W ∗Which picture of himi did every boyi buy.
b. Which picture of hisi mother did every boyi buy.
As second way to increase the distance between the two positions that give
rise to a Condition B violation in Saﬁr’s example, is by making the relative clause
longer in the way shown in (89b) and (90b). In (89b) and (90b), however, if any, only
a very small improvement is found as compared to (89a) and (90a).
(89) a. M ∗Mary exhibited the picture of every boyi that hei bought.
b. M ∗?Mary exhibited the picture of every boyi that hei thought John bought.
(90) a. J ∗John bought a picture of every girli that shei chose.
b. J ∗?John bought a picture of every girli that shei thought he would choose.
But, the status of (89b) and (90b) should be measured against an example like (91b),
where Condition B in an intermediate position of a chain is at issue. Since (91b) seems
to be not fully grammatical, Conditon B seems to apply in intermediate positions of
a chain. But, if this is the case, (89b) and (90b) are expected to ungrammatical as
well.
(91) a. Which picture of herselfi does every girli believe Bob likes?
b. W ∗?Which picture of heri does every girli believe Bob likes?
84The correlation between Condition B eﬀects and Saﬁr’s observation conﬁrms
the account of the latter proposed above. Therefore the strong crossover case of (75)
supports a version of the matching proposal where the internal trace is identical to
the external head modulo vehicle change. Since the weak crossover case of (75) relates
to the unsolved problem of why no weak crossover is found in cases like (77), which
I also have no solution for, I leave this matter open. Together with the arguments in
section 3.1 and that surrounding the structure (17), I believe to have given conclusive
evidence for a representation of the external head internal to a matching relative
clause.
The next argument concerns the question where matching of the internal and
external head applies in matching relatives. The belief expressed above, that the rela-
tionship between the two NPs is that of an elided NP and its antecedent presupposes
that matching is veriﬁed at LF. And the evidence given above for the eﬀects of vehi-
cle change in matching relatives already lend strong support to this conclusion. The
following argument provides further evidence that matching applies at LF. Consider
(92), which is repeated from (34) above. I argued that, at LF, the NP-part paper of
hisk of the wh-phrase is represented in the trace position ti, while the relative clause
that Maryj was given is represented at LF in its surface position. The LF-structure
of (92) is shown (93).
(92) [Which paper of hisk that Maryj was given]i did shej tell every studentk to
revise ti?
85(93)
 
Which [λz Maryj was given [z]]
 
λx did shej tell every studenti to revise [x,
paper of hisi]?
Notice that the LF-structure in (93) satisﬁes matching since both, the internal and
the external head, are empty. If, however, matching was applying before the higher
copy of paper of hisk is deleted, the relative clause in (92) would be expected to
contain a copy of it, and speciﬁcally the bound variable pronoun hisk. This pronoun,
however, would not be in the scope of its binder in the LF-representation of (92).
Hence, matching must apply in (92) after the overt copy of paper of his has been
deleted.
At this point, the raising analysis proposed above can be analyzed as special
case of the matching analysis with one remaining phonological stipulation. Speciﬁ-
cally, the argument that the matching applies at LF and that matching is satisﬁed in
case both NP-parts are empty as in (92) suggests that this is the case in the raising
analysis as well. Consider again the matching and raising structures in (94) (repeated
with modiﬁcations from (59)). Empty NPs are indicated in (94c) by empty brackets
[]. Both the external head position and the complement of the relative clause oper-
ator could be occupied by an empty NP, and therefore the structure (94c) satisﬁes
matching.
(94) a. the picture everybody likes
b. the
head
      
picture

which
elided NP
      
picture λx everybody likes [x, picture] (matching)
86c. the []

which [] λx everybody likes [x,
head
      
picture] (raising)
Since the relative clause operator is related to the trace position by movement, the
structure of (94c) before LF-deletion applies must be that in (95). This structure, does
however, not directly reﬂect the facts of English pronounciation: in raising relatives
the head is pronounced in front of the relative clause operator, just like in matching
relatives. For matching relatives, I have already assumed a pronounciation rule that
bans pronounciation of the internal head. To get the pronounciation of (95) right,
I suggest that just in case the external head is empty, the internal head is actually
pronounced, namely in the position of the external head. This is clearly a stipulation,
but at this point it seems to be the best I can do.
(95) the []

which picture λx everybody likes [x, picture]
The assumption that raising relatives are a special case of matching relatives
provides a straightforward explanation for the restricted occurence of raising relatives
noted in the discussion of (60). Recall from section 2.2 that the lexical material of the
top copy of a wh-chain can only be deleted if this is required for the interpretation
of a bound variable, that is not bound in this high position. If this generalization
applies to relative clauses as well (and also encompasses the cases of narrow scope
in (54)), it predicts that the copy of the internal head in the position of the relative
clause operator can only be deleted if it contains a variable that is bound internal to
the relative clause. Furthermore, if the copy of the internal in the operator position
87doesn’t delete, matching requires the external head to be non-empty as well. There-
fore, the external head can only be empty, if the internal head contains a variable
that’s bound internal to the relative clause. This explains that the raising analysis
of relative clauses is restricted to cases with a ‘special’ interpretation in (60)—only
the special interpretation requires that the internal head be deleted in the operator
position.
To conclude this section, let me summarize the main points concerning rel-
ative clauses. Based on the contrasting behavior with respect to Condition C and
other tests for Binding Reconstruction, I concluded that there are two possible LF-
structures for relative clauses: a raising and a matching structure. Of these, I claimed
the raising analysis to always be associated with a ‘special interpretation’ as exempli-
ﬁed by (60), whereas the matching analysis I claimed to be the default. Furthermore,
I concluded that the relative clause internal trace of a raising relative forms a chain
with the external head, whereas on the matching analysis the internal head consists
of its own lexical material, but must be phonologically deleted under identity with
the external head.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, I argued for four main generalizations about which material of a
moved DP seems to enter binding theory in the trace position. The discussion above
has shown that it’s useful to distinguish three types of parts of a moved DP, the
determiner D, the NP-part, which is the lowest NP-projection (excluding all adjuncts)
88of the complement of D, and relative clauses and other modiﬁers adjoined to the NP-
part. For the concise statement of the generalizations, I use the term segment to refer
to either the NP-part or any modiﬁer of a DP. The terminilogy is exempliﬁed in (96).
(96) which
      
Det.
argument of John’s
      
NP-part
that Mary had criticized
      
modiﬁer
      
segments
The generalizations can be stated as in (97), as conditions governing when deletion
applies to a copy of the NP-part or a Modiﬁer in a chain. The way the generalizations
are stated in (97) reﬂects a hierarchy between them with (97a) being the highest
ranked. Generalizations lower in rank, are only fulﬁlled up to the an extent such that
the higher ranked generalizations are fulﬁlled.
(97) a. Recoverability: At least one copy of every segment of the restrictor must
remain represented.
b. Binding: Any occurence of a segment that contains a bound pronoun that
isn’t c-commanded by its antecedent must be deleted.
c. A-bar: The lowest position of an A-bar chain must contain a copy of the
NP-part.
d. ACD: If material inside a modiﬁer is anaphorically related to the con-
stituent surrounding an occurence of this modiﬁer, this occurence of this
modiﬁer must be deleted.
e. Lebeaux’s Generalization: Copies of a segment in positions lower than
the copy that is pronounced may be deleted (in a particular order).
89f. Economy of Deletion: Segments must not be deleted.
Of the six generalizations, (97b) to (97e) have been argued for in detail above,
while (97a) and (97f) have been more or less presupposed as background assumptions.
Both (97a) and (97f) play an important role in the account. (97f) is, for example,
responsible for the fact that quantiﬁer raising doesn’t obviate Condition C in exam-
ples like (98a) (repeated from (9)), where ACD isn’t involved. If it was possible to
delete the lower copy of the relative clause modiﬁer in the LF-representation in (98b),
Condition C should be obviated by quantiﬁer raising in (98a), contrary to fact.
(98) a. S ∗Someone introduced himi to everyone Johni wanted you to dance with.
b.
 
∗
 
everyone [λy J.i wanted you to dance with [y]]
 
λx someone introduced himi to [x,[ λy J.i wanted you to dance with [y]]]
The Recoverability constraint (97a) is required for examples like (99). Since the
every copy of the modiﬁer who knows heri in (99) will contain a bound pronoun that
isn’t c-commanded by its antecedent, (97b) would force deletion of all copies of this
modiﬁer. This would incorrectly predict that (99) should be grammatical, namely
with the same interpretation as the sentence The boy thinks that every girl is singing.
(97a) blocks deletion of all copies of the relative clause in the LF-representation of
(99) and therefore (99) is correctly predicted to be ungrammatical.
(99) T ∗The boy who knows heri thinks that every girli is singing.
90Of the four main generalizations (99b) to (97e), I assume (99b) and (99c)
throughout in the form stated. Of course, it would be desirable to derive them from
other principles, but at this point such a step seems premature. (97e), I assume
involves seemingly countercyclic adjunction because of the discussion of example (37)
above. (99d), ﬁnally, has curious nature since it seems to involve look-ahead to
interpretation in form of the licensing of ACD. Alternatively, (99d) might be a deletion
rule that always applies in the case of an VP-deletion dependency where the elided VP
is contained in the antecedent it depends. Then, (99d) would require no lookahead,
but the dependency of the two VPs would need to be formally represented. At the
end of section 3.2, I present one argument for the latter view of (99d).
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Identity of Traces
Certain constructions impose an identity (or parallelism) requirement on two con-
stituents. If these constituents contain traces, we can ask the question under what
conditions two traces are identical. This chapter argues that two traces are identical
in the relevant sense if the lexical content represented in the trace positions is the
same. Therefore, this result provides independent support for the claim of the previ-
ous chapter that the lexical content of a moved phrase is partially represented at LF
in the bottom position of a chain. More precisely, I show a perfect correspondence;
namely, the same parts of the moved phrase are represented in the trace position for
the concerns of Binding Theory (previous chapter) and the concerns of the Identity
Condition (this chapter). In section 3.2, I argue for the stronger claim that the lexi-
cal material in the trace position is not only represented there, but interpreted in the
trace position.
A major part of this chapter concerns the analysis of a restriction on ACD
that was ﬁrst studied in detail by Kennedy (1994). The restriction is demonstrated
93in (1a), where ACD is blocked. The contrast between (1a) with ellipsis and (1b)
without ellipsis shows that the ungrammaticality of (1a) is due to a restriction on
VP-ellipsis.
(1) a. P ∗Polly visited every town in every country Eric did  visit .
b. Polly visited every town in every country Eric visited
c. Polly visited every town Eric did.
Kennedy’s puzzle is then to explain why ACD is possible in (1c), but not in (1a).
Descriptively, the diﬀerence between (1a) and (1c) is the following: In (1c), the ACD-
relative clause is attached directly to the NP that will undergo quantiﬁer movement
for the resolution of ACD. In (1a), on the other hand, the ACD-relative clause is
attached to an argument of this NP. In fact, it’s marginally possible in (1a) (and
much easier with an overt complementizer that in the relative clause) to attach the
relative clause to the higher noun town, in which case ACD is grammatical.
Since I keep referring back to the same example for most of this chapter, it’s
more convenient to talk about the contrast in (2) instead of (1). For (1), the natural
reading is one where every country takes scope over every town. But, this scope shift
is irrelevant for the discussion, and would make the LF-representations more complex
than needed. Therefore, I talk about example (2a), where the scope shift is not
needed. In (2a) the judgment is more subtle than in (1a), since (2a) is grammatical
on a reading of the elided VP clause as visited every town in t, which is more marginal
in (1a). The fact to explain though is that both (1a) and (2a) don’t have the reading
94of the elided VP as only visited.
(2) a. P ∗Polly visited every town in a country Eric did  visit .
b. Polly visited every town Eric did  visit .
Assuming that traces are interpreted as variables, (3) shows the LF representations for
(2a) in (3a) and for (2b) in (3b). In both cases, the quantiﬁer every town has moved
to resolve ACD. As a result of this movement, the elided VP and the antecedent are
identical in both (3a) and (3b). As I argue now, assuming the representations in (3)
would make it impossible to account for (2) in a principled way—not surprisingly so,
since the VPs in (3a) and (3b) are the same.
(3) a. ∗

[every town, in a country

Opy Eric
elided VP       
visited [y]] λx Polly
antecedent       
visited [x]
b.

[every town,

Opy Eric
elided VP       
visited [y]] λx Polly
antecedent       
visited [x]
Kennedy (1994) showed that the explanation of (2) must be a constraint on ellipsis,
as mentioned above. The only constraint on ellipsis usually assumed is an identity
(or parallelism) condition that the elided VP and its antecedent must satisfy, where
I for now assume an intuitive concept of identity that is sharpened in sections 3.2
and 3.3 (In the end, the condition I assume is very similar to that of Rooth (1992b).)
The only place where a diﬀerence could be made between the two VPs in (3b) are
the traces. Therefore, I assume that (3) is evidence for a condition on the identity of
traces that distinguishes (2a) from (2b). This assumption underlies all approaches to
95Kennedy’s puzzle I know of, namely those of Kennedy (1994) and Heim (1997a) and
the one developed.
The question where the approaches disagree is: What makes the traces in
(3a) diﬀerent, whereas those in (3b) are identical? Sag (1976:66,103) ﬁrst suggested
that traces are only identical for the purposes of VP-ellipsis if their binders are the
same. Sag also develops a particular way to implement this suggestion, namely via
two restrictions that apply to the indices conventionally used to mark relations of
dependence: First, diﬀerent dependencies, even when they don’t overlap, must use
diﬀerent indices, and, second, an elided VP is only identical to its antecedent if the
indices on all unbound traces (and other variables) are the same. If relative clause
internal traces are viewed as bound by the DP the relative clause is attached to,
these considerations yield the LF-representations sketched in (4), where crucially the
indices of the traces in (4b) are identical, but not in (4a). Both Kennedy (1994) and
Heim (1997a) develop Sag’s idea and apply it to cases like (2). I call Sag’s approach
as well as its descendants the index identity approach.
(4) a. ∗

[every town, in a country

Opy Eric
elided VP       
visited [y]] λx Polly
 = antecedent
      
visited [x]
b.

[every town,

Opx Eric
elided VP       
visited [x]] λx Polly
antecedent       
visited [x]
The reason I think Sag’s index identity is not the right approach to Kennedy’s puzzle
(2) are contrasts like (5). Both examples in (5) have the same structure. The only
diﬀerence between (5a) and (5b) is the head of the relative clause. Since this diﬀer-
96ence isn’t expected to aﬀect the indexation possibilities, the index identity approach
predicts (5a) and (5b) to have the same status; namely, both should be ungrammat-
ical. This prediction is wrong: (5a) is clearly better than (5b). Sections 3.1 and
3.2 contain numerous contrasts like (5) which make sure that (5) is representative
of a real generalization. The failure of the index identity approach to account for
this generalization leads me to reject it and to pursue an alternative approach to
Kennedy’s puzzle. It should say, though, that while I reject index identity as an
approach to Kennedy’s puzzle, this doesn’t justify provide an argument against the
index identity condition per se, but only against an account of Kennedy’s puzzle (2)
based on the index identity condition. In fact, I present empirical support for the
index identity requirement in section 4.1 and discuss in section 4.2 which assumption
of the index identity approach should be given up. Since I present Heim’s (1997a)
version of the index identity approach there in more detail and my approach is based
on quite diﬀerent assumptions, I don’t discuss it any further in this chapter.
(5) a. Polly visited every town that’s near the one Eric did  visit .
b. P ∗Polly visited every town that’s near the lake Eric did  visit .
The contrast in (5) shows that lexical properties of the antecedents of the
traces aﬀect the acceptability of examples with the structure of Kennedy’s puzzle.
My approach to Kennedy’s puzzle is inspired by the idea of Chomsky (1993) that the
trace positions contain copies of the lexical material of their antecedents, which was
also discussed in the previous chapter. Hence, I call this approach the Copy Identity
97Approach. Consider the sketched representations for (2) in (6). In (6), I repeated the
head noun of the antecedent in the trace positions. In the sketch (6a) for the bad
example, (2a), the antecedent is diﬀerent from the elided VP. In (6b), on the other
hand, the antecedent and the elided VP are identical.
(6) a. ∗

[every town, in a country

Op Eric
elided VP       
visited country] Polly
 = antecedent
      
visited town
b.

[every town,

Op Eric
elided VP       
visited town] λx Polly
antecedent       
visited town
I claim that the lexical material in the trace positions in the way captured by (6) is the
right explanation of Kennedy’s puzzle. This copy identity approach is developed in
section 3.1. It is shown, in particular, that the copy identity approach directly predicts
the contrast in (5) and similar such contrast. Another point, section 3.1 discusses
that relationship of the copy identity approach to the Condition C evidence discussed
in chapter 2. Notice that in (6) only parts of the moved phrases are represented in the
trace positions. Section 3.1 shows that the copy identity approach and Condition C
converge on the same conclusion as to which parts of a moved phrase are represented
in the trace position.
Section 3.2 makes a new argument concerning the lexical material represented
in the trace position, that goes beyond what could be tested using Condition C in
chapter 2. It argues that the lexical content of the trace position is not only formally
represented there, but contributes to interpretation in the trace position. I argue for
this based on the observation that the acceptability of examples that test the identity
98of traces depends on the semantic relationship of the lexical content of the traces, as
well as on general grounds.
Section 3.3 considers facts like (7) where no eﬀect of the copy identity is
observed, thought the elided VP and its antecedent contain traces with diﬀerent
lexical content. I show that two mechanisms can circumvent the eﬀect of the copy
identity requirement: focus percolation into the trace position and a kind of sloppy
reading. The former, I argue in section 3.3.2, applies to example (7a), while the latter
applies to (7b) as shown in section 3.3.3.
(7) a. I know which cities Mary visited, but I have no idea which lakes she did
 visit . (= (71a))
b. The cities Mary visited are near the lakes Bill did  visit . (= (71b))
3.1 A Copy Identity Account of Kennedy’s Puzzle
This section begins to develop an account of Kennedy’s observation (2) based on
the view that lexical material of the head of a chain is partially represented in the
bottom position of the chain. One of the conclusions of the previous chapter was
that A-bar traces of a DP always contain the lexical content of the NP-part of the
moved DP. (Recall, that I deﬁned NP-part a st h eN Pt h a ti st h es i s t e ro ft h eD - h e a d
of the DP minus all adjoined modiﬁers). In ACD-constructions, speciﬁcally, section
2.1 argued based on Condition C that exactly the NP-part is represented in the trace
position, whereas all the quantiﬁer and the ACD-relative are represented only in
the top position of the QR-chain. Furthermore, the analysis of matching relatives
99of section 2.4 argued that the relative clause contains an unpronounced copy of the
external head of the relative clause. If this is true of the ungrammatical example from
(2), repeated as (8a), the LF-representation must be (8b), which essentially the same
as (6a). The elided VP and its antecedent diﬀer in (8b) with respect to the lexical
material that appears in the trace position. My proposal is that this diﬀerence blocks
VP-ellipsis in (8a).
(8) a. P ∗Polly visited every town in a [country Eric did  visit ].
b. [ ∗[every town in a [country, Opy Eric visited [y, country]
      
elided VP
]]
λx [Polly visited [x,t o w n ]
      
 = antecedent
]
Compare (8) with the grammatical example of (2), which is repeated in (9a): The
lexical content of the two traces, the one in the elided VP and the one in the an-
tecedent, is identical, namely [x, town]. This is shown by the LF-representation in
(9b).
(9) a. Polly visited every town Eric did.
b. every [Opy Eric visited [y,t o w n ]
      
elided VP
][ λx Polly visited [x,t o w n ]
      
antecedent
]
In both (8b) and (9b) the names of the variables, x and y, inside the traces diﬀer
between antecedent and elided VP. For now, assume that the names of variables are
ignored by the identity condition. In section 4.1, I argue contrary that this assumption
is in general wrong, but in section 4.2, I argue that in examples like (8b) and (9b)
the identity requirement for variable names can be circumvented. For the moment,
100it’s easiest to assume that variable names generally don’t matter.
Now, consider one prediction of the copy identity approach already hinted at
in the introduction with (5). This prediction is that if the antecedents of two traces
have the same NP-parts, the traces should be considered identical even if the two
operators binding the traces are diﬀerent. Consequently, ACD should be possible.
The contrast in (10) shows that this prediction is correct. (10b) is basically the same
as Kennedy’s example (8a). In (10a), however, the NP to which the relative clause
is attached to and the NP-part of the object quantiﬁer are lexically identical. If the
second occurrence of town is destressed in (10a), the example is fully acceptable.1
(10) a. John visited every town near a town Mary did  visit .
b. J ∗John visited every town near a lake Mary did  visit .
The LF-representation for (10a) is shown in (11). The trace-positions in the elided
VP in the relative clause and the trace of quantiﬁer raising in the antecedent both
have town as its lexical content, and therefore the elided VP and its antecedent mean
1Some English speakers don’t ﬁnd the improvement in (10a) very strong, but everybody I con-
sulted with found a strong contrast in the examples with one-anaphora below. I assume that speakers
who ﬁnd (10a) unacceptable diﬀer from those who do in whether they ﬁnd it natural to destress the
second occurrence of town.
The destressing requirement is probably due to contribution stress would make to the meaning
in this construction. Consider (i), where also a repeated occurrence of the noun book is stressed:
The stress indicates a contrast between the book John read and the book Mary read, with respect
to their ‘bookness’. In eﬀect, (i) entails that what John read wasn’t really a book. Therefore, I
assume the two nouns book in (i), despite having similar phonology, diﬀer in the sense relevant for
the identity condition on traces. The destressing requirement argues therefore that the identity
required isn’t identity of lexical form, but identity of meaning. Section 3.2 presents more arguments
for this conclusion.
(i) John read a book and Mary a BOOK.
101the same.2
(11)
 
every town near a [town, Opy Mary visited [y,t o w n ]
      
elided VP
]
 
λx John visited [x,t o w n ]
      
antecedent
It’s important to go through the argument that (10) makes to see that it’s
independent support for the result of the previous chapter: (10) shows that for the
well-formedness of ACD the head nouns of the antecedents of the two traces involved
must be identical, namely of the trace of QR and of the trace internal to the relative
clause. Why would there be such a requirement? As already mentioned in the
introduction, it’s established that an elided VP must be identical to its antecedent.
Therefore, I conclude that the head nouns are represented in the elided VP and its
antecedent, respectively. The only part of the two VPs related to the head nouns
are the traces. Hence, it’s natural to assume that, if anywhere, the head nouns are
represented in the trace positions. Therefore, (10) argues that the head noun of a
2The copy identity approach shares the prediction (10) with—at least a benevolent interpretation
of—a proposal of Lappin (1984). Lappin proposes, in eﬀect, that two traces or pronouns are identical
if they can be naturally interpreted as having the same intended range of possible values. (Lappin
1984:(10)) He, however, doesn’t discuss contrasts like (10) and his proposal is too vague to be sure
of this prediction. There are other diﬀerences between the copy identity approach I’m developing
and Lappin’s proposal. For one, Lappin doesn’t derive the identity condition from properties of the
semantic representation in the it’s done here, but suggests that the condition is pragmatic which,
as far as I can see, he presents no motivation for. Secondly, Lappin’s condition applies to all traces
and bound pronouns, which isn’t true of the copy identity approach pursued here as discussed in
section 3.3. The examples in (ib) and (iib) show that this aspect of Lappin’s (1984) proposal makes
wrong predictions (see also Fiengo and May 1994).
(i) a. Here is the man who Bill saw, and here is the man who he didn’t  see . (Lappin
1984:(21b))
b. Here is the man who Bill saw, and here is the woman who he did  see .
(ii) a. [Every friend of John’s]i wants Mary to kiss himi, but [none of the little fellows]j believes
that she will  kiss himj  (Lappin 1984:(10))
b. [Every friend of John’s]i wants Mary to kiss himi, while [every friends of Bill’s]j wants
Sue to  kiss himj .
102QR-chain is represented in the trace position, and that the head noun of the relative
clause external head is represented in the relative clause internal head position.
Notice that the argument is independent of the arguments given in chapter 2
in favor of the same conclusion. In 2.1, I argued with example (12a), repeated from
(13b) on page 40, that for Condition C the NP-part phrase that moves for ACD-
resolution remains represented in the trace position. The LF-representation proposed
for (12a) is repeated in (12b).
(12) a. I ∗In the end, I did ask himi to teach the book of Davidi’s that Irene wanted
me to  ask him to teach .
b.
 
the book of David’s λy Irenei wanted me to ask him to teach [y, book of David’s]
      
elided VP
 
λx I asked himi to teach [x, book of David’s]
      
antecedent
Furthermore, I argued in section 2.4 based on Saﬁr’s (1998) discovery in (13a), re-
peated from (75) on page 78, that also the relative clause internal trace position
contains lexical material. Namely, if the NP-part of the head of the relative clause is
represented there as in (13b), (13a) is predicted to violate strong crossover.
(13) a. P ∗Pictures of anyonei which hei displays prominently are likely to be attrac-
tive ones.
b. a ∗anyone λx
 
pictures of [x, one]
      
external head
[which picture of [x, one]
      
internal head
] λy hex displays
prominently [y, pictures of [x, one]]
      
internal trace
 
are likely to be attractive ones.
103The argument based on (10) provides independent conﬁrmation of these two conclu-
sions of chapter 2. In the remainder of this section, I give further evidence for this
interpretation of (10) and the parallelism to the arguments of chapter 2. I start by
adding some more examples just like those in (10), then I show that it is not just
the head noun, but the NP-part that matters for the identity of traces, just like it
does for binding theory as argued in chapter 2. Finally, I show a diﬀerence between
A- and A-bar-movement that parallels the A/A-bar distinction found with respect to
binding.
Both examples in (10) marginally allow an interpretation of the elided VP as
visit every town near t. This is expected because extraction out of a reduced relative
clause is marginally possible as in (14a), and on this reading the operator binding
both traces is the same.
(14) a. W ??Which lake did you visit every town near?
b. W ∗Which lake did you visit every town that’s near?
As (14b) shows, extraction out of a full relative clause is impossible. The examples in
(15), repeated from (5) in the introduction, and (16) show a similar contrast to (10),
but the don’t allow a diﬀerent reading of the elided VP than the indicated one.
(15) a. John visited a town that’s near the town Mary did  visit .
b. J ∗John visited a town that’s near the lake Mary did  visit .
(16) a. Jon ordered a drink that’s more expensive than the drink Sue did  order 
104b. J ∗Jon ordered a drink that’s more expensive than the dish Sue did  order 
The repetition of the same noun within one sentence is usually a little unnat-
ural and most speakers prefer to replace the second occurrence with a one-anaphor.
As the examples in (17) show, the good examples of (14), (15), and (16) are also
good with a one-anaphor in place of the repeated noun. We can ignore the ques-
tion whether one-anaphora are analyzed as NP-ellipsis (Lakoﬀ 1968) or NP-pronouns
(Jackendoﬀ 1977:58-60); on either assumption the facts in (17) are expected: Since
on either one the one anaphor is, semantically at least, not diﬀerent from a full NP
that could be used to paraphrase it, the examples in (17) are expected to behave just
like (10a), (15a), and (16a).
(17) a. John visited every town near the one Mary did  visit .
b. John visited a town that’s near the one Mary did  visit .
c. Jon ordered a drink that’s more expensive than the one Martin did  order 
Consider the LF-representation of (17b) given in (18). In (18), the lexical content
of the trace position in the relative clause is indicated as town, though the external
head of the relative clause is one. However, the representation in (17b) is possible
if either of the following two assumptions is correct: one is a phonologically reduced
expression of town, or the content of the internal head of a matching relative must
have the meaning as that of the external head. I believe that, at the least the
latter assumption is correct for the reasons given in section 2.4. Hence, the LF-
105representation in (18) is possible, and satisﬁes the identity requirement of the elided
VP straightforwardly.3
(18)
 
a town that’s near the one λy Mary did visit [y,t o w n ]
      
elided VP
 
λx John visited [x,t o w n ]
      
antecedent
Jacobson (1998a) points out that the ungrammaticality of Kennedy’s examples
is also found in cases like (19a), where ACD is resolved by overt wh-movement rather
than by covert movement. In (19a), the antecedent of the trace of wh-movement is
town while the head of the relative clause is lake. As we see in (19b) and (19c), if the
two nouns are the same or one is anaphoric to the other, the example improves.
(19) a. D ∗Do you know which town near a lake Mary did  visit  John visited?
b. Do you know which town near a town Mary did  visit  John visited?
c. Do you know which town near the one Mary did  visit  John visited?
Example (20) shows that the judgement doesn’t change if the other VP is elided—
the one that contains the trace of wh-movement. As Jacobson (1998a) already notes,
(20a), doesn’t allow deletion of the VP containing the trace of wh-movement. The
contrast with (20b) and (20c) shows that, again, the diﬀerence of lexical content of
the antecedents of the two trace in (20a) causes the ungrammaticality.
(20) a. D ∗Do you know which town near a lake Mary visited John did  visit ?
3In the next section, I present arguments that the kind of identity required between the elided
VP and its antecedent is identity of meaning. This implies that even if one occupies the relative
clause internal trace position, ACD should be possible as long as one means the same as town,t h e
content of the QR-trace in the antecedent.
106b. Do you know which town near a town Mary visited John did  visit ?
c. Do you know which town near the one Mary visited John did  visit ?
This argues for the LF-representation of (20a) in (21) (and it would be the one of (19a)
if the labels antecedent and elided VP were interchanged). In (21), the head noun of
the wh-phrase is represented in the position of the wh-trace, while the head noun of
the relative clause head is represented in the relative clause internal trace position.
Again, the identity requirement of the elided VP and its antecedent is clearly violated
by the content of the traces. That ACD is possible in the b) and c) examples of (19)
and (20), on the other hand, shows that the relative clause isn’t represented in the
position of the wh-trace.
(21)
 
∗
 
which town near a lake λy Mary visited [y,l a k e ]
      
 = antecedent
 
λx John visited [x,t o w n ]
      
elided VP
Note that, again, the conclusion just reached parallels the conclusion pointed out in
section 2.2, namely that overt wh-movement also represents the lexical content of the
NP-part in the trace position. There the argument that the NP-part of a wh-phrase
must be represented in the trace position, while a relative clause adjoined to it need
not be, was the argument/adjunct asymmetry with Condition C of Freidin (1986)
and Lebeaux (1988) illustrated in (22) (repeated from (20) on page 44).
(22) a. [ ∗[Which argument that Johni was wrong]j did hei accept tj in the end?
b. [Which argument that Johni had criticized]j did hei accept tj in the end?
107So far, there is one apparent diﬀerence between the conclusions reached here
based on identity conditions on traces and the conclusions reached in chapter 2 based
on the distribution of Condition C eﬀects. Namely, the discussion in this section
has produced arguments that the head noun of an antecedent is represented in the
trace position. The distribution of Condition C eﬀects argued that the NP-part,
which is the head noun plus its complement, is represented in the trace position.
The diﬀerence is only apparent: In the examples so far, the NP-parts of the relative
clause head and the DP moving for ACD-resolution consisted only out of the head
noun. The paradigm in (23) shows that similar contrasts are also found in a case
where the NP-parts have the same head-noun but the arguments of the head noun
is diﬀerent. However, repeating a complex NP within the same sentence as in (23b)
is so unnatural that the contrast to (23c) is very weak. The contrast between (23a)
and (23c) is clear, though. (24) shows the relevant aspect of the LF-representation
proposed for (23c)—the elided VP is not identical to its antecedent.
(23) a. Bill gave a description of Mary that’s similar to the one John did  give 
b. B ??Bill gave a description of Mary that’s similar to the description of Mary
John did  give 
c. B ∗?Bill gave a description of Mary that’s similar to the description of Sue John
did  give 
(24)
 
∗
 
a description of Mary that’s similar to the description of Sue λy John did
give [y, a description of Sue]
      
elided VP
 
λx Bill gave a [x, a description of Mary]
      
 = antecedent
108The lack of a contrast in (25) below shows that diﬀerent adjuncts of the antecedents of
the two traces don’t block ACD. One possible explanation could be that the diﬀerence
between (23c) and (25b) mirrors the argument/adjunct distinction of binding theory.
A conclusive judgement on this issue, however, would need to take into account the
considerations brought up in the next section 3.2. (See footnote 6 below).
(25) a. John visited a town near Madrid that had signs for the one Bill did  visit .
b. John visited a town near Madrid that had signs for the one near Rome Bill
did  visit .
Example (26) is another place where the predictions of an identity of NP-parts
requirement diﬀer from an identity of head noun requirement. In (26), the head of
the relative clause is an argument of the noun heading the NP-part of the DP that
moves for ACD-resolution: Even though the head-nouns of the two NP-parts involved
in (26) are identical, the examples are ungrammatical. The two NP-parts itself aren’t
identical in (26), because one contains the other. For example, in (26a), the NP-part
of the relative clause head is only picture, but the NP-part in the antecedent is picture
of a picture. This is captured in the representation in (27).4
(26) a. S ∗Susi produced a picture of a picture Meltem did  produce .
4The LF-representation I actually assume for (26a) must contain the relative clause in the trace
position as in (i), and therefore doesn’t allow ACD (See the discussion of example (28) on page 47).
With respect to question of whether the NP-part of the noun head is represented (i) leads to the
same conclusion.
(i) [a picture of a picture Meltem did produce] λx Susi produced [x, picture of a picture Meltem
did produce]
109b. J ∗Jonathan visited every relative of the relative Danny did  visit .
(27)
 
∗
 
a picture of a picture λy Meltem produce [y, picture]
      
elided VP
 
λx Susi produced [x, picture of a picture]
      
 = antecedent
The contrast in (28) brings out the diﬀerence between arguments and adjuncts as
a minimal pair. For the judgement, imagine that John’s art is painting pictures of
Dali’s pictures. One day, John meets Dali and Dali tells him about his plan for a new
great painting. John likes the plan a lot, and immediately makes his own plans based
on Dali’s plan. In this context, (28b) is an acceptable sentence, but (28a) remains
unacceptable.
(28) a. J ∗John is planning to paint many pictures of the one Dali is  planning to
paint. 
b. John is planning to paint many pictures showing the one Dali is  planning
to paint. 
Since the head of the relative clause one is an argument of the higher NP in (28a)
and therefore inside the NP-part of the DP that moves for ACD-resolution, (28a) is
expected to be bad. (28b), on the other hand, is expected to have the same status as
(10) because the head of the relative clause is contained in an adjunct to the higher
NP-part.
110Given the parallelism of chapter 2 and the conclusions here, it’s expected that
a diﬀerence between A- and A-bar-chains is also found with the trace identity require-
ment. Recall from section 2.3 that A-chains and A-bar-chains diﬀer with respect to
Condition C as illustrated in (29) (repeated from (41) on page 55): While Kai in
the A-bar moved phrase behaves as if in the trace position with respect to Condition
C, the R-expression Kai in (29b) can be coreferent with the pronoun him. Hence,
section 2.3 concluded that the requirement that the NP-part must be represented in
the trace position of a chain, only applies to A-bar chains.
(29) a. [ ∗[Which relative of Kaij’s]i did hej say ti likes Kazuko.
b. [One relative of Kaij’s]i seemed to himj to ti like Kazuko.
The examples in (30) and (31) show a contrast between topicalization (A-
bar-movement) and passivization (A-movement) that argues that the requirement on
trace identity is sensitive to the A/A-bar-distinction as well. Namely, the passive
examples in (30a) and (31a) are acceptable, while the topicalization cases in (30b)
and (31b) are ungrammatical.
(30) a. The town near the lake that was  visited by vandals  seems to have been
visited by vandals, as well.
b. T ∗The town near the lake they did  visit , the vandals seem to have visited,
as well.
111(31) a. The town near the lake that was visited by vandals seems to have been
 visited by vandals , as well.
b. T ∗The town near the lake they visited, the vandals seem to have  visited ,a s
well.
These contrasts argue, based on the identity criterion, that the trace in an A-chain
need not contain lexical material of the antecedent. Consider the LF-representation
of (30a) in (32). If both the elided VP and its antecedent contain only a variable
in the object position, but not the lexical material of the antecedent, the identity
condition of VP-ellipsis is satisﬁed.
(32)
 
The town near the lake λz [z,l a k e ]λy was visited by vandals [y]
      
elided VP
 
λx seems
to have been visited [x] by vandals
      
antecedent
, as well.
Therefore, the contrasts in (30) and (31) provide independent support for the A/A-bar
distinction as stated in 2.3. There are, however, examples like (33) where deletion of a
VP containing an A-trace is blocked, even though the identity condition is predicted
to be satisﬁed. (34) is the LF-representation of (33a) assuming that the VP internal
subject hypothesis, which claims that the subject A-moves from a VP-internal posi-
tion to its surface position (see Webelhuth 1995:60-64 and references therein). In fact,
most of the examples discussed in the papers of Kennedy (1994) and Heim (1997a)
are examples with A-traces, and Kennedy and Heim both view examples like (33) as
support for the index identity view.
112(33) a. A ∗A proof that God exists does  exist  (Wasow 1972:93)
b. E ∗Every man who said George would buy some salmon did  buy some salmon 
(Kennedy 1994:(2b))
(34) A proof that God λy exists       
antecedent
λx does [x]e x i s t
      
elided VP
As Kennedy (1994:fn. 3) notes and Heim (1997a) discusses in detail, the grammati-
cality of examples like in (33) improves for many speakers with the addition of focus
particles like too, as well,o rinstead, which is not the case for examples with A-bar
movement like (2). Hence, I reject the conclusion that the examples in (33) should
receive a similar explanation as Kennedy’s A-bar movement cases. Example (33a)
is probably ill-formed because it requires scope reconstruction of the subject into a
VP-internal position (see for example Diesing 1992). In section 4.1, I provide an ac-
count that predicts that examples like (33b), while not ungrammatical, are diﬃcult
to parse.
3.2 Semantic Content of the Trace
Two independent lines of argumentation established that parts of the antecedent of
trace are represented in the trace position at the LF-level. In chapter 2, the argument
was based on the distribution of Condition C eﬀects. In the previous section 3.1, I
presented an argument based on the identity condition between traces imposed by
VP-ellipsis. While this correspondence is quite remarkable, it still leaves it open what
the contribution of the lexical material in the trace is to interpretation. Up to now,
113it’s conceivable that the material in the trace doesn’t contribute to interpretation at
all, except in the cases of variable binding in section 2.2. In this section, I argue that
in the lexical material in the trace position is also interpreted there—it constitutes
the semantic content of the trace. In particular, I show that the range of entailments
drawn from a constituent containing a trace, but not its antecedent, is aﬀected by
the semantic content of the trace.
The alternative position I’m arguing against here doesn’t, at least at this point,
look very attractive. The assumption that the lexical material in a trace position isn’t
interpreted there, but in the position of the antecedent, would necessitate the follow-
ing additional assumptions: To begin with, it requires the assumption that the lexical
material in the trace position is also represented in the antecedent, so that no infor-
mation is lost if the material in the trace position is ignored. This assumption is
unproblematic (In fact, I have been making this assumption throughout and give an
argument for it in section 3.3.3 below), except when the fronted material contains a
variable in (35a) (repeated from (34) on page 50). Here, I have been assuming a rep-
resentation like that in (35b), where the part of the fronted constituent that contains
the bound variable is only represented in the trace position of the wh-chain. On the
assumption that normally, lexical material in the trace position is ignored, either the
case of a bound variable must constitute an exception to this, or additional semantic
mechanisms that allow the interpretation of a bound variable in a position outside
the c-domain of its binder must be postulated. However, such mechanisms have been
postulated; for example Skolem-functions in Engdahl (1986) and Chierchia (1993)
and abstraction over assignments as in Sternefeld (1998) (technically a generalization
114of Skolem-functions).
(35) a. [Which paper of hisk that Maryj was given]i did shej tell every studentk to
revise ti?
b.
 
Which [λz Maryj was given [z]]
 
λx did shej tell every studenti to revise
[x, paper of hisi]?
A second consequence of the assumption that the lexical content of the trace is se-
mantically vacuous, is the existence of two kinds of deletion at the LF-level. This is
clear in examples like (36a) (repeated from (2)), and the same point could be made for
(13b) in section 2.1. In the QR-chain of the LF-representation of (36a), as repeated
in (36b), the ACD-relative clause is represented only in the operator position of the
chain, while the NP-part of the QR-chain is represented in both the operator and the
trace position of this chain. However, if the lexical material in the trace position is
also not entering interpretation in that position, (36) in eﬀect involves two steps of
deletion: Before Condition C and the identity condition of ellipsis apply, the relative
clause is deleted in the position of the QR-trace. After the two conditions applied,
the NP-part is deleted in the trace position. While this position isn’t incoherent, it’s
also not particularly attractive from my point of view since the second step of deletion
operations seems unmotivated.
(36) a. P ∗Polly visited every town in a country Eric did  visit .
b. e ∗every [town, in a country Opy Eric visited [y, country]
      
elided VP
]
115λx Polly visited [x,t o w n ]
      
 = antecedent
The argument I give now in favor of the trace actually having semantic content
is quite a bit stronger than the preceeding two arguments. The argument comes from
a closer look at Kennedy’s restriction on ACD. Consider the data in (37): (37a)
and (37b) are repeated from (15) above, however (37c) is new. Surprisingly, (37c)
is almost as good as (37a), though the lexical material of the QR-trace is predicted
to be town while that of the relative clause internal trace is city. As in (37a), the
judgement requires leaving city unstressed; if city is stressed, (37c) is unacceptable
(cf. footnote 1).5
(37) a. John visited a town that’s near the town Mary did  visit .
b. J ∗John visited a town that’s near the lake Mary did  visit .
c. J ?John visited a town       
QRNP
that’s near the city
    
RCNP
Mary did  visit 
For the following discussion it is convenient to have the following two terms at our
disposal: The NP-part of the DP that moves covertly for ACD-resolution I call QRNP,
and the NP-part of the head of the ACD-relative I call the RCNP. The empirical
generalization argued for in section 3.1 could then be stated as follows: ACD is
possible if and only if QRNP is equal to RCNP. (37c) shows that this generalization
is not exactly correct. While ACD is always possible when QRNP and RCNP are
identical, there seem to be more cases where ACD is possible. (38c), (38d), (39c),
5In fact, for some people, it’s possible to leave lake in (37b) unstressed and then (37b) becomes
acceptable. The explanation given below for (37c) carries over to this case as well.
116and (39d) show that (37c) isn’t the only exception while (38a) and (38b), as well as
(39a) and (39b) (repeated from (16)) display the contrast familiar from the previous
section.
(38) a. John lives in a city that’s close to a city Mary used to  live in .
b. J ∗John lives in a city that’s close to a castle Mary used to  live in .
c. J ?John lives in a city that’s close to a town Mary used to  live in .
d. J ?John lives in a city that’s close to where Mary used to  live .
(39) a. Jon ordered a drink that’s more expensive than the drink Sue did  order 
b. J ∗Jon ordered a drink that’s more expensive than the dish Sue did  order 
c. J ??Jon ordered a cocktail that’s more expensive than the beer Sue did  order 
d. J ?Jon ordered a drink that’s more expensive than what Sue did  order 
It seems that the relationship between the RCNP and the QRNP that is required for
the ACD to be acceptable has a semantic character. While I found a great amount
of speaker variation with respect to examples like the above ones, every speaker I
consulted found that the semantic relationship of RCNP and QRNP was the deciding
factor in the judgements. This semantic character supports strongly that it’s the
semantic contribution of the trace content which determines the identity of traces.
The account I develop now makes the semantic character precise, and speciﬁcally
aims to accounts for the facts in (38) and (39). The generalization I end up with in
this section is that ACD is possible if and only if QRNP denotes a subset of RCNP as
in (38d) and (39d) or QRNP and RCNP are from the semantic ﬁeld as in (38c) and
117(39c). It remains to be seen whether this generalization is correct exactly as stated
here; I do believe, though, that the general point concerning the semantic character
is.6
This generalization I argue is implied by the conjunction of two things: the
assumption that the lexical content of the trace contributes to interpretation and the
right account of the identity requirement. As already argued, the identity requirement
imposed on RCNP and QRNP in ACD is part of the identity requirement of VP-
ellipsis in general. Therefore, I now present an account of the identity requirement
of VP-ellipsis. I, then, come back to ACD, and show that this account predicts the
generalization just mentioned.
It is a well known observation that VP-ellipsis requires some form of seman-
tic identity or sameness of meaning between the elided VP and its antecedent (see
Sag 1976:92-95 and references therein). For example, in (40a), the ﬁrst conjunct is
ambiguous between a volitional reading and an idiomatic, non-volitional reading, but
the interpretation of the elided VP in the second conjunct has to correspond to that
of the ﬁrst VP. Similarly, the ﬁrst VP in (40b) can receive an interpretation like
put paint on the bike or one like made a picture of a bike, but the elided VP has to
correspond in meaning to the ﬁrst.
6In the present context, reconsider the example in (i), repeated from (25b). The well-formedness
of (i) could be due to the fact that the RCNP and the QRNP are from the same semantic ﬁeld even
if the modiﬁers near Madrid and near Rome are represented in the trace positions. Therefore, it
seems at this point impossible to test using examples with the structure of Kennedy’s puzzle whether
modiﬁers are represented in the trace position.
(i) John visited a town near Madrid that had signs for the one near Rome Bill did  visit .
118(40) a. John hit the wall and then Pete did  hit the wall 
b. John painted a bike after Mary did  paint a bike 
An important observation that plays a role in the following is that destressing of a
VP displays a semantic requirement very similar to that of VP-deletion (Tancredi
1992, Rooth 1992b, Wold 1995, Fox 1998a). For example, the examples in (41) show
the same disambiguation as those in (40). (I represent destressing in (41) and in the
following by italics and a reduced character size.)
(41) a. John hit the wall and then Pete hit the wall
b. John painted the bicycle after Mary paint the bicycle
The ﬁrst to discuss in detail the claim that VP-ellipsis requires identity of
meaning is Sag (1976). Sag, however, rejects this claim, and opts instead for a
requirement that LF-representations must be identical. His only reason is the example
in (42), where a child is interpreted generically in the ﬁrst VP, but existentially
in the elided VP. Sag’s conclusion isn’t forced by example (42), at least not on a
quantiﬁcational variability account of generic interpretations of indeﬁnites (Wilkinson
1991). On such an account, the ﬁrst conjunct contains a covert generic quantiﬁer
usually that lends its quantiﬁcational force to the indeﬁnite a child and could take
scope outside of VP. The indeﬁnite a child can, on this account, receive an existential
interpretation in both the elided VP and its antecedent.
119(42) They caned a child severely when I was a child, but not like Miss Grundy did
 cane a child  yesterday. (Sag 1976:(2.0.13))
Since there are examples like (40) where I know of no argument in favor of
an LF-diﬀerence between the two interpretations that VP-ellipsis draws a distinction
between, I assume that VP-ellipsis requires identity of meaning to an antecedent. This
is also assumed by Tancredi (1992), Rooth (1992b), Wold (1995), and Fox (1998a).
The nature of the identity condition aﬀects the question what the nature of
the content of the trace is because the identity condition is sensitive to it. If there
is only an identity of meaning requirement on elided VPs, the lexical material in the
trace position must be interpreted there since it’s relevant to the identity condition.
However, exact semantic identity wouldn’t explain the examples like (37c). Hence,
the identity requirement must be a more complicated technical condition, not the
intuitive notion of identical I have made appeal to up to this point. Whether this
more complicated condition makes references to the form or to the meaning is what
needs to understood. Before coming back to (37c), I summarize the literature on
this question. In the literature, the main disagreement is whether there is also a
requirement of identity of form in addition to the identity of meaning requirement.
If there’s a requirement of identity of form, the requirement that traces must have
identical lexical content might be a purely formal requirement. In that case, there’s
no evidence that traces have semantic content other than being variables.
Rooth (1992b), in particular, argues that there is also a requirement of identity
120of form. One of his argument has the following structure:7 As seen above, destress-
ing and deletion seem to share the semantic identity requirement. There are cases,
though, where destressing and also VP-ellipsis can be licensed by satisfying a weaker
requirement of indirect identity. Therefore, the semantic requirement allows indirect
identity. This, however, overgenerates possible interpretations for VP-ellipsis. There-
fore, there must be an additional requirement, identity of form, for elided material.
I now present Rooth’s (1992b) argument for identity of form in more detail. I then
summarize a diﬀerent way to draw the distinction between destressing and deletion
argued for by Fox (1998a), which doesn’t require identity of form. Finally, I argue
that the facts from ACD above argue for Fox’s (1998a) statement of the condition
and also show that the trace has semantic content.
Strict semantic identity is too strong in cases of destressing like those in (43).
As Tancredi (1992) and Rooth (1992b) argue, such examples argue that destressing
can be licensed under identity of meaning with a sentence that is not part of the
discourse itself, but rather, entailed by the discourse. For example, the ﬁrst conjunct
in (43b) entails that Mary is having a drink, and it’s semantic identity to the VP
of the second conjunct that can license destressing in (43a). I call this relationship,
where identity is satisﬁed by an entailment of the antecedent, indirect identity.
(43) a. John enjoyed one Russian novel, and even Bill r e a dab o o k .
b. Mary ordered a beer and Sue is having a drink, too.
7The other argument concerns the requirement that sloppy readings must have a same dependency
in the antecedent. See the dicussion of the parallel dependencies requirement at the end of section
4.1.2.
121While Tancredi (1992) claims that indirect identity is only found with de-
stressed VPs, Rooth (1992b) shows a case where an elided VP seems to be only
indirectly identical to its antecedent. The argument relies on an observation illus-
trated in (44a) and (44b). If her in the ﬁrst conjunct refers to Mary, (44a) allows a so
called sloppy interpretation: the pronoun her in the elided VP need not refer to Mary,
but can also refer to Jane instead. However, as shown in (44b), the pronoun her in
the elided VP cannot be taken to refer to Sue. (44) argues for a constraint on sloppy
readings such as that given in (45) (see Ristad 1990, Fiengo and May 1994:96–117,
Rooth 1992b, Fox 1998c for further evidence for (45)). I assume (45) for the rest
of this chapter as an empirical generalization—I discuss brieﬂy at the end of section
4.1.2 how Rooth (1992b) actually derives most cases of the requirement (44).
(44) a. First, John told Maryi I was bad-mouthing heri,
and then Sue told Janej Iw a s bad-mouthing herj 
b. F ∗F i r s t ,J o h nt o l dMaryi I was bad-mouthing heri,
and then Suej told Jane I was  bad-mouthing herj 
(45) Parallel Dependencies: If a pronoun isn’t identical in reference to the cor-
responding pronoun in the antecedent, it must stand in the same structural
relationship to its binder as the corresponding pronoun in the antecedent.
Assuming (45), Rooth’s (1992b) argument is based on (46). In (46), as indicated
the pronoun her in the elided VP can refer to Sue, even when the the corresponding
pronoun in the antecedent refers to Mary. In (46), the condition (45) seems to be
122violated, because the antecedent of the pronoun in the second conjunct is the subject,
whereas that of the corresponding pronoun in the ﬁrst conjunct is the object.8 Rooth
proposes that the violation of (45) in (46) is only apparent; ellipsis in (46) isn’t
licensed by direct identity with the ﬁrst conjunct, but by indirect identity where the
relevant entailment of the ﬁrst conjunct is the sentence (47).
(46) First, John told Maryi I was bad-mouthing heri,
and then Suej heard I was  bad-mouthing herj  (Rooth 1992b:(30))
(47) Maryi heard I was bad-mouthing heri.
Therefore, (46) argues that indirect identity can license ellipsis as well. At the end
of section 3.3.2, I summarize an additional argument from Jacobson (1998a) that
indirect identity can license ellipsis. However, there are many cases where indirect
identity is lenient: Rooth (1992b) and Tancredi (1992) show with examples likes those
in (48) that ellipsis must require more than indirect identity. In (48a), which contrasts
with destressing in (43a), the elided VP cannot receive the interpretation indicated
though it would satisfy indirect identity. Similarly, (48b) and (48c) clearly contrast
with (46), since the entailment argued to be involved in the licensing of deletion in
(46) cannot license deletion in (48a) and (48b).
8Fiengo and May (1994:100) claim that the surface subject of the second conjunct of (45) is
in fact an object, and therefore (46) doesn’t violate the condition (45). But, as Danny Fox (p.c.)
points out, Fiengo and May’s (1994) account predicts that sloppy ellipsis should also be possible if
the order of the conjuncts is reversed, which isn’t the case as (i) shows. Rooth’s (1992b) analysis of
(46) makes the right prediction for (i).
(i) F ∗First, Suej heard I was bad-mouthing herj, and then John told Maryi Iw a s bad-mouthing
heri 
123(48) a. J ∗John enjoyed one Russian novel, and even Bill did  read a book. 
b. F ∗First someone told Mary about the budget cuts and then Sue did  hear
about the budget cuts  (Rooth 1992b:(15))
c. F ∗First John told Maryi I was bad-mouthing heri and then Suej did  hear I
was bad-mouthing herj 
The argument shows that VP-ellipsis has an additional requirement which distin-
guishes it from destressing. Rooth (1992b) proposes that this is an identity of form
requirement; speciﬁcally, he refers to the reconstruction relation of Fiengo and May
(1994). While this is a possible account of (48) it could also be the case that the
semantic identity requirement VP-ellipsis imposes is slightly stricter than that of de-
stressing, in a way similar to the proposal of Tancredi (1992). Fox (1998a:ch. 3)
develops such a proposal, which I adopt. The arguments of Fox (1998a) for his pro-
posal, and against that of Rooth (1992b), are too intricate to summarize here; instead
I point out some of the problems an identity of form proposal faces, before I sum-
marize Fox’s (1998a) proposal. The account of facts like (37c) I present then is an
additional argument for Fox’s (1998a) approach.
Consider the examples in (49) in the context of an identity of form require-
ment. In each of them, identity of form must be compromised because, if the elided
VP would have to be identical in the choice of lexical items to the antecedent VP,
all four sentences are predicted to be ungrammatical. Therefore, as Johnson (1996:7)
argues, examples like these are a signiﬁcant challenge for any version of an identity
124of form requirement, and the best developed proposal of this kind I’m aware of is
that of Fiengo and May (1994:220). According to Fiengo and May, the examples
require essentially of list expressions that satisfy identity of form despite being lexi-
cally diﬀerent, for which Fiengo and May (1994) introduce the term vehicle change
as mentioned in section 2.4.
(49) a. John doesn’t see anyone, but Bill does. (Sag 1976:(2.3.39))
b. Jonathan didn’t have a red cent, but Susi did  have money .
c. John won’t leave until midnight, but Bill will  leave before midnight 
(Chomsky 1972a:(75))9
d. Because Sue didn’t want to buy Billi’s dinner, hei had to  buy hisi dinner .
Based on other (stronger) arguments, Fox (1998a) proposes to replace the concept
of identity of form that Rooth (1992b) appealed to with a stricter condition on the
semantic relation between an elided VP and its overt antecedent. Speciﬁcally, he
proposes a restriction on indirect identity that amounts to the recursive condition in
(50):10
(50) The antecedent VPantecedent and the elided VPelided, which is part of a sentence
S, can satisfy indirect identity only if there’s no VPelided
  such that
9Grinder and Postal (1971) judge the sentence (49c) ungrammatical. However, Chomsky (1972a)
and my informants do ﬁnd it acceptable with the appropriate contrastive foci on the subjects John
and Bill. See also Sag (1976:158-60) for discussion.
10The diﬀerence is mainly that Fox states the condition for focus domains, rather than for elided
VPs speciﬁcally. This presupposes the semantics of focus which are only introduced in section 3.3.
Moreover, this aspect of Fox’s proposal would not be useful at this point.
125a. replacing VPelided with VPelided
  in S yield a grammatical sentence S 
b. S  is logically stronger than S
c. VPelided
  is (directly or indirectly) identical with VPantecedent
The restriction (50) can also be seen as a constraint on the parsing (or recovery) of
elided material. Then it could be stated as follows: For an elided VP site, choose
a parse with an interpretation as strong as possible, but entailed by the antecedent,
and that’s compatible with the overt material surrounding the deletion site.
Fox’s condition accounts for Rooth’s problem that VP-ellipsis of indirectly
identical material was licensed in (46), but blocked in (48). Consider (48a), as re-
peated in (51), ﬁrst. In this case, there is an interpretation of the elided VP site is
possible that results in a stronger statement and that is also indirectly (as well as
directly) identical to the ﬁrst conjunct: Bill enjoyed one Russian novel. Therefore,
the interpretation indicated in (51) is blocked. In general, it will be the case that
the interpretation of the elided VP directly identical to the antecedent is the one
chosen, unless there is a requirement imposed by the material surrounding the elided
VP which blocks direct identity.
(51) J ∗John enjoyed one Russian novel, and even Bill did  read a book. 
The diﬀerence between (51) and (46), repeated in (52), is that in (52) material outside
of the elided VP together with the constraint (45) forces indirect identity. The only
parse which satisﬁes (45) is the strict reading. But, the strict reading stands in no
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block (52). Among the sloppy readings, condition (45) forces a parse of the elided VP
as a verb with an object pronoun. Of these, the one in (52) is the logically strongest,
and hence, is the one possible for the elided VP.
(52) First, John told Maryi I was bad-mouthing heri, and then Suej heard I was
 bad-mouthing herj 
In sum, Fox (1998a) claims that there’s no requirement of identity of form
between the elided VP and its antecedent, but only a slightly stronger semantic iden-
tity condition than the one for destressing. Going back to the question whether the
lexical material in the trace position is interpreted there, Fox’s (1998a) account is
only compatible with one answer. Namely if Fox is right, it predicts that traces must
have semantic content beyond being a variable, since it must be their semantic contri-
bution that’s blocking ACD in cases like (2). Additional support for this conclusion
and Fox’s (1998a) account comes from the facts in (37) to (39), as I show now.
Consider ﬁrst the examples where RCNP denotes a subset of RCQR, like those
in (53) (repeated from (38d) and (39d)). The contrast in (54) shows that RCNP must
denote a subset of RCQR, and not the other way round.
(53) a. J ?John lives in a city that’s close to where Mary used to  live .
b. J ?Jon ordered a drink that’s more expensive than what Sue did  order 
(54) a. Last night, I talked to a bachelor who looked like the guy you did  talk to 
127b. L ∗Last night, I talked to a guy who looked like the bachelor you did  talk to 
I propose that in these cases indirect identity is involved. Consider the elided VP and
its antecedent in the LF-representation of (54a) in (55). The matching requirement
on relative clauses doesn’t allow a lexical content of the trace in the elided VP other
than guy (see (56) below). Therefore, if the antecedent in (55) has an entailment
where the lexical content of the trace is [x, guy], the elided VP satisﬁes the require-
ments for indirect identity that no logically stronger replacement of the elided VP is
grammatically possible.
(55)
 
a bachelor who looked like the guy λy you talked to [y, guy]
      
elided VP
 
λx It a l k e dt o[ x, bachelor]
      
antecedent
Treating (53) and (54) as cases of indirect identity, therefore, requires that the con-
tribution of [x, bachelor] to the meaning of the antecedent is such that it allows an
entailment to the VP where it’s replaced by [x, guy]. For now, let us assume that
the meaning of the trace [x, bachelor] can be paraphrased as the indeﬁnite a bach-
elor. Then, it’s indeed predicted that ellipsis is licensed in (55), since ‘I talked to a
bachelor’ entails ‘I talked to a guy’.
The possibility of indirect identity makes it necessary to brieﬂy talk about the
analysis of relative clauses again. In section 2.4, I argued one class of relative clauses,
the matching relatives, involve both an internal and external head NP, and I suggested
that the internal head NP is obligatorily phonologically deleted and the antecedent
128of it is the external head. If indirect identity could be satisﬁed in the relationship
of the internal and external head, this would have consequences on the account of
Kennedy’s puzzle. Consider Kennedy’s example in (55a), repeated from (2). Since,
being a country entails being something, an empty internal head is entailed by the
external head in (56a). But, as (56b) illustrates, (56a) is predicted to be grammatical
if a representation with an empty internal head was possible. However, entailment
isn’t the only requirement of indirect identity. If we assume that condition (50) carries
over to directly to the case of NPs, direct identity of the semantic content of internal
and external head is required in cases like (56a).
(56) a. P ∗Polly visited every town in a country Eric did  visit .
b. [ ∗[every town in a [country, Opy Eric visited [y,]
      
elided VP
]]
λx [Polly visited [x,t o w n ]
      
antecedent
]
Now, consider the cases where NPRC and NPQR are from the same semantic
ﬁeld, but no subset relation holds between them. In (57), (38c) and (39c) from above
are repeated. In contrast to the subset cases, in these cases NPRC and NPQR seem
interchangeable as (58) aims to show ((58a) repeated from (37c)).
(57) a. J ?John lives in a city that’s close to a town Mary used to  live in .
b. J ??Jon ordered a cocktail that’s more expensive than the beer Sue did  order 
(58) a. J ?John visited a city that’s near a town Mary did  visit .
b. J ?John visited a town that’s near a city Mary did  visit 
129Notice that for the examples to be acceptable, a particular intonation is required.
Even then, they still remain marginal for most speakers if compared to the cases
where NPQR and NPRC are identical. On the required intonation, NPQR is stressed,
while NPRC is unstressed. Though I haven’t been able to verify whether the pitch
on NPQR conﬁrms this claim, I claim that NPQR bears a topic accent in the sense
of B¨ uring (1996, 1998) since this helps in explaining the relative acceptability of (57)
and (58).
One of the functions of topic accents B¨ uring discusses is that they signal the
presence of an alternative question to the assertion made. One of B¨ uring’s (1995)
examples is (59a), where the topic accent on female is phonetically realized as a
falling pitch. With this intonation, (59a) indicates that the question What did the
male pop stars wear? is still open. (59b) answers this open question, and in (59b)
male cannot bear a topic accent. This is because, with the assertion of (59b), it is
known what all the pop stars wear. In (59b) male can though optionally bear focus.
(In (59) and the following, I indicate pitch accents with capital letters, semantic focus
with an F-subscript, and semantic topic with a T-subscript. With B¨ uring (1995), I
assume that a pitch accent inside a semantic topic is phonetically realized as falling
pitch, whereas a pitch accent inside a semantic focus is realized by a rise in pitch.)
(59) a. The [FEmale]T pop stars wore [KAFtans]F.
b. The male pop stars wore [tuXEdos]F.
The examples in (60) and (61) indicate that the implicit question raised in-
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which implicit question raised is the licensing one. Hence, (60) and (61) are acceptable
in a situation where only German and American beer or red and green gummibears
are under consideration.
(60) a. [John]F bought [German]T beer. [Mary]F bought the American one.
b. [John]F eats only [red]T gummibears. [Mary]F must’ve eaten the green one.
(61) a. [John]F bought [German]T beer. As for the American one, [Mary]F did.
b. [John]F eats only [red]T gummibears. As for the green ones, [Mary]F does.
What I claim is that the examples of (37) to (39) where RCNP and RCQR are from
the same semantic ﬁeld satisfy the licensing condition on VP-ellipsis for the reason
the examples in (61) do. Assume that (37c) has the focus structure in (62). The
alternative needed to license VP-deletion is a question like Who visited a town?.
Alhough the matter is far from clear, the topic accent might make this antecedent
available. The requirement to be in the same semantic ﬁeld, I believe, is a general
requirement on alternative questions raised by topic accents.
(62) [John]F visited a [city]T that’s near a town [Mary]F did  visit .
This concludes the discussion of the examples (37) to (39). I showed that a
class of such examples, where NPRC denotes a subset of NPQR, is actually predicted
by the assumption of Fox (1998a) that VP-deletion can be licensed indirectly if this
is forced by the overt material surrounding the deletion site. This is part of a theory
131where all the licensing conditions for VP-ellipsis are only sensitive to meaning. As
for the second class of examples where NPRC and NPRC are from the same semantic
ﬁeld, I oﬀered a suggestion of how to incorporate these cases into the theory of
ellipsis. Both accounts relied on the assumption that the lexical material represented
in the trace position contributes to the interpretation of the trace. In particular, for
the examples above, the interpretation of an unbound trace [x, NP-part] could be
paraphrased as an indeﬁnite ‘a NP-part’.
The remaining pages of this section contain a digression. The question it ad-
dresses is raised at the end of chapter 2 and concerns deletion of ACD-relatives in
a trace position. I state this as the requirement in (63) (repeated from (97d)). The
question raised above is whether this requirement involves look-ahead of the mech-
anism that deletes parts of a chain to the level where the licensing conditions for
ellipsis apply, or whether chain deletion applies in an ACD conﬁguration indepen-
dently of whether this will license deletion or not. In chapter 2, it was impossible to
distinguish these possibilities empirically because it seemed that all examples with
an ACD conﬁguration required deletion of the modiﬁer in the trace position for the
licensing of VP-ellipsis. But, at this point, it becomes possible to draw a distinction,
and as I will show, the results lead me to conclude that no look-ahead is involved
with (63).
(63) ACD If material inside a modiﬁer is anaphorically related to the constituent
surrounding an occurence of this modiﬁer, this occurence of this modiﬁer must
be deleted.
132Consider the following prediction of the idea that VP-deletion can be licensed indi-
rectly via an entailment. In (64a), the head of the ACD-relative is introduced by an
upward entailing quantiﬁer. In this case, VP-ellipsis in the relative clause is predicted
to be licensed even if the relative clause remains in its surface position. Consider the
LF-representation in (64b). For the antecedent and elided VP as indicated, indirect
identity is satisﬁed by the structure in (64b): Since a is an upward entailing quan-
tiﬁer, the clause (64a) entails that John read a book. But, this provides a suitable
antecedent for the elided VP in (64b) if, as I argued above, an indeﬁnite in the an-
tecedent is suﬃcient to license deletion of a VP where a trace with the same NP-part
corresponds to the indeﬁnite.
(64) a. John read a book Mary did  read 
b. John read [a book λx Mary did
elided VP
      
read [x,b o o k ] ]
      
antecedent
This prediction gives us way to test whether the condition in (63) is looking
ahead to see whether ACD can be licensed without deletion, or whether ACD applies
whenever the formal conﬁguration of ACD arises. Namely, if (63) is looking ahead the
conﬁguration in (64b) should arise in the licensing of ACD with indeﬁnites. On the
other hand, if (63) doesn’t look ahead, it should apply in (64b), and therefore ACD
should require QR for its resolution even with upward entailing quantiﬁers. How can
we test this prediction? The ﬁrst test that comes to mind is to use quantiﬁer scope
as a diagnostic of whether QR applied. As we’ll see, the result seems to favor the no
look-ahead position, but is ultimately not decisive. A second diagnostic is Condition
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look-ahead position and, in this case, I ﬁnd the argument convincing.
First, the quantiﬁer scope test. As Sag (1976:72-74) and Larson and May
(1990:112-15) observe, ACD forces the DP that the ACD-relative is part of to take
scope outside of the antecedent of the elided VP. This follows from—and to be more
precise, strongly supports—the assumption that covert movement to a position out-
side of the antecedent is required for the resolution of ACD. This is shown in (65),
where only the case where the elided VP is interpreted as indicated is relevant. The
fact observed by Sag is that then the quantiﬁer every cannot take scope below want.
The explanation of this fact is that QR to a position outside of the antecedents is
required which forces an LF-representation like (65b). In (65b), however, every is
outside of the c-domain of want.
(65) a. Betsy’s father wants her to read everything her boss wants  her to read 
(everything   want, ∗want   everything) (Sag 1976:(1.3.38))
b.
 
everything λy her boss wants her to read [y, thing]
 
λx Betsy’s father
wants her to read
Sag’s example (65a), as well as the example of Larson and May (1990), demonstrate
the correlation between scope and ACD using the universal quantiﬁer every. The ques-
tion at hand is whether upward entailing quantiﬁer behave diﬀerently. The examples
in (66), based on suggestions by Irene Heim (p.c.) and Danny Fox (p.c.), show that
indeﬁnites behave like universal quantiﬁers. Both involve the scope of the negative
134polarity item anything which is upward entailing in its NPI-meaning. In this meaning
it must occur in the scope of an NPI-licensing expression, which in (66a) is negation
and in (66b) the verb refuse. In both examples, consider only an interpretation where
the NPI-licenser is part of the antecedent of the deletion in ACD, as indicated. If the
correlation between scope and ACD wouldn’t hold for upward entailing quantiﬁers,
the VP-deletions indicated could be licensed without moving the NPI to a position
outside the scope of its licenser. However, this prediction seems to be wrong—the
interpretations of the elided VPs indicated seem unavailable. This shows that with
upward entailing quantiﬁer, Sag’s observation also holds: the ACD-containing DP
must take scope outside of the antecedent.
(66) a. J ∗John plans never to be anywhere Mary did  plan never to be  (∗any  
not, ∗not   any)
b. J ??John is refusing to read anything Mary is  refusing to read  (??any  
refuse, ∗refuse   any)
The result in (66) seems to favor the idea that the deletion in ACD involves no
look-ahead. In fact, though, the look-ahead view probably predicts the lack of a
narrow scope reading for the examples in (66) in the following way. Consider the
LF-representation for (66a) in (67). While it’s true that “John is in a place that
Mary is” entail that “John is in a place”, this entailment is not suﬃcient to license
indirect identity in (67). The entailment required for (67) would be from “John plans
never to be anywhere Mary plans never to be” to “John plans never to be anywhere”,
135which obviously doesn’t hold. Therefore, (67) doesn’t satisfy indirect identity.
(67) John plans never to be anywhere λx Mary did
elided VP
      
plan never to be [x, place]
      
antecedent
The failure of (67) to license indirect identity is not an accident, but inherent to
the logic of the scope argument: An example without this ﬂaw would be one where
an upward entailing quantiﬁer with an ACD-relative, entails the wide scope reading
while taking narrow scope. As Abusch (1994) argues, it is for pragmatic reasons
impossible to test whether a certain reading is present, if it’s entailed by another
reading whose existence is established. Hence, I believe the argument based on scope
argument doesn’t decide whether there’s look-ahead in ACD-resolution.
The second test for the look-ahead question is based the obviation of Condi-
tion C discussed in section 2.1. Recall that in an example like (68) (repeated from
(7a) on page 34) Condition C was obviated by ACD, because ACD requires dele-
tion of the ACD-relative clause in the position of the QR-trace, as shown by the
LF-representation in (68b).
(68) a. You introduced himi to everyone Johni wanted you to  introduce himi to 
b.
 
everyone [λy Johni wanted you to introduce himi to [y]
      
elided VP
]
 
λx you introduced himi to [x]
      
antecedent
.
Since indirect identity could license ACD without movement with upward entailing
quantiﬁers, the look-ahead view would predict that in these cases we shouldn’t ﬁnd
Condition C obviation. The contrast in (69), which seems as strong as in the case
136of the universal quantiﬁer in (68a), falsiﬁes this prediction. This argues that the
LF-representation in (70), though it would satisfy indirect identity, is ruled out by a
formal requirement that rules out any conﬁguration where an elided VP occurs inside
of its antecedent. Therefore, I conclude that the no look-ahead position is correct.
(69) a. J ?John introduced heri t oam a nM a r y i wanted him to  introduce her to .
b. J ∗John introduced heri t oam a nM a r y i wanted Bill to like.
(70) John introduced heri t oam a nλx Maryi wanted him to
elided VP
      
introduce her to [x,m a n ]
      
antecedent
3.3 Wh-Traces and Focus in Chains
This sections starts out with a number of apparent problems for the assumption that
traces have content that matters for the licensing of VP-ellipsis. The goal of the
section is to show that the right understanding of how focus works in chains, which is
actually mostly drawn from the literature, yields a natural solution to these problems,
and in fact provides new support for the main claim of this chapter.
The problems are examples like (71). Apparently, in constructions other than
ACD, the lexical content of a trace, if it’s there, doesn’t block VP-ellipsis (Evans
1988, Jacobson 1992)11
11Sag (1976:63–67) and Williams (1977:130–31) claim based on examples like those in (i) that
wh-extraction from an elided VP is impossible. The examples in the text falsify this general claim
and the examples in (i) are probably ruled out for irrelevant reasons: In (ia), since the verb moves to
Comp, the elided VP is in the complement position of an empty head, which is generally impossible
(Lobeck 1992). (ib) and (ic), as Fiengo and May (1994:244) suggest, indicate a preference to delete
as much material as possible once material is deleted (See also 2 on Lappin 1984).
(i) a. What did Harry take a picture of?
W ∗What did Bill? (Sag 1976:(1.3.18))
137(71) a. I know which cities Mary visited, but I have no idea which lakes she did
 visit .
b. The cities Mary visited are near the lakes Bill did  visit .
Let me brieﬂy sketch the solution before I spell it out in detail below. The ﬁrst point
to note is that the examples in (71) require two diﬀerent solutions. This is shown by
the surprising contrast in (72): (72a) shows that a VP containing a relative clause
internal trace can license deletion of a VP containing a trace of wh-movement with
diﬀerent lexical content. (72b) shows that it’s impossible to license deletion in the
other direction—a VP containing the trace of wh-movement cannot be the antecedent
for an elided VP that contains a relative clause internal trace with diﬀerent lexical
content.
(72) a. I know the cities Mary visited, but I would like to know which lakes she
did  visit .
b. I ∗I know which cities Mary visited, but I would like to know the lakes she
did  visit 
In section 2.4, I discussed another diﬀerence between relative clauses and questions,
namely with respect to Condition C as illustrated in (73)(repeated from (49) on page
62). The account presented in section 2.4 essentially claimed that in a question, the
b. J ∗John who Bill saw and who Bob did, too. (Williams 1977:(93))
c. W ??We ﬁnally got in touch with John, who my brother Al tried to visit, but who he couldn’t
 visit  (Sag 1976:(1.3.22))
138fronted material is directly related to the trace position. The relationship between the
head of a relative clause and the relative clause internal trace position, on the other
hand, is less direct, and therefore allows the minor change in the lexical content of
the NP-part that’s represented in the trace position, needed to circumvent Condition
C.
(73) a. Which is the picture of Johni that hei likes?
b. W ∗Which picture of Johni does hei like?
My solution for (71a) makes use of this distinction between relative clauses and ques-
tions. I claim that material that’s directly related to the dislocated material, as in
a question, is essentially overt material, and therefore isn’t subject to the identity
requirement on elided material. Indirectly related material, on the other hand, is
subject to the requirement. This is the essence of my solution for (71a) presented in
more detail below.
The solution of (71a) just sketched doesn’t carry over to (71b), because here
the relative clause internal traces depend only indirectly on the external heads, which
are diﬀerent. Because of the contrast in (72), this is a desirable result. The solution
for (71b) I propose draws an analogy between them and sloppy readings. Consider
the sloppy reading in example (74): While I have so far assumed that the semantic
contribution of a variable is ignored by the identity condition, this is usually assumed
to be incorrect—in fact, I argue that it’s incorrect in section 4.1. But, then the two
VPs are diﬀerent in meaning, namely bribed John and bribed Bill. This problem looks
139similar to the problem in (71b), since there as well the lexical content of the trace
depends on a phrase outside of the elided VP.
(74) Johni admitted that Mary had bribed himi.
Billj admitted that she had  bribed himj , too. (Hardt 1992:(27))
I elaborate this analogy by extending Rooth’s (1992b) account for sloppy readings,
which I argue for in section 4.1, to the case of (71b). In particular, I show that
the explanation of the parallel dependencies requirement (45) also accounts for the
diﬀerence between the well-formed(71b) and the ill-formed (72b), as well as the ACD-
cases like (2): In (71b) the material the traces are related to is the external head of
the relative clause for both, the elided VP and the antecedent. In the ill-formed
examples, this isn’t the case, and therefore (71b) seems to be satisfactorily explained.
The remainder of this section is divided in three subsections, each of which
considers one possible way to circumvent the identity requirement of VP-ellipsis.
First, I consider pseudo-gapping but only to conclude that it doesn’t account for
cases like (71a) and (71b). Second, I consider Focus, and will argue that it provides
the solution for (71a), but not for (71b). Finally, I consider Domain Extension and
argue that it solves (71b).
3.3.1 Pseudogapping and Traces
Pseudogapping, illustrated in (75), as a potential way to circumvent the identity
requirement of VP-ellipsis, was brought to my attention by Fox and Nissenbaum
140(1998). In pseudogapping, a VP is elided, except for the object which is pronounced
and can be diﬀerent from the antecedent. In fact, the object must be diﬀerent.
(75) a. While some visited cities, others did  visit  lakes.
b. While some people advised Mary to visit cities, others did  advise Mary to
visit  lakes.
It seems possible that most examples of apparent VP-ellipsis with a trace in ob-
ject position are really instances of pseudogapping, where the trace isn’t part of the
elided material (Cormack 1984, Jacobson 1992). Consider, for example, the LF-
representation for (71a) in (76). If pseudogapping only imposes an identity require-
ment on the elided material, and the trace in object position can be not part of
the elided material, (76) is predicted to satisfy the identity requirement. This is the
right prediction for (71a), but the account overgenerates massively: It predicts that
all examples of VP-deletion with an object trace should allow an analysis like (76),
unless the trace is too deeply embedded in the VP. This would incorrectly predict all
examples like Kennedy’s puzzle (2) to be good.
(76) I know which cities λx Mary visited       
antecedent
[x, cities], but I have no idea which
lakes λy she did visit     
elided VP-part
[y, lakes].
There is reason to doubt that pseudogapping involves deletion of parts of a VP. For
one, deletion on this account would be an unusual operation since it does target non-
constituents. For example, but the VP-parts hypothetically deleted in (75b) don’t
141form a constituent. Based on this and additional arguments, all recent analyses of
pseudogapping (Jayaseelan 1990, Lasnik 1995, Johnson 1996) conclude that pseudo-
gapping is actually VP-ellipsis preceeded by movement of the object to a position
outside of VP. This means that, even in pseudo-gapping, the identity condition always
applies to a trace.
The remaining question is whether the lexical content of the antecedent is
represented in this trace or not. Or in other words, whether the object movement in
pseudogapping is A- or A-bar-movement. If it is A-movement, as shown in section
2.3 and at the end of section 3.1, the trace usually doesn’t contain material of the
antecedent, and pseudogapping would help to circumvent the identity requirement.
If it’s A-bar-movement, the content of the trace in pseudo-gapping would not be
diﬀerent from content of the trace of wh-movement.
The recent analysis of pseudogapping by Jayaseelan, Lasnik and Johnson dis-
agree about the type of movement involved in pseudogapping. Jayaseelan (1990)
proposes heavy NP shift, Lasnik (1995) advocates object shift analogous to what is
found in Scandinavian languages, and Johnson (1996) opts for a movement analo-
gous to Dutch scrambling. At least Lasnik’s and Johnson’s point in the direction
of A-movement; object shift is always A-movement and scrambling in Dutch is A-
movement in many cases (D´ eprez 1990). However, the objective of all three papers
is to account for the locality restrictions of the movement and restrictions on the
type of object that can occur. Therefore the argument for A-movement is only in-
direct: the movement in pseudogapping shows restrictions reminiscent of restrictions
on A-movement some other languages exhibits.
142We can test for whether A- or A-bar-movement is involved in pseudo-gapping
by considering Condition C obviation. As seen in section 2.3, only A-movement obvi-
ates Condition C regardless of where in the moving phrase the R-expression occurs.
The examples in (77) show that pseudo-gapping must involve A-bar-movement by
the Condition C test. Neither in (77a) nor (77b) is it possible for her to corefer with
an R-expression that’s part of the NP-part of the moving DP.
(77) a. I ∗Ig a v eh e r i a book and you did  give heri  a picture of Maryi.
b. W ∗While some told heri to paint a portrait of John, others did  tell heri to
paint  a picture of Suei.
The contrast in (78) is parallel to the well-known argument/adjunct contrast of Frei-
din (1986) and Lebeaux (1988) discussed in section 2.2 above. If the R-expression
occurs in a modiﬁer adjoined to the object-DP that moves in pseudogapping as in
(78b), it doesn’t cause a Condition C eﬀect.
(78) a. W ∗While some believed himi everything, others did  believe himi  only the
s t o r yt h a tJ o h n i had met aliens.
b. While some believed himi everything, others did  believe himi  only the
s t o r yt h a tJ o h n i had evidence for.
Because of (78) and (79), I conclude that the object in pseudo-gapping undergoes
A-bar movement, and leaving a trace with the same lexical content as the trace of wh-
movement. Hence, pseudo-gapping can never obviate the identity requirement that’s
143imposed on the lexical content of A-bar traces and isn’t involved in the explanation
of (71a).
3.3.2 Focus and Wh-Traces
Focus is another possibility to escape the semantic identity requirement. This is
illustrated in (79) using the identity requirement of destressing. Recall that (79a)
(repeated from (41b)) is ambiguous with respect to whether John produces a picture
of the bicycle or puts paint on the bicycle, but the interpretation of the destressed
VP in the second conjunct must correspond to that of the ﬁrst conjunct. This was
used to show that the destressed VP has to satisfy the identity of meaning require-
ment, as well. Now consider (79b): it exhibits a similar requirement of sameness of
interpretation, but the object car cannot be subject to this requirement. Since car
must be focussed in (79b), this argues that focus is required for material in the scope
of an identity requirement that isn’t identical to the antecedent. In a sense, focus
must make material invisible to the identity of meaning requirement.
(79) a. John painted the bicycle and Mary painted the bicycle
b. John painted the bicycle and Mary painted the [CAR]F
Examples like (79b) show that the identity requirement is only imposed on the mean-
ing of the non-focussed parts of a destressed VP. Following Jackendoﬀ (1972), Rooth
(1985), and Kratzer (1991), I refer to the meaning of the non-focussed parts of a
phrase as the presuppositional skeleton. It isn’t always intuitively obvious what the
144meaning of the non-focussed parts is; for example, if the non-focussed parts aren’t
a constituent. To make the notion presuppositional skeleton more precise, I adopt
(with one minor diﬀerence) a formalization argued for by Kratzer (1991), which was
inspired by Jackendoﬀ (1972) and Rooth (1985:12). Kratzer deﬁnes a function that
assigns to a phrase-marker its presuppositional skeleton, which I use the notation
[[[—]]] for. Informally, the value of [[[XP]]] is the meaning of an XP  that is derived
from XP by replacing all focussed subconstituent of XP with designated variables of
the corresponding semantic type. Examples like (80a) with multiple foci, argue that
diﬀerent focussed constituents must correspond to diﬀerent variables in the presup-
positional skeleton. Otherwise, interpretation (80c), would be incorrectly predicted
to be possible for (80a).
(80) a. At the party, John only introduce [MAry]F
1 to [GRANDma]F
2,
b. ‘For any x1 diﬀerent from ‘Mary’, and any x2 diﬀerent from ‘Grandma’,
John didn’t introduce x1 to x2.
c. ‘ ∗‘For any x1 diﬀerent from ‘Mary’, and any x1 diﬀerent from ‘Grandma’,
John didn’t introduce x1 to x1.
I indicate the variables a focussed constituent translates as by a superscripting it to
the focussed constituent in the syntactic representation. This is exempliﬁed by (80a).
Assuming a similar notation, Kratzer deﬁnes [[[—]]] by recursion over the syntactic
structure, where G is the assignment function for the focus variables:
145(81) a. [[[[X]F
n]]] G =G ( n )
b. [[[X 0]]] = {[[X 0]]},i fX 0 is a terminal node
c. otherwise [[[[X Y]]]] = C([[[X]]] G,[[[Y]]] G), where C represents the function that
assigns to [[X ]] and [[Y  ]] the semantic value [[X  Y ]] for any X   of the same
s e m a n t i ct y p ea sXa n da n yY   o ft h es a m es e m a n t i ct y p eo fY
Assuming Kratzer’s deﬁnition of presuppositional skeleton, the identity of
meaning requirement can be restated as a relationship of the meaning of the an-
tecedent to the presuppositional skeleton to take the role of focus into account.
Namely, the antecedent must be identical to the value of the presuppositional skeleton
under G for at least one choice of assignment function G.
(82) There is an assignment G such that [[antecedent]] = [[[VP]]]G
For (80), (82) requires that the meaning of the antecedent VP, painted the bicycle,
must be an element of the presuppositional skeleton given in (81). For this to be the
case, the interpretation of paint in the antecedent and the partially destressed VP in
(80) must be identical.
The example in (83a) from Fox (1995a) is another case where focus marks
material that escapes the identity requirement. This case involves VP-ellipsis. (83a)
allows an interpretation where the subject in both conjuncts takes scope below seem.
As we see in (83b), on this interpretation, the elided VP doesn’t seem to be identical
to its antecedent, unless we exempt focussed material from the identity requirement.
146Notice that the example in (83) provides an additional argument against the identity
of form requirement discussed in the previous section: If there was an identity of form
requirement on elided VP, it would have to apply at the level of LF to allow ACD.
But, to allow (83a), it would need to be sensitive to focus. Therefore, an identity
of form requirement would have to redundantly replicate the identity of meaning
requirement ellipsis and destressing have in common.
(83) a. An American athlete seemed to Bill to have won a Gold Medal, and a
[RUSsian RUNner]F did to. (Fox 1995a)
b. seemed to Bill to an American athlete have won a Gold Medal       
antecedent
and
seemed to Bill to a [Russian runner]F have won a Gold medal
      
elided VP
Focus is relevant for the cases we’re interested in, if traces or their lexical
content can be focussed. Clearly traces cannot bear the pitch accent that usually
indicates focus phonetically. But, it has been argued by Selkirk (1995) and references
therein that traces can inherit the F-marking of their antecedents: F-marking of a
constituent licenses the F-marking of its trace (Selkirk 1995:559). One of Selkirk’s
(1995) arguments based on the work of Bresnan (1971, 1972) starts with the obser-
vation that while usually, as we saw in (79b) above, material that is not identical
in meaning to preceding material must be focus marked and receive a pitch accent,
this doesn’t hold for the verb in case the object is also focussed. Reviewed in (84a) is
new information, but doesn’t need to bear a pitch accent. For comparison, when the
object in (84b) isn’t focussed, pitch accent on the verb is required.
147(84) a. Bill read the article and Helen [reviewed]F [the BOOK]F.
b. Bill read the article and Helen [reVIEWed]F the article.
From (84), Selkirk (1995) concludes that an F-marked verb doesn’t need to receive
pitch accent if its complement is F-marked. Based on this generalization, she argues
that in (85b) the object trace must be F-marked. Consider (85b) in the context of
(85a). Again, both the object and the verb must be F-marked. However, a pitch
accent on the fronted object suﬃces to phonetically realize this F-marking. This is
explained by the same phonological principle that applied in (84a), if the trace of
the fronted phrase is F-marked. Otherwise though, (85b) not only requires a new
phonological principle for pitch placement, but one that refers to a syntactic notion
such as the antecedent of a trace. Therefore, (85b) argues that the trace in (85b) can
obtain F-marking from its antecedent.
(85) a. Bill read an article, but ...
b. [Which [BOOK]F]i did Helen [review]F [ti]F? (Selkirk 1995:(24))
Consider now example (71a) again, which is repeated in (86a). If Selkirk (1995)
is right, the trace of a wh-moved phrase is F-marked in case the moved phrase is F-
marked. On a copy theory of movement this can be restated as follows: Copies of F-
marked phrases are F-marked. Assuming this for (86a), yields the LF-representation
in (86b). To satisfy the focus-sensitive identity requirement in (82), there must be a
replacement of the focussed material inside the elided VP, such that the antecedent VP
148and the elided VP mean the same. In (86b), the focus-sensitive identity requirement
is obviously satisﬁed because it’s possible to replace the lakes, the lexical content of
the trace in the elided VP, with cities to achieve identity.12
(86) a. I know which cities Mary visited, but I have no idea which [lakes]F she did
 visit .
b. I know which cities λx Mary visited [x, cities]
      
antecedent
,
but I have no idea which [lakes]F λy she did visit [y, [lakes]F]
      
elided VP
This concludes the account of (71a). As shown the standard claim that focus in
the head of a chain is also represented in the trace position together with the equally
standard claim that focussed material isn’t seen by the identity requirement on elided
material, yields a straightforward explanation of this case. The next question is under
which circumstances a focus that is phonetically expressed on a one constituent is also
represented as F-marking in a dependent position. For the discussion, I refer to this
12The account makes a prediction for examples like (ia) (repeated from (20a)). Since the elided
VP contains a trace of wh-movement in (ia), focus percolation should from the wh-phrase should be
possible, and the focus structure in (ib) should be result. But, then (ia) should be acceptable with
focus on town-phrase, since lake is a focus-alternative to town that would satisfy direct parallelism.
This prediction seems factually incorrect.
(i) a. D ∗Do you know which town near a lake Mary visited John did  visit ?
b. which [town]F near a lake λy Mary visited [y, lake]] λx John did visit [x,[ t o w n ] F]
The structure of (iib) resembles that of the A-movement examples like (33) discussed at the end
of section 3.1 and in section 4.1, where the ellipsis site also contained a trace of overt movement.
However, in contrast to the A-movement cases, the addition of focus particles doesn’t seem to lead
to an improvement of (ia) as (ii) attests. While I still hope that a better understanding of what
are possible focus structures will provide an explanation for (ia), at this point, I have to leave the
matter open.
(ii) D ∗Do you know which town near a lake that Mary visited John did instead.
149situation as percolation of the F-marking from one position to another. I want to argue
that F-marking can only percolate if the two positions are related via movement.13
One piece of support for the claim that F-marking can only percolate to a
dependent within a chain comes from the sluicing paradigm in (87) and (88).14 I
assume an analysis of sluicing as IP-ellipsis (Ross 1969b, Chung et al. 1995). It’s
quite well known that the fronted wh-phrase in sluicing can be related to the trace
position in the elided IP either via movement, or via a diﬀerent process that doesn’t
create a syntactic chain. For example, Chung et al. (1995:279) distinguish between
sprouting (involving a chain) and sluicing (not involving a chain). I cannot discuss
the process invoked by sluicing (in the narrow sense of Chung et al. 1995) in detail
(see also Reinhart 1994). Two properties of sluicing matter: that it isn’t sensitive to
syntactic islands and that it doesn’t involve formation of a syntactic chain. Therefore,
in the examples in (87), both sprouting and sluicing are possible, but in (88) only
sluicing is possible because an island intervenes between the antecedent and the trace
in the elided material, as can be seen from the paraphrases in both (88a) and (88b).
Then the facts in (87) and (88) yield the following conclusion: Sprouting, as in
(87a) is possible even if the NP-part of the wh-phrase is diﬀerent from the NP-part
of the corresponding indeﬁnite in the antecedent. Sluicing, however, as shown, in
(88), requires that the NP-part of the wh-phrase be identical to the NP-part of the
corresponding indeﬁnite in the antecedent.
13As is expected from the absence of lexical content in the trace position, Focus in A-chains
cannot percolate to the trace position. Hence, the only way for a F-marked DP in an A-chain
can contribute an F-mark in the trace position is by scope reconstruction (see section 6.2). Diesing
(1992) and Selkirk (1995) argue based on data from Berman and Szamosi (1972) that this prediction
is correct.
14Examples like (87) came to my attention during a discussion with Chris Kennedy.
150(87) a. An astronomer needs to ﬁnd a lot of new supernovae for her Ph.D., but
I don’t know how many galaxies  an astronomer needs to a ﬁnd for her
Ph.D. 
b. An astronomer needs to ﬁnd a lot of new supernovae for her Ph.D., but I
don’t know exactly how many  new supernovae an astronomer need to a
ﬁnd for her Ph.D. 
(88) a. A ∗An astronomer needs to ﬁnd a quadrant that contains a lot of new super-
novae for her Ph.D., but I don’t know how many galaxies  an astronomer
needs to ﬁnd a quadrant that contains for her Ph.D. 
b. An astronomer needs to ﬁnd a quadrant that contains a lot of new super-
novae for her Ph.D., but I don’t know exactly how many  new supernovae
an astronomer needs to ﬁnd a quadrant that contains for her Ph.D. 
For the account of sluicing, I adopt the assumption that an indeﬁnite in the antecedent
can correspond to a trace with the same NP-part in the elided IP, which is in the
spirit of Reinhart (1994). Then the facts in (87) and (88) follow directly from the
assumption that focus can only percolate from the antecedent to its dependent if the
two are linked by a syntactic chain. Notice that in (87a), the NP-part of the wh-phrase
how many galaxies must be focussed. Since in (87a) the wh-phrase can be linked to
the trace position by a syntactic chain, the focus of the wh-phrase can percolate to
the trace position, as shown in (89a). Therefore, the elided IP in (89a) is identical
modulo its focussed parts to the antecedent. In (88a), on the other hand, no syntactic
151chain can be formed between the antecedent and the trace position. I claim that, as
shown in (89b), F-marking cannot percolate to the NP-part of the trace because it’s
not linked to its focussed antecedent by a chain. But, if the NP-part of the trace
isn’t F-marked in (89b), it doesn’t satisfy the identity requirement. Therefore, (88a)
is ill-formed on the assumption that F-marking can only percolate in a chain.
(89) a. how many [galaxies]F λx an astronomer needs to ﬁnd [x, [galaxies]F]
b. how many [galaxies]F λx an astronomer needs to ﬁnd a quadrant that
contains [x, galaxies]
In relative clauses, the question whether F-marking can percolate from the
external head to the relative clause internal trace is much harder to investigate. Re-
call from section 2.4 that there are two possible structures for a relative clause, the
matching and the raising structure, and that these are quite hard to distinguish based
on their interpretation. The main discussion of focus percolation in relative clauses
I’m aware of is found in (Bresnan 1971) and the replies to Bresnan’s paper (Lakoﬀ
1972, Berman and Szamosi 1972, and Bresnan 1972). Especially, the discussion of
a correlation between a diﬀerence in interpretation and stress placement in Bresnan
(1972:337-40) is quite interesting for our current purposes. The discussion is based on
the notion of normal stress which unfortunately isn’t made very precise in the paper
itself. For the following, I assume that normal stress can be characterized as bear-
ing F-marking on the rightmost ‘most embedded’ constituent that can be F-marked
(H¨ ohle 1979 1982, Cinque 1993, Schwarzschild 1998, Zubizaretta 1998). This assump-
152tion predicts a diﬀerence in normal stress between the matching and raising analysis,
in examples like (90), where an object relative clause is attached to the object of the
main verb. On the raising analysis, normal stress should require pitch accent on the
relative clause head so that the trace in the object position of the relative clause is
F-marked. On the matching analysis, however, it should be impossible to F-mark the
trace in the relative clause, and therefore the verb in the relative clause should be
F-marked.
(90) a. I gave John the [BOOKs]F he wanted. (Bresnan 1972:(43))
‘I gave John the number of books that he wanted.’
‘Of books, I gave John the ones he wanted.’
b . Ig a v eJ o h nt h eb o o k sh e[ W A N t e d ] F (Bresnan 1972:(44))
‘Of the books, I gave John the ones he wanted.’
‘ ∗‘I gave the John the number of books that he wanted.’
In her discussion of (90), Bresnan rejects the claim of Lakoﬀ (1972) that the normal
stress in an example with an object attached relative like in (90) can be freely assigned
to either the head of the relative clause as in (90a) or the verb inside the relative
clause as in (90b). Instead, she argues that the apparent optionality correlates with
a diﬀerence in interpretation. The two interpretations Bresnan characterizes are one
where where the relative clause applies to the entire head in (90a) and a concealed
partitive interpretation for (90b). The prediction seems therefore at least partially
borne out as (90b) doesn’t allow an amount interpretation. I ﬁnd it impossible to
153assess whether (90a) has only an amount or kind interpretation, or whether it also
has a restrictive interpretation.
Accent placement in (90) might also be aﬀected by the implicature that if
John was given books, he probably wanted them. For the example (91), most of my
informants agree that (91b) prefers an interpretation where those is used to refer to
the same tokens of chips as those that used to be ours. (91a), on the other hand,
could be used when the chips are diﬀerent tokens, but the amount of chips is the
amount of chips that we lost. Again, (91) conﬁrms a part of the prediction, while it
leaves it open whether pitch accent on the head noun can be the ‘normal’ stress for
a matching analysis of the relative clause.
(91) a. Those are the [CHIPs]F we lost
b. Those are the chips we [LOST]F
One argument for the prediction concerning examples with pitch accent on the head
noun comes from the example in (92), where a raising analysis is ruled out by Con-
dition C. As predicted, the pitch placement in (92b) seems to be preferred in (92).
(92) a. T ??T h o s ea r et h e[ A U N T so fM a r y i]F shei likes
b. Those are the aunts of Maryi shei [LIKes]F
With non-ﬁnite relatives in (93) the intuitions are sharper. In a neutral con-
text, Hackl and Nissenbaum (1998) argue that pitch accent on the head noun, as in
(93a), forces an interpretation where the relative clause has possibility modal force.
154Pitch accent on the verb, on the other hand, forces an interpretation paraphrasable
only with a necessity modal. Hackl and Nissenbaum (1998) present arguments based
on Condition C that (93a) has a raising analysis, while (93b) has a matching analysis.
Therefore the prediction mentioned above is fully conﬁrmed by (93).
(93) a. Sabine came up with many [PROblems]F f o ru st ow o r ko n
‘Sabine came up with many problems we could work on.’
‘ ∗‘Sabine came up with many problems we should work on.’
b. Sabine came up with many problems for us to [WORK]F on
‘ ∗‘Sabine came up with many problems we could work on.’
‘Sabine came up with many problems we should work on.’
Based on these arguments, I conclude that F-marking can only percolate to a
dependent within a chain. This predicts that focus on a fronted phrase can obviate
the eﬀect of the identity condition on a trace position, only if the trace is related to
the antecedent directly via movement as in the case of wh-movement, but not in the
case of matching relatives. Though I regard the arguments based on normal stress
above as tentative, this conclusion must be correct: Otherwise, all the examples of
Kennedy (1994) like (2) would be predicted to be acceptable with the right pitch
placement, which isn’t the case as shown by (94a) and (95a).15
15One person in the audience at the SALT 8 conference at MIT reported a general improvement
of Kennedy’s examples if the head of the relative clause is stressed. However, none of my informants
share this intuition, and the person in question was not a native speaker of English. In fact, as
discussed in 1 and also observed with the paradigm in (39), destressing the head of the relative
clause is required even in the good examples.
155In contrast to matching relative clauses, raising relatives are predicted to pat-
tern with wh-questions, because here the relationship of the external head to the
relative clause internal trace position was argued to be created by movement (section
2.4). The contrasts in (94) and (95) seem to conﬁrm this prediction for the kind
reading of raising relatives. In (94a) (repeated from (10)) and (95a) (repeated from
(16)), placing pitch accent on the head of the ACD-relative lakes doesn’t improve the
example. But in (94b) and (95b), where a kind reading is possible, accenting the
head of the ACD-relative improves the example.
(94) a. J ∗John visited towns that are near the LAKes Mary did  visit .
b. John visits towns that are much nicer than the LAKes Mary does  visit .
(95) a. J ∗Jon ordered a drink that’s more expensive than the DISH Martin did
 order .
b. John orders drinks that are more expensive than the DISHes Martin does
 order 
To see that the contrast in (94) is predicted, consider the LF-representations in (96).
In (96a), the lexical content of the trace in the elided VP is not F-marked, and
therefore blocks identity between the elided VP and the potential antecedent. In
(96b), on the other hand, the lexical content of the trace in the elided VP is F-marked,
and therefore irrelevant for the identity condition (82). Therefore, the antecedent and
the elided VP are considered identical in (96b).
156(96) a.
 
∗
 
towns that are near the [lakes]F λy Mary did visit [y, lakes]
      
elided VP
 
λx John
visited [x, towns]
      
 = antecedent
b.
 
towns that are much nicer than the λy Mary did visit [y, [lakes]F]
      
elided VP
 
λx
John visited [x]
      
antecedent
In matching relative clauses, focus percolation is predicted to be possible for
overt material that is part of the internal head. This is pied-piped material surround-
ing the wh-word in a matching relative clause. Jacobson (1998a) points out examples
like those in (97) which conﬁrm this prediction.
(97) a. Mary visited every country the [EMbassy]F of which [BILL]F did  visit .
b. John greeted every boy whose [MOther] [Sue]F did  like 
c. Sue voted for every candidate the [FAther] of whom [BILL]F had  voted
for  (Jacobson 1998a:(15))
Consider the LF-representation of (97a) in (98). The pied-piped material is repre-
sented in the relative clause internal trace position, but is focussed. Therefore, the
identity requirement is satisﬁed in (98).
(98)
 
every country λy Bill visited the [embassy]F of [y, country]
      
elided VP
 
λx Mary visited [x, country]
      
antecedent
157Jacobson (1998a) makes a very interesting observation about (97) that is not relevant
to the current discussion, but strongly supports Rooth’s (1992b) view of the parallel
dependencies requirement and indirect identity. Notice that the parallel dependen-
cies requirement seems to be violated in (98) because the relationship of y in the
elided VP to its antecedent is diﬀerent from that of x to its antecedent. Jacobson
(1998a) proposes therefore that (98) requires indirect identity, and the entailment of
the sentence that contains the antecedent in (98) that satisﬁes the parallel dependen-
cies requirement is one like that paraphrased in (99), where territory of is inserted to
make the dependency parallel to the y-dependency in the elided VP.
(99) λx Mary visited the territory of [x, country]
Jacobson points out that the contrasts in (100) and (101) corroborate the view
that (97) requires indirect identity. The examples (100a) and (101a) are very similar
to those in (97), except that the DP that moves covertly for ACD-resolution in (97) is
moved overtly by topicalization in (100) and (101). Because the elided VP precedes
its antecedent linearly, (100a) and (101a) are slightly harder to parse than (97), but
both acceptable. This is expected because the account just given for (97) carries over
to (100a) and (101a). The examples (100b) and (101b), however, are ill-formed.
(100) a. E ?Every country the embassy of which Bill did  visit , Mary visited.
b. E ∗Every country the embassy of which Bill visited, Mary did  visit .
(101) a. E ?Every candidate the father of whom Bill had  voted for , Sue voted for.
158b. E ∗Every candidate the father of whom Bill had voted for, Sue had  voted for 
(Jacobson 1998a:(18))
Jacobson’s account correctly predicts (100b) and (101b) to be ill-formed. Consider
the LF-representation of (100b) in (102). The antecedent isn’t directly identical to
the elided VP in (102). The entailment that would be required to license indirect
identity would be one from “Bill visited the embassy of the country” to “Bill visited
the country”. Since this entailment isn’t valid, no antecedent for the elided VP is
available in (102).
(102)
 
∗
 
every country λy Bill visited the [embassy]F of [y, country]
      
 = antecedent
 
λx Mary visited [x, country]
      
elided VP
In this way, the asymmetry between deletion of the VP with the complex trace and
deletion of the VP with the simpler trace seen in (101) and (102) follows directly
from the fact that an entailment from a simple DP like country to a more complex
DP territory of the country seems always possible, whereas an entailment in the other
direction is usually impossible. Notice that (103), where the entailment from the
complex DP to the simpler one is licit, is better than (100b), as predicted. Therefore,
Jacobson (1998a) concludes that her paradigm involving pied-piping in the relative
clause lends strong support to the claim the VP-ellipsis can be licensed by indirect
identity.
159(103) E ?Every country the capital of which Bill visited, Mary did  visit ,t o o .
In sum, Focus percolation in a chain explains the puzzle (71a) from the begin-
ning of this section, while still predicting the ACD examples like (2) to be bad. Since
focus percolation doesn’t apply to matching relative clauses, it also doesn’t predict
(71b) (repeated in (104a)) to be good, unless it could be argued to allow a raising
analysis. As (104b) shows, examples like (104a) are acceptable even when a raising
analysis of the relative clause is ruled out by Condition C. Hence, the explanation of
(104) cannot be focus percolation into the trace position.
(104) a. The cities Mary visited are near the lakes Bill did  visit .
b. The aunt of Maryi shei visited live near the uncle of Billi hei did  visit .
3.3.3 Domain Expansion and Focus Index Sloppiness
Example (71b) (just repeated in (104a)) still needs an account. What I suggest, is that
(71b) is similar to examples that have a sloppy reading. Consider (105a), repeated
from (74) above, on a sloppy reading of the second VP. The LF-representation of
(104a) is shown in (105), where the elided VP and a potential antecedent are indicated.
On the sloppy reading the name and value of the variable x in the antecedent and
that of y in the elided VP diﬀer. So far I have been assuming that this diﬀerence
is irrelevant for the identity condition of VP-ellipsis. It is, however, widely assumed
that this assumption is incorrect and I present an argument against this assumption
in chapter 4. That means, though, that the elided VP and the antecedent in (105b)
160are predicted to be not identical, and it looks surprising that ellipsis is possible in
(105a).
(105) a. Johni admitted that Mary had bribed himi.
Billj admitted that she had  bribed himj ,t o o .
b. John λx x admitted that Mary had bribed x       
 = antecedent
Bill λy y admitted that Mary had bribed y
      
elided VP
Rooth (1992b), incorporating an idea of Ristad (1990) and Fiengo and May (1994) into
the focus semantics framework of Rooth (1992a), presents a solution for this problem.
He proposes that the identity requirement (82) need not be veriﬁed for the elided VPs,
but can instead be veriﬁed for any bigger constituent that contains the elided VP.
If the bigger domain includes the binder of the variable, the names and values of
the variables eﬀectively aren’t visible to the identity condition since, once bound,
variables names have no semantic eﬀect. For example, in the LF-representation in
(106b) the domain of identity indicated and the antecedent are semantically identical:
Both denote a function from individuals into truth values which yields true if and
only if the individual admitted that Mary had bribed it. Therefore, (106) satisﬁes
the identity condition in the expanded domain of identity.
161(106) John λx x admitted that Mary had bribed x
      
antecedent
Bill λy y admitted that Mary had bribed y
      
elided VP       
domain of identity (∼P)
In (106), the expanded domains were exactly identical because the material between
the binder and the elided VP was identical. There are examples of sloppy readings
like (107) where this isn’t the case. But, the solution to this problem is the focus
sensitivity of the identity condition already argued for in (82) above: The material
that is diﬀerent in (107) between the antecedent and ∼P must be focussed, as Hardt
(1992) notices, and therefore doesn’t block identity on Rooth’s (1992b) account.
(107) a. Johni admitted that Mary had bribed himi.
Billj didn’t admit that MAry had  bribed himj 
But hej admitted that SOMEbody had  bribed himj  (Hardt 1992:(31))
b. he λx x admitted that [somebody]F had bribed himx       
elided VP       
domain of identity (∼P)
I claim that (71b), repeated in (108a), is analogous to a sloppy reading. Recall
that on the matching analysis of relative clauses, which I argued for in section 2.4,
there are two heads, an internal head and an external head. Furthermore, the lexical
content of the internal head depends on that of the external head. One could say that
the external head binds the internal head, forgetting for the moment the argument in
2.4 that the internal head has an internal syntactic structure. Under this assumption,
the LF-representation in (108b) is possible, where N and M are variables over NP-
162part meanings that express the dependency of the internal head on the external head.
In (108b), the antecedent is identical to ∼P, if Bill is focussed.
(108) a. The cities Mary visited are near the lakes Bill did  visit .
b. the cities λN λx Mary visited [x,N ]
      
antecedent
are near
the lakes λM λy [Bill]F visited [y,M ]
      
elided VP       
domain of identity (∼P)
That’s essentially the solution of (71b): to capture the dependency of the non-focus
correspondent of a focussed phrase by a semantic mechanism. The one last diﬃculty
to consider is of a more technical nature: Based on Saﬁr’s observation, I argued in
section 2.4 that the internal head of a matching relative is not just a variable, as in
(108b), but a copy of the lexical material of the external head. Whereas a variable can
be bound in the familiar way, for a copy of lexical material that’s unexpected. The
dependency of the internal head on the external head is not variable binding, but a
deletion-antecedent relationship since the internal head is obligatorily phonologically
deleted and therefore has to satisfy an identity requirement similar to that of VP-
ellipsis. In the following paragraphs, I ﬁrst show that the diﬀerence between the
variable-binding relationship of the NP-parts assumed in (109b) and the deletion-
antecedent relationship of the NP-parts argued for by Saﬁr’s fact causes a technical
problem for the account of (71b). I then show that the same property of a deletion-
antecedent relationship that’s needed to solve this technical problem is also needed in
examples of VP-deletion, one of them being Kratzer’s (1991) ‘Tanglewood-example’.
163I then basically adopt the account of Kratzer (1991), but argue for one minor change.
After that, I discuss some new predictions of the solution of (71b).
To begin with, it’s necessary to distinguish the antecedents in examples with
more than phrase that imposes an identity requirement. Following Rooth (1992a),
I use numerical indices to mark the antecedents and the corresponding ∼Ps, the
phrases that need to satisfy the identity requirement. Using this notation, the focus
structure of (108a) is given in (109).
(109) the [cities]F       
antecedent2
λx Bill visited [x, cities       
∼P2
]
      
antecedent1
are near
the [lakes]F       
antecedent3
λy Bill visited [y,l a k e s       
∼P3
]
      
∼P1
The question is why lakes in the trace position in the second relative clause is identical
to cities in the relative clause trace in the ﬁrst antecedent. The properties of (109)
that are going to play a role in the a solution, are: one, that lakes stands in an
deletion-antecedent relationship to another copy of lakes; two, that the other copy of
lakes is focussed; and three, that the other copy is also part of the domain of identity
under consideration.
Notice that examples that raise the same issue as (109) can be given with
VP-destressing and deletion. Consider the VP in the while-clauses in (110). Except
for the focussed verb, the VP can be destressed under identity to the preceeding
material. But, part of the destressed material as well as the antecedent is a elided
164VP that can be interpreted as indicated. The elided material is neither focussed nor
identical to the elided VP in the ﬁrst clause. Hence, it seems to violate the identity
condition just like the lexical content of the the trace in (108a) does.
(110) a. John bought a book from the guy Bill did  buy a book from , while Sue
[STOle]F ab o o kf r o mt h eg u yB i l ld i d steal a book from 
b. Every girli writes like heri teacher does  write , while every boyj [TALks]F
like hisj teacher does  talk 
The LF-representation of (110a) in (111) brings out the parallelism to (109) (To save
space, the lexical content of the traces is not represented in (111)). The bold-faced
instance of steal in ∼P3 isn’t identical to the corresponding verb buy in the antecedent,
but isn’t focussed. Therefore, it should block identity, on our assumptions so far.
(111) John λx
 
the guy λy Bill did buy a book from y
      
∼P2
 
λz x bought a book from z
      
antecedent2       
antecedent1
while
Sue λx
 
the guy λy Bill did steal ab o o kf r o my
      
∼P3
 
λz x [steal]F ab o o kf r o mz
      
antecedent3       
∼P1
In both (109) and (111), the non-identical material of ∼P stood itself in an identity
relationship to another instance of the same material within ∼P. It seems that in
computing the identity requirement of ∼P such internal relationships need to be
taken into account. More generally the problem can be characterized in the following
165way: If an unfocussed XP is related by an identity condition to a focussed YP and the
focus value of a domain that includes both XP and YP is computed, then the value
of XP should covary with the focus-alternatives of YP. The examples in (110) also
show that the solution given above, binding of the destressed XP by YP is insuﬃcient
because in (111) the destressed XP isn’t c-commanded by YP.
A third place where the same problem comes up is (112a) from Kratzer (1991).
The interpretation of (112a) paraphrased in (112b) shows that the relationship be-
tween the focussed instance of Tanglewood and the instance of Tanglewood in the
elided VP must be visible for the interpretation of the focus particle only.
(112) a. I only went to [TANglewood]F because YOU did  go to Tanglewood  (Kratzer
1991:(15))
b. ‘The only place such that I went there because you went there is Tangle-
wood.’
Recall, at this point, the assumption of Kratzer (1991) introduced in (81) that
an F-marked constituent corresponds to a variable in the presuppositional skeleton.
The argument Kratzer gives for this assumption is based on (112a). Her point is for
the interpretation (112b) the elided instance of Tanglewood must also correspond to
a variable in the presuppositional skeleton and more precisely, it must correspond to
the variable as the focussed instance of Tanglewood.
Kratzer (1991) executes her proposal assuming on an identity of form require-
ment for VP-ellipsis, namely LF-copying of syntactic material. If it’s required that
166the F-mark and the focus index of the overt instance of Tanglewood are also present on
the elided instance of Tanglewood, both instances are translated as the same variable
in the presuppositional skeleton by the procedure (81).
(113) a. I only went to [TANglewood]F
1 because YOU did  go to TanglewoodF
1 
(Kratzer 1991:(15))
As shown by (113), Kratzer’s (1991) proposal predicts that Tanglewood in
the elided VP is focussed. This seems counterintuitive on a deletion view of VP-
ellipsis and is in fact ruled out by most analysis of ellipsis. Furthermore, Kratzer’s
example can also be created with VP-destressing as in (114a) and does allow the same
reading, though most people prefer there in (114). In this case, it would be probably
contradictory to assume either LF-copying or that the destressed there or occurence
Tanglewood be focussed in (114a).
(114) I only went to [TANglewood]F because YOU went to there/??Tanglewood16
Finally, the claim that F-marking is present on material in a ∼P that corresponds to
an F-marked constituent in the antecedent would interfere with my account Kennedy’s
example (2a) repeated in (115a). Under Kratzer’s (1991) assumption, the relative
clause internal copy of country is F-marked as shown in (115b). But, (115b) satisﬁes
the focus sensitive identity condition, and hence (115a) would incorrectly be predicted
to be acceptable.
16While (114) is clearly acceptable with there, it seems to be considerably degraded when the
lexical item Tanglewood is reapeated. This is at present unexplained.
167(115) a. P ∗Polly visited every town in a country Eric did  visit .
b.
 
∗
 
every town, in a [country]F λy Eric visited [y, [country]F]
      
elided VP
 
λx Polly visited [x,t o w n ]
      
antecedent
The problem with Kratzer’s account is that the correspondent of a focussed
phrase is always interpreted as a variable in the presuppositional skeleton—that’s
after all what it means ot be focussed. Rather, it seems that the correspondent of a
focussed phrase is only translated as a variable if the constituent the presuppositional
skeleton is computed for includes the focussed constituent itself. Therefore, I propose
to represent the correspondent of a focussed constituent not as focussed itself, but
as bearing focus index, speciﬁcally the same focus index as the focussed phrase it
corresponds to. Using this notation, consider the two representations in (116a) and
(117a). For the computation of the presuppositional skeleton of (116a), the F-index
on the instance of Tanglewood that corresponds to the focussed instance must be
ignored. The result is (116b). But, for the computation of the presuppositional
skeleton of (117b) the F-index on the same instance of Tanglewood must cause it to
be interpreted as a variable, such that (117b) is the result. Moreover, the identity
relationship internal to (117a) is probably the reason the focus index is present on
elided instance of Tanglewood.
(116) a. [[[went to [Tanglewood]1]]]
b. ‘went to Tanglewood’
168(117) a.
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣went to [Tanglewood]F
1
      
antecedent
because [you]2 went to [Tanglewood]1
      
∼P
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦
b. ‘went to x1 because x2 went to x1’
Wold (1996, 1998) develops for independent purposes a formalism where a
focus can be sometimes interpreted as a variable and at other times as its lexical con-
tent, depending on the constituent the presuppositional content is computed for. He
calls this device a Switch Strategy. It’s an interesting question whether his motivation
for introducing this device and the use of it I make here are related in a more relevant
way. For the moment, I just apply Wold’s device to the case at hand.
Wold’s idea is to only use partial assignment functions for the computation of
the presuppositional skeleton and interpret a focus as a variable only if this variable is
deﬁned. In diﬀerence to Wold, I assume a distinction between F-marked constituents
bearing a focus index and constituents that aren’t F-marked, but bear a focus index.
This diﬀerence is that the F-marked constituents must, in some sense, be able to
enforce an interpretation as variable not only of themselves, but also of the the non-
F-marked constituents bearing the same focus index.
Therefore, I postulate the interpretation rules of constituents bearing an F-
index as in (118). What F-marking adds to a focus index x is that it forces an
evaluation under an assignment G that assigns a value to x. Since, this eﬀect inﬂu-
ences the evaluation of the entire constituent under consideration, it can be used to
trigger that the non-F-marked constituents with the same focus index are interpreted
as variables.
169(118) a. [[[[XP]F
x]]] G is only deﬁned if x is in the Domain(G)
[[[[XP]F
x]]] G = G(x) where deﬁned
b. [[[[XP]x]]] G =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
G(x)i f x is in the domain of G
[[[XP]]]
G otherwise
The identity requirement must now be revised to take advantage of the ﬂexi-
bility the switch strategy provides. Moreover, it needs to ensure that the focus index
of the correspondent of a focussed phrase is that of the focussed phrase. Therefore,
the identity condition I propose has the two clauses in (119). The ﬁrst clause is almost
the same as (82) except for the domain minimality requirement. This requirement
makes sure that a constituent bearing a focus index is only interpreted as a variable, if
either itself or another instance of the same focus index in ∼P also bears an F-mark.
The second clause of (119) makes sure that the correspondents in ∼P of a focussed
phrase in the antecedent bear the same focus index.
(119) [[antecedent]] = [[[∼P]]] G for a G with a minimal domain such that [[[∼P]]] G is
deﬁned and for this G:
[[[antecedent]]]H = [[[∼P]]] H for any H that expands17G
Coming back to (71b), repeated in (120a), consider the LF-representation in
(120b). As indicated by the raised focus indices in (120b), the identity condition
applying between the external and internal head of the relative clause, has ensured
17An (assignment) function H expands an (assignment) function G if the domain of H is a superset
of the domain of G and for any x in the domain of G it’s the case that G(x)=H(x).
170that the internal head bears the same focus index as the external head, though the
internal head isn’t F-marked. For the antecedent and ∼P indicated, the deﬁnition
of the identity condition just given is satisﬁed. The reason is that ∼P contains
an F-marked instance of the focus index 2, and therefore even the phrase [lakes]2
in the relative clause internal trace position is interpreted as a variable when the
presuppositional skeleton of ∼P is considered.
(120) a. The cities Mary visited are near the lakes Bill did  visit .
b. The [CIties]F
1 [MAry]F
3 visited [x, [cities]1]
      
antecedent
are
near the [LAkes]F
2 [BIll]F
4 did visit [y, [lakes]2]
      
∼P
In this way, the modiﬁcation of Kratzer’s (1991) approach developed above
accounts for (71b). The status of the focus indices probably needs to be thought
about more, if they occur independently of focus as I have claimed. Nevertheless, I
believe the essential idea of the account is right; that there is a dependency between
a focussed constituent in the antecedent and its correspondent in ∼Pt h a ti sr e l e v a n t
when the presuppositional skeleton of a phrase containing both of them is computed.
In particular, the account make one interesting prediction; namely, it’s expected
that the dependency it introduces is subject to the parallel dependencies requirement
(45).18 I argue now that two classes of examples show that the prediction is correct.
The ﬁrst are the examples of Kennedy’s puzzle like (2a). The second one are cases
18This might intuitively seem surprising, but it follows from Rooth’s (1992b) account of the parallel
dependencies requirement as I show at the end of section 4.1.2. Note in this context that ‘pseudo-
sloppy’ readings in (i) obey parallel dependencies, where the eﬀect of a sloppy pronoun arises despite
that lack of c-command.
171like (72b) from above, where the only potential antecedent for a relative clause is a
question with a diﬀerent NP-part.
Consider ﬁrst (2), repeated in (121a) with the LF-representation in (121b),
where the relevant focus indices are indicated. The dependencies that are at issue
in (121b) are: the dependency between country2 in the relative clause internal trace
position and the focussed instance countryF
2 in the external head; and the dependency
between the copy of townF
1 in the QR-trace and the copy of townF
1 in the phrase
that moved by QR for ACD-resolution.
(121) a. P ∗Polly visited every town in a country Eric did  visit .
b.
 
∗
 
every [town]F
1, in a [country]F
2 λy Eric visited [y, [country]2]
 
λx Polly
visited [x,t o w n ] 1
F
The two dependencies aren’t parallel: Compare the structural relationship of the
relative clause head to the relative clause in (122a), with that of the NP-part of the
moved phrase to its complement in (122b). The NP-part in (122a) c-commands its
dependent in the relative clause, while the NP-part in (122b) doesn’t.
(i) a. The policeman who arrested Johni read himi hisi rights and the policeman who arrested
Billj did  read himj hisj rights  too.
b. T ∗The policeman who Johni talked to read himi hisi rights and the policeman who arrested
Billj did  read himj hisj rights ,t o o .
172(122) a.
DP
 
   
DN P
 
  
NP-part CP
   
λy ...
b.
IP

    
DP
 
   
DN P
 
  
NP-part Mod.
IP
   
λx ...
Now consider the second case: an example where the only potential antecedent
for a relative clause is a question with a diﬀerent NP-part. The contrast in (123)
((123a) and (123b) repeated from (72)) illustrates that this case is also ill-formed.
(123a) is an example where a relative clause serves as the antecedent for a question,
while (123b), where the question is the potential antecedent for a relative clause, is
ill-formed. The controls in (123c) and (123d) show that the ill-formedness of (123b) is
due to the diﬀerence in lexical content of the antecedent of the relative clause internal
trace and the the wh-word in the question.
173(123) a. I know the cities Mary visited, but I would like to know which lakes she
did  visit .
b. I ∗I know which cities Mary visited, but I would like to know the lakes she
did  visit 
c. I know the cities Mary visited, but I would like to know which cities Bill
did  visit .
d. I know which cities Mary visited, but I would like to know the cities Bill
did  visit 
The paradigm in (124) illustrates the same point. Again, the NP-parts of the trace
antecedents diﬀer in (124a) and (124b). (124a), where the antecedent is a relative
clause, and the elided VP appears in a question, is acceptable just like (123a). (124b),
however, where the question is the antecedent and the relative clause contains the
elided VP is ungrammatical. In (124c) and (124c) the NP-parts of the two trace
antecedents are identical, and there is no contrast between the relative clause an-
tecedent, question with deletion case in (124c) and the question antecedent, relative
clause with deletion in (124d).
(124) a. We know which is the house Marlyse bought, but not which car Paul did
 buy 
b. W ∗We know which house Marlyse bought, but not which car is the one Paul
did  buy 
174c. We know which is the house Marlyse bought, but not which house Paul
did  buy 
d. We know which house Marlyse bought, but not which is the house Paul
did  buy 
The facts in (123) and (124) seem to be a remarkable discovery, since they essentially
recreate Kennedy’s puzzle without antecedent containment. It is, I believe, no small
achievement of the account developed here, that is predicts the entire paradigms in
(123) and (124) correctly. The examples with identical NP-parts ((123c), (123d),
(124c), and (124d)) are acceptable, because the content of the traces is identical, just
like the examples (10). Consider the LF-representation in for (123d) in (125). For
the ∼P indicated, the antecedent is suitable.
(125) I know which cities λx Mary visited [x, cities]
      
antecedent
,
but I would like to know the cities λy [Bill]F did visit [x, cities]
      
∼P
Next, consider the examples (123a) and (124a) where the NP-parts are diﬀerent and
the antecedent of a question is a relative clause. In the question the focus of the head
of wh-chain can percolate to the trace position, as argued in the previous subsection.
This is indicated in the LF-representation in (126). Because the lexical content of the
trace in ∼P is focussed, it doesn’t block identity, and the antecedent and ∼P satisfy
the identity requirement.
175(126) I know the cities λx Mary visited [x, cities]
      
antecedent
,
but I would like to know [which [lakes]F] λy she did visit [y, [lakes]F]
      
∼P
Finally, consider (123b) and (124b). The LF-representation of (123b) is given in
(127). Because focus cannot percolate to the trace position in a matching relative
clause, the ∼P indicated in (127) isn’t identical to the antecedent, even if the overt
occurrence of lakes is focussed.
(127) I ∗I know [which cities] λx Mary visited [x, cities]
      
antecedent
,
but I would like to know the [lakes]F λy she did visit [y, lakes]
      
 = antecedent
If the domain the identity condition is applied to is expanded as in (128), the focus
index dependency between the external and internal head of the matching relative
is part of ∼P, and now eﬀectively counts as a focus on lakes. But, (128) violates
the parallel dependencies requirement: the dependency of the focus index 2 isn’t
parallel to that of focus index 1 in the antecedent. The diﬀerence between the two
dependencies is due to the fact that the relative clause is a sister of NP, while the
predicate created by wh-movement is a sister of DP. This is same structural diﬀerence
as that shown in (122). Therefore, the examples like (123b) are in all respects relevant
to the account pursued here alike to Kennedy’s puzzle (2).
176(128) I ∗I know [which citiesF
1] λx Mary visited [x, citiesF
1]
      
antecedent
,
but I would like to know the [lakes]F
2 λy she did visit [y,l a k e s 2]
      
 = antecedent
The account of (71b) is hence corroborated by these non-trivial prediction. In
the remainder of this section I show that, based on the account of (71b), an argument
can be made for the assumption that the NP-part of a chain is not only represented
in the trace position, but also in the higher positions of the chain unless binding
is involved. I introduced this assumption in the introduction of chapter 2 without
presenting any arguments in favor of it. At this point, an empirical argument for it
can be made.
Recall that the lexical material inside a relative clause trace can become in-
visible to the identity condition if the focus index dependency to the external head is
part of the domain considered. In addition the focus index dependency of the relative
clause trace material is subject to the parallel dependencies requirement as attested
by the ungrammaticality of (2) and (72) as just discussed. With this in mind, consider
the examples in (129).
(129) a. Which city that Mary did  visit  is near the lake that John visited.
b. After I saw a lake that John visited, I was wondering which city that Mary
did  visit  is more enjoyable.
The examples in (129) are like (71b), except that the relative clause that contains
the elided VP is part of a wh-chain. The previous discussion of wh-chains in sections
1772.2 and 3.1, argued that the NP-part of the wh-chain and the relative clause can be
represented in diﬀerent positions of the chain. However, the ellipsis in (129) requires
parallel focus index dependencies of the head of the relative clause and the relative
clause internal trace for the two relative clauses in both (130a) and (130b). If the
lexical content of the trace is only represented in the trace position, even if the relative
clause occurs in the top position of the chain the LF representation of (129a) is (130),
which doesn’t satisfy parallel dependencies for the focus indices 1 and 2.
(130)
 
∗
 
Which λy that Mary visited [y, city2]
 
λx is [x,[ c i t y ] F
2]
near the lakeF
1 λz that John visited [z,l a k e 1]
Therefore, if the NP-part in a chain is represented in only one position, it follows that
the examples in (129) require reconstruction of the relative clause to the position that
the NP-part must reconstruct to. Reconstruction results in the LF-representation in
(131), where the focus index dependencies are parallel.
(131)
 
Which
 
λx is [x,[ c i t y ] F
2 λy that Mary visited [y, city2]]
near the lakeF
1 λz that John visited [z,l a k e 1]
If, on the other hand, the NP-part of a wh-chain is represented not only in the trace
position, but in every position of a chain, reconstruction of the relative clause in
(129) is not required. Consider the LF-representation in (132), which is just like
(130) except for the additional, seemingly redundant, instance of cityF
2 in the head
position of the wh-chain. This extra instance of city satisﬁes focus index parallelism
178in the domains indicated.
(132)
 
Which cityF
2 λy that Mary visited [y, city2]
      
∼P
 
λx is [x,[ c i t y ] F
2]
near the lakeF
1 λz that John visited [z,l a k e 1]
      
antecedent
A test for reconstruction is Condition C. The examples in (133a) and (133b)
are structurally like the examples in (129), but reconstruction of the relative clause
attached to the wh-word is blocked by Condition C. It seems that coreference is
possible in (133a) and (133b) as indicated. Hence, I conclude that the examples in
(133) argue that the NP-part is represented in all positions of a wh-chain.
(133) a. After I saw the lake that John visited, I was wondering which city that
Maryi did  visit  shei would prefer to that lake.
b. The person John met at the party knows which girl that Maryi did  meet
at the party  shei stayed in touch with afterwards.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, I looked at ellipsis constructions where the elided constituent and
the antecedent contain a trace. The question I asked is when the two traces are
considered identical in the sense that is relevant for the licensing of ellipsis. It turns
out that the most intricate pattern of data is found in the examples with the structure
of Kennedy’s puzzle (2), which sections 3.1 and 3.2 are concerned with. Section 3.3
looks at other constructions with traces in ellipsis and shows why their properties
179diﬀer from those of Kennedy’s puzzle.
The main empirical discovery of section 3.1 are contrasts like (134) (repeated
from (5)). The only diﬀerence between (134a) and (134b) is the lexical content of the
NP the relative clause is attached to. This diﬀerence, however, aﬀects the possibility
of ellipsis: If the head of the relative clause is identical in meaning to the NP-part of
object of the matrix verb visit, as in (134a) ellipsis is possible. Otherwise, ellipsis is
impossible.
(134) a. Polly visited every town that’s near the one Eric did  visit .
b. P ∗Polly visited every town that’s near the lake Eric did  visit .
Section 3.1 shows that contrasts like (134) argue that parts of the moved constituent
are represented in the trace position of movement. If traces have lexical content, it’s
expected that whether two traces are identical for the licensing of ellipsis is aﬀected by
the lexical content of their antecedent. I argue that this is precisely the explanation
of (134). Furthermore, section 3.1 shows that the amount of lexical material in a
trace position that the identity criterion establishes is the same as that argued for
based on the distribution of Condition C in chapter 2. Speciﬁcally, I show three cases
where the two criteria lead to the same result: the eﬀect of ACD, the integrity of the
NP-part, and the the A/A-bar distinction. The results of chapter 2 and section 3.1
together are therefore a much stronger argument for the lexical content of a trace,
then each result individually.
Section 3.2 establishes that the lexical content of a trace makes a semantic
180contribution to the constituent containing the trace. I show that the semantic con-
tribution of the content of the trace to the elided constituent and its antecedent is
important for the licensing of ellipsis. One way I argue for this claim is to argue that
the licensing of ellipsis only looks at the semantic content of the elided constituent
and its antecedent—it requires identity of meaning, not identity of form. To make
this point I summarize the account of Fox (1998a) for the few cases that were thought
to require an identity of form requirement in addition to an identity of meaning re-
quirement in Rooth (1992b), and conclude that Fox’s (1998a) account renders the
identity of form requirement redundant. The second argument for the claim that the
semantic content of the traces determines the possibility of ellipsis comes from facts
like (135)(repeated from (39)). (135) shows that the acceptability of examples with
the structure of Kennedy’s example is aﬀected by the semantic relationship of the
two NPs involved, the head of the relative clause, and the NP-part of the matrix
object. The relevance of this semantic relationship cannot be explained if the two
NPs, which constitute the content of the traces at logical form, don’t make a semantic
contribution in the trace positions. On the view that the content of a trace makes a
semantic contribution, on the other hand, the eﬀect of the semantic relationship can
be predicted in the was section 3.2 discusses.
(135) a. Jon ordered a drink that’s more expensive than the drink Sue did  order 
b. J ∗Jon ordered a drink that’s more expensive than the dish Sue did  order 
c. J ??Jon ordered a cocktail that’s more expensive than the beer Sue did  order 
d. J ?Jon ordered a drink that’s more expensive than what Sue did  order 
181While sections 3.1 and 3.2 look at the identity criterion in examples with
the structure of Kennedy’s puzzle, section 3.3 looks at other cases. If explain why
the eﬀect of the identity requirement on traces is usually not observed in cases of
wh-movement other than ACD, as for example in (136) (repeated from (71)).
(136) a. I know which cities Mary visited, but I have no idea which lakes she did
 visit .
b. The cities Mary visited are near the lakes Bill did  visit .
Section 3.3.2 argues that (137a) should be explained based on the assumption a focus
o nt h eh e a do fawh-chain is also represented in the trace position. Then, the general
observation that focussed material is not relevant for the identity condition of ellipsis
also explains why ellipsis is possible in (137a). This account, however, doesn’t carry
over to (136b), because I argue that the focus on the head of a relative clause is
not represented in the relative clause internal trace position in (136b). Section 3.3.2
argues that (136b) should be analyzed as a kind of sloppy reading of the dependency
of the internal head of the relative clause and the external head. In particular, I show
that the notion of sloppiness required for (136b) independently required following in
one case the argumentation of Kratzer (1991). Interestingly the account developed in
section 3.3.3 predicts that the identity criterion should apply in (137) (repeated from
(123)) in the same way as in examples that have the structure of Kennedy’s puzzle.
This prediction is seen to support the approach developed in section 3.3.3.
182(137) a. I know which cities Mary visited, and now I would like to know the cities
Sue did  visit 
b. I ∗I know which cities Mary visited, but I would like to know the lakes she
did  visit 
183184Chapter 4
Linking Trace and Antecedent
In this chapter, I present several new results concerning the semantic mechanism that
links a trace to its antecedent. I call this mechanism the Dependency Mechanism. This
mechanism is a central piece of semantic competence, but it is unfortunately quite
diﬃcult to study. The results I present compare three widely used mathematical
models of the dependency mechanism: one, the variable free model of combinatorial
logic; two, variable binding in the form of ﬁrst order logic (with restrictors added);
and three, variable binding combined with λ-calculus. The three models are math-
ematically equivalent, as far as I know, and the choice between them is a matter
of convenience for mathematic purposes. But, I present arguments that for linguis-
tic purposes the third mechanism is the most appropriate. In the conclusions, I try
to isolate the factors that make model three more successful in accounting for the
data I present, in the hope that these properties are properties of the dependency
mechanism.
In the organization of this thesis, this chapter starts a new topic. The previous
185two chapters have concerned the content of the trace position in the LF-representation
and its contribution to interpretation. Almost no attention was paid to the fact, that
ultimately the interpretation of the antecedent of the chain must be able to, in some
sense, involve the trace position. In the notation I used, a dependency was represented
by the λx next to the antecedent phrase and the x that’s part of the representation of
the trace. This chapter and the following concern the mechanism(s) that accomplishes
the semantic relationship of trace and antecedent.
(1) [Which book] λx did John read [x,b o o k ]
This chapter, in particular, concerns the aspects of the interpretation mechanism(s)
that chains have in common with the relationship of a bound pronominal and its
binder. For example the bound pronoun his in (2), is dependent on the interpretation
of its binder every boy in a similar way to a trace. Chapter 5 addresses what is
particular to chains, namely the semantic content of the trace position.
(2) Every boyi was riding hisi bicycle.
The notation used to represent the fact that which book and [x, book] in (1)
belong together semantically was chosen ad hoc, and I could have used instead any of
the notations in (3) or inﬁnitely many other notations. In (3a) and (3b), the a variable
index is written in diﬀerent positions. In (3c), the non-antecedents are marked instead
of the antecedent. And in (3d), the dependency is graphically indicated in a manner
similar to Higginbotham (1983). Probably, (3d) would have been the most appropriate
186notation for the previous two chapters, since it doesn’t suggest anything about the
mechanism.
(3) a. [Which book]x did John read [x,b o o k ]
b. Whichx bookx did John read bookx
c. [Which book] .did .John .read [book]
d. which book did John read book
Obviously the notation isn’t interesting; the mechanism is. Of the three models
mentioned at the beginning, two use variables and assignment functions. Namely,
λ-calculus and an extended ﬁrst order logic with restrictors have variable in common.
The third view, combinatorial logic, does without variables, but instead employs more
complex rules of combination. I call the former view the Variables View, the latter
the Combinatorial View. While I presuppose knowledge of the basics of the variables
view, I brieﬂy introduce the combinatorial view below just before the beginning of
section 4.1. Before doing that, I sketch the kind of argument for the variables view I
detail in section 4.1.
The main diﬀerence between the two views is that on the variables view the
dependents in one dependency relation are diﬀerent from those in any other depen-
dency relation, namely the variables involved are diﬀerent.1 On the combinatorial
view, however, the dependents are more or less semantically vacuous, and there’s no
1Technically, it’s only required to choose diﬀerent variables for dependencies that overlap. In the
discussion surrounding (11), I present reasons to believe that non-overlapping dependencies might
also involve diﬀerent indices.
187semantic diﬀerence between the dependent of one dependency and those of another
one. (This is, as mentioned, introduced below in detail.) Using the identity condition
of focus semantics from the previous chapter, it’s possible to distinguish the two views
empirically: Consider a situation sketched in (4) where the domain of identity, ∼P,
contains a dependent element but not the phrase it depends on. Furthermore, the
antecedent in (4) contains a dependent element in a position corresponding to that
in the domain of identity ∼P, but the phrase it depends on is diﬀerent.
(4) binder ...
antecedent       
... dependent ... ... binder ...
domain of identity (∼P)
      
... dependent ...
On the variables view, the contributions of the dependents to the meaning of the
antecedent and the meaning of ∼P could potentially be diﬀerent in (4). Namely,
the variables chosen for the dependencies could diﬀer. On the combinatorial view,
as explained below, the contribution the dependents make to the meaning of the
antecedent and ∼P in (4) are identical. It turns out that, on the variables view,
there’s some reason that the variables chosen for the two dependencies actually must
be diﬀerent. Then, there’s a clear diﬀerence in prediction made for a structure like
(4). On the variables view, the dependent in ∼P must be focussed, since otherwise
the identity condition is violated. On the combinatorial view, no focus is required in
the same situation.
To test for the diﬀerence in predictions between the two views, a focus structure
and interpretation like that in (4) must be argued for in an actual example. The
dependent element of (4) is a pronoun that receives a sloppy reading, which is easy
188to test for.2 The other part of the situation in (4) is that a domain is subject to the
identity condition, that includes the sloppy pronoun, but not the binder. Since the
question which domains are subject to the identity condition is getting important,
the following terminology is convenient: I call the domains that the identity condition
must apply to Focus Domains following Truckenbrodt (1995) and I’ll keep Rooth’s
notation to mark the domains that are subject to the identity condition with a ∼-mark
in the focus semantic representation of a sentence.
I present two arguments distinguishing the variables view from the combina-
torial view based on the diﬀerence in prediction for the situation in (4). The ﬁrst
argument relies on additional restriction on the placement of focus that Schwarzschild
(1998) argues for. Informally, the requirement is that, if a phrase is focussed, it must
be diﬀerent from the antecedent—Schwarzschild calls this the Avoid F(ocus) Prin-
ciple. Assuming this, the argument for the variables view comes from the fact that
the dependent pronoun can optionally be focussed as in (5). On the variables view,
because of the diﬀerence in variable name, Avoid F is satisﬁed if the focus domain in
(4) is considered. On the combinatorial view, since there is no diﬀerence between the
two pronouns, Avoid F cannot be satisﬁed for any choice of focus domain. Therefore,
the focus placement in (5) is predicted to violate Avoid F on the combinatorial view.
(5) Every boyi is riding hisi bike and every manj is riding [HISj]F bike.
2It seems impossible to create the conﬁguration in (4) with the dependent element being a trace,
because the possibility of intermediate landing sites usually makes is possible that there is another
binder close enough to the dependent to be part of ∼P.
189While the ﬁrst argument involved an optional focus domain, the second argu-
ment looks at a situation where a certain focus domain is forced. In that case, the
variables view predicts that a sloppy pronoun must be focussed, while the combina-
torial view predicts that it must be destressed. Below, I argue based on arguments
of Schwarzschild (1998) that essentially every branching F-marked constituent must
be a focus domain. Additional assumptions of Schwarzschild (1998) concerning the
relationship between the placement of F-marks and the placement of pitch accent
are introduced below and important for the argument. Together, they yield a very
precise picture of the focus structure of (6d) if (6d) is part of the discourse in (6),
and only left bears pitch accent in (6d). The focus structure argued for is indicated
in (6d). The prediction of the variables view is that (6d) is ill-formed without focus
on her, while the combinatorial view predicts (6d) to be well-formed. Since there is
a contrast between (6d) and both (7a) and (7b) when part of the same discourse, I
conclude that the prediction of the variables view is conﬁrmed in (6d).
(6) a. A: Who cut the carrots?
b. B: John didn’t. Hei broke hisi right hand.
c. A: Did Mary cut the carrots?
d. B: No. ∗Maryj cut [herj [LEFT]F hand
      
∼P
]F
      
∼P
(7) a. B: No. Maryj cut [hisi [LEFT]F hand
      
∼P
]F
      
∼P
190b. B: No. Maryj cut [[HERj]F [LEFT]F hand
      
∼P
]F
      
∼P
These two arguments for the variables view are presented in detail in sections
4.1.1 and 4.1.2. Together sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.1 argue not only that the variables
view is more appropriate than the combinatorial view of binding, but also that the
names of variables matter for the identity of meaning considerations relevant for focus
and destressing. This assumption, that the indices of variables matter for semantic
identity considerations, is underlying the index identity account of Kennedy’s puzzle.
This account is mentioned and argued against in the introduction of the previous
chapter 3. The apparent conﬂict between the argument against the index identity
view presented in chapter 3 and the arguments for the index identity requirement of
section 4.1 is addressed in section 4.2. Retracing a line of argumentation of Heim
(1997a), I show that the argument against the index identity view of Kennedy’s
puzzle argues only against one of the two popular incarnations of the variables view.
I follow Heim (1997a) in calling the two implementations the Formulas view and the
Predicates view. The diﬀerence between the two is indicated by the notation in (8).
The formulas view, indicated in (8a), uses as a model an extension of standard ﬁrst
order logic to allow restricted quantiﬁcation. The two arguments of a quantiﬁer,
restrictor and scope, are formulas with an unbound variable, which the operator
binds. The predicates view uses λ-calculus as the model: the two arguments of a
quantiﬁer are one-place predicates, and the quantiﬁer itself is a function from tuples
of predicates to truth values. For index identity, the diﬀerence between the two views
191is that on the latter the λ-predicate is a constituent where the index of the moved
phrase is bound, but that doesn’t include the moved phrase itself. As I show below,
this diﬀerence favors the predicates view.
(8) a. [Whichx book(x)] did John read [x,b o o k ]
b. [Which book] λx did John read [x,b o o k ]
4.1 Variables or Combinators
This section contrasts the view of binding based on the notion of a variable with that
of combinatorial logic by looking at the focus domains that include only a sloppy
pronoun, but not the binder of it. (See the discussion in footnote 2 about using traces
instead of pronouns.) It starts by introducing the two views, and in subsections 4.1.1
and 4.1.2 argues that the indices of the variables view matter for the focus structure
of a sentence. Namely, 4.1.1 shows that focus can force indices to be distinct, while
4.1.2 shows that absence of focus can under special circumstances force indices to be
identical.
Both views of dependency I discuss, the variables view and the combinatorial
view, are taken from mathematical logic. Since the variables view is older and more
popular, I explicate it ﬁrst.
Within mathematical logic, the status of variables has been viewed diﬀerently.
In the ﬁrst versions of ﬁrst order logic, Frege (1884) and Whitehead and Russell
(1910), a variable has no status other than marking a dependency for the statement
of inference rules quantiﬁcational statements. An unbound variable, on this view, had
192no well-deﬁned meaning. With the advent of model theory, Tarski (1936), variables
did get a meaning, namely the refer to a value that’s provided by an assignment, a
kind of storage and retrieval mechanism. This later concept of a variable is what
has become to be the major model for dependent reference in linguistics. The use
of variables and assignments in semantics is well-known and very clearly presented
in recent textbooks (Larson and Segal 1995, Heim and Kratzer 1998). The essential
idea is that the meaning of a phrase XP is relative to an assignment functions that
must at least assign a value to the variables that occur free in XP. Secondly, the
meaning of a complex phrase XP = [X Y] is a combination of the meanings of its
parts X and Y relative to the same assignment function, except when one of the parts
is a binder. In case one of the parts of XP is a new binder, the assignment relative
to which the meaning of the sister is considered is modiﬁed, as shown in (9b) for
the empty operator λ. (See section 4.2 below for deﬁnitions for quantiﬁers on the
formulas view.)
(9) a. [[X Y]]g = C([[X]]g, [[Y]]g)w h e r eC is the semantic composition function (see
section 1.1)
b. [[λζ Y]] = the function λx.[ [ Y ]] g[ζ →x]
The variables view as presented so far leaves it open to which extent the in-
dices of unbound variables matter for the comparison of meanings needed for focus
semantics. The following three possibilities come to mind to state the identity re-
quirement for an antecedent XP and a focus domain YP: One, it could be that the
193indices of variables don’t matter at all for the identity condition. This can be stated
as the requirement that there is an assignment g such that the meaning of XP under
g is identical to that of YP under g. The two other views have in common the as-
sumption that indices do matter, which can be expressed by an identity requirement
that for every assignment g the meaning of XP under g is identical to that of YP
under g. The diﬀerence between possibility two and three is whether reuse of indices
is possible In mathematical logic, the formula in (10a) is well-formed and has the
same meaning as (10b), because the two dependencies don’t overlap (as long as x and
y are unbound within the surrounding material indicated by dots in (10)). Possibility
two is to assume that similarly in semantic representations that choice of index for a
d e p e n d e n c yi sf r e ee x c e p tf o rt h ec a s eo fo v e r l a p .
(10) a. (∀x:...x...)...(∀x:...x...)
b. (∀x:...x...)...(∀y:...y...)
If reuse of an index for diﬀerent dependencies was possible, the identity condition
could in most cases with variables be satisﬁed by reusing an index. The third possi-
bility is that the indices of variables do matter and that it’s reuse of an index is not
possible. The third possibility results in the strongest restriction and it’s the version
of the variables view advocated by Sag (1976) and Heim (1997a). Henceforth, when
I mention the variables view, I refer to this third possibility as the ‘oﬃcial’ version of
the variables view. Heim (1997a) states the requirement that reuse of an index isn’t
possible as in (11) (see also Sag 1976, Chomsky 1986:75 and below)
194(11) No Meaningless Coindexing: If an LF contains an occurrence of a variable
v that is bound by a node α, then all occurrences of v in this LF must be
b o u n db yt h es a m en o d eα. (Heim 1997a:(24))
The results below argue in favor of not just the variables view, but more pre-
cisely, the third possibility of explicating it. One argument against the ﬁrst possibility
considered above, that indices don’t matter at all, is the observation of McCawley
(1976:328) (also Bach, p.c.˙ to Williams 1977), that a deictic pronoun in an elided
VP must refer to the same individual as the corresponding deictic pronoun in the
antecedent VP does. This is shown for VP-deletion in (12a) and for destressing in
(12b). If deictic pronouns are interpreted as unbound variables, for which the dis-
course provides an appropriate assignment, McCawley’s observation can be stated as
a requirement that the index of the variable the pronoun him is interpreted as must
be the same in the focus domain and the antecedent. This requirement follows from
the second and the third possibility mentioned above, but not from the ﬁrst.
(12) a. Betsy saw himi and Sandy did  see himi .
b. Betsy saw himi and Sandy saw himi.
Note, however, that the argument based on deictic pronouns depends very much on
the assumptions made for deictic pronouns. For example, if deictic pronouns are
phonetically reduced forms of proper names, the facts in (12) would also be expected
on the ﬁrst view. As already mentioned the arguments I give below for the variables
view argue, in fact, for possibility three from above.
195Distinguishing the possibilities two and three empirically, I leave for below. It
seems, though, that possibility three is also conceptually simpler: If we assume that
the computational system of syntax doesn’t use variables, variables are introduced at
the point where the LF-structure of a sentence is translated into a semantic represen-
tation. As mentioned the reuse of an index must be prohibited on both possibilities,
if the dependency the index was ﬁrst used for is overlapping with the one it’s being
reused for. For example, such a restriction is needed for (13a), where two chains are
overlapping. If in the translation of the syntactic representation containing chains
into a semantic representation containing variables the indices of variables could be
freely chosen, a semantic representation like (13b) must be blocked.
(13) a. W ?What mani do you know what manj to talk to tj about ti?
b. W ∗What manx do you know what manx to talk to x about x?
The easiest way to block (13b) is to postulate that diﬀerent chains are always trans-
lated with a diﬀerent variable index. This is possibility three. If, as possibility two
assumes, it’s sometimes possible to reuse an index the procedure translating syn-
tactic chains into operator-variable dependencies would need to verify whether the
no-overlap condition is satisﬁed. In particular, since this condition must be checked
globally, on the entire structure that is translated, this seems undesirable.3
Combinatorial Logic is the only alternative to variables in mathematical logic,
3For pronouns, Condition C seems to be such a global condition on the translation of syntactic
representation into semantic representation (David Pesetsky, p.c.). But, even if the existence of such
global conditions is granted, this doesn’t yet justify an unrestricted proliferation of such devices.
196as far as I know (Sch¨ onﬁnkel 1924, Curry 1930, Curry and Feys 1958, Hindley et al.
1972). Though far less popular than the variables view, a treatment of dependencies
modeled on categorial logic has been proposed by a number of people (Quine 1960,
Szabolcsi 1987, Hepple 1990, 1992, Dowty 1992, Jacobson 1992, 1993, 1994, 1998a,
1998b). Since the diﬀerent adaptations vary in their terminology and range and no
standard has emerged, the exposition I give here uses the notation of Curry and Feys
(1958).
A constituent XP that contains a dependent element, but not its antecedent
is, on the categorial view, always interpreted as a function, that given an appro-
priate argument yields the interpretation that XP would have if the argument was
inserted in the position of the dependent element. The open argument position of
the dependent is kept open until the antecedent is encountered. To keep this position
open, the semantic composition mechanism of a combinatorial semantics are more
ﬂexible. In the following, I annotate the composition rule that applies to determine
the interpretation of a complex phrase from its parts in the node dominating the
complex phrase. Most advocates of the combinatorial view use some convention like
this. As mentioned in the introduction, on the variables the semantic composition
rule applying for each phrase is probably predictable from the semantic types of its
parts (Klein and Sag 1985, Heim and Kratzer 1998), and therefore I haven’t indicated
the composition rules above. For the combinatorial view, I am not aware of any dis-
cussion of the predictability of the composition rule applying—because of the bigger
inventory of composition rules, the result of the variables view doesn’t carry over to
the combinatorial view.
197The deﬁnitions of the combinators, I assume, are those marking functional
application, function composition, and ‘duplication’. For the ﬁrst two, in addition,
the direction must be indicated which I do with the signs   and   following for example
Steedman (1996). Functional application, which is usually not indicated by any sign,
therefore is indicated by just the direction mark as in (14).
(14)
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Z
   
X   Y
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
is deﬁned as [[X]]([[Y]])
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Z
   
X   Y
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
is deﬁned as [[Y]]([[X]])
Function composition is indicated by the letter B and the direction mark, as deﬁned
in (15).
(15)
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Z
    
X B  Y
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
is deﬁned as λx[[X]]([[Y]](x))
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Z
    
X B  Y
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
is deﬁned as λx[[Y]]([[X]](x))
Important for binding is the Duplicator. This simple version of the duplicator in (16)
when applied to a binary predicate X yields a unary predicate which is derived from
198X by applying the same argument twice. In eﬀect the duplicator enforces cobinding
of two argument positions. I indicate the points where the duplicator applies with
the letter W (Jacobson uses Z instead).
(16)
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Z
  
W X
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
is deﬁned as λx.[[X]](x)(x)
In the case of overlapping dependencies some version of the following generalized
Duplicator is needed. It’s however not needed for any of the cases below.
(17)
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
Z
   
Wn,m X
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
with n<mis deﬁned as
λxλy1 ...λy n-1λyn+1 ...λy m-1.[[X]](x)(ym-1)...(yn+1)(x)(yn-1)...(y1)
Dependent positions can be treated as either semantically empty or be inter-
preted as the identity function. I follow Jacobson (1998b) in assuming the latter.
Consider then the example (18) of a bound pronoun. The semantic representation in
(20) with the combinatory rules indicated yields the bound interpretation.
(18) Every boyi called hisi mother.
199S
 
     
(19) NP

  
Every   boy

    
W VP
 
      
called B  NP
 
   
his
idDe
B  mother
Compare (18) with an example where there’s no binding like (20). In the
semantic representation of (20) in (21), the combinatory rules are diﬀerent from those
in (19).
(20) Every boy called Mary’s mother.
S
 
         
(21) NP

  
Every   boy
  VP
 
      
called   NP
 
   
Mary’s   mother
200As the comparison between (19) and (21) indicates, the relationship between
a dependent and its antecedent is notated in the composition principles on the com-
binatorial view. Therefore, it must be assumed that in the translation of syntactic
chains into a semantic representation, the choice of combinator applying in each node
is at least partially determined, such that the dependency of a chain is correctly rep-
resented. At present it seems to me that this requires annotating the LF-structure
with the appropriate composition rule for each node, as I have done above.4
In contrast to the variables view, the combinatorial view seems to allow only
one possibility with respect to how the identity condition of focus semantics and
applies to a phrase that contains a dependent element, but not its antecedent. Since
there are no indices, a one dependent means the same another. Hence, there is a
diﬀerence between the combinatorial view and the oﬃcial version of the variables
view. The prediction of the combinatorial view is that a sloppy pronoun, like hisj
in (22), is identical to its antecedent, no matter what domain of identity is under
consideration.
4Pauline Jacobson (p.c.) notes that, if all restrictions on possible dependencies are part of inter-
pretation, the syntax-semantics mapping needs no restrictions on the composition principles. This
would be conceptually a simpler view of the syntax-semantic interface, and there are indeed clear
examples of dependencies ruled out for semantic reasons, for example a pronoun her presupposes
that its antecedent is of female gender. However, there seem to me to be equally clear cases of
semantically conceivable dependencies that are impossible because the corresponding syntactic rep-
resentation cannot be derived. A particularly well understood case is the diﬀerence between crossing
and nesting dependencies illustrated in (i) (from Pesetsky 1982:268 with minor modiﬁcations). As
Reinhart (1981), Rudin (1988), Koizumi (1994), and Richards (1997) show, the explanation of (i) is
actually an interaction of the Shortest Attract requirement of syntax with a morphological property
of English, namely how many Speciﬁers of CP are possible. Richards (1997) demonstrates that
languages with a diﬀerent morphological property, show the opposite judgement pattern for (i).
(i) a. W ?What mani do you know what manj to talk to tj about ti?
b. W ∗What mani do you know what manj to talk to ti about tj?
The arguments against the combinatorial view developed in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, apply to the
view Jacobson suggests.
201(22) Every boyi called hisi father and every teacherj called hisj father
For example the meaning of antecedent and ∼P indicated in (23), are exactly identical.
(23) Every boy   W [called B  [idDe B  father]]
      
antecedent
and
every [teacher]F   W [called B  [idDe B  father]]
      
∼P
On the variables view, the antecedent and ∼P, as in (23) are not identical. Rather,
the extended focus domains in (24) must be considered to license destressing in (22).
(24) Every boy λx x called x’s father
      
antecedent
and
every [teacher]F λy y called y’s father
      
∼P
Both views predict correctly that destressing is licensed in (22), though the
licensing focus domains are diﬀerent. To be actually able to distinguish the variables
view from the combinatorial view empirically, it’s necessary to have a better under-
standing of the distribution of focus domains. Both section 4.1.1 and section 4.1.2
argue ﬁrst for a certain generalization about the distribution of focus domains and
then consider the implication for the question of whether variables or combinators
are the correct view. The generalizations about the placement of focus domains are
based on the those of Schwarzschild (1998), but diﬀerent.
2024.1.1 Forcing Diﬀerent Indices
Based on the old observation that focussed material must be ‘new’ in some sense,
Schwarzschild (1994, 1998) argues for a ban against superﬂuous F-marking, which
he calls the Avoid F condition. Obviously, this ban can be absolute since otherwise
there would be no F-marking at all. Therefore the ban against F-marking must
interact with the factors requiring focus, namely the identity requirements imposed
by focus domains ∼P. The nature of this interaction is not obvious. For the moment,
I assume the principle Avoid F as deﬁned in (25), according to which the Avoid F
condition applies to a structure after the focus domains have been determined. I
discuss Schwarzschild’s version of deﬁning the Avoid F condition in section 4.1.2 and
show below that (25) has empirical advantages.
(25) Avoid F: F-mark as little as possible without violating the identity require-
ments imposed by ∼Ps.
Direct evidence Schwarzschild (1998) gives for the Avoid F condition are
question-answer pairs like (26). The answer in (26b) is felicitous where exactly the
new material is focussed in the answer. The focus structure in (26c) is infelicitous
because there is no focus domain structure such that Mary would not have an an-
tecedent. This is expected if the entire answer constitutes a focus domain ∼P. Then
focus on the new information, John, is required since no antecedent with John in
the object position is available in the discourse in (26). The F-mark on Mary in
(26c), however, is avoidable since an antecedent is available that satisﬁes the identity
203condition without focus on Mary, as (26b) attests.
(26) a. Who did Mary praise?
b. Mary praised [JOHN]F.
c. [ ∗[Mary]F praised [John]F
The argument for the variables in this section is based on the observation in
(27) that the example of a sloppy reading (22), the sloppy pronoun can optionally
be focussed. At ﬁrst, an optional focus seems to be inconsistent with the idea of an
Avoid F condition, and it’s indeed inconsistent with Schwarzschild’s (1998) statement
of Avoid F as I show below. The way Avoid F is stated in (25), however, allows op-
tionality of F-marking in principle, if diﬀerent choices of focus domains force diﬀerent
amounts of F-marking. This is what I assume to be the case in (27). As was shown
in (43a) above, the absence of focus on the sloppy pronoun can be explained easily.
But, for the choice of focus domains considered there, since they tolerate the absence
of focus on the sloppy pronoun, Avoid F blocks focus on the sloppy pronoun.
(27) Every boyi called hisi father and every TEAcherj called HISj father.
To satisfy Avoid F, there must be a placement of focus domains such that the focus
on his is required in (27). At this point, the variables and the combinatorial view
diverge: on the variables view there is such a placement of focus domains, namely
that in (28). For ∼P1 in (28) to be identical to the antecedent, the variable y must
be focussed to be distinct from the antecedent.
204(28) Every boy λx x called x’s father       
antecedent1       
antecedent2
and every [teacher]F λy y called [y’s]F father
      
∼P1       
∼P2
On the combinatorial view, on the other hand, there’s no distribution of focus domains
such that the focus marking on his is required. In particular, the choice of focus
domain indicated in (29) is identical to the antecedent. Therefore, Avoid F cannot
be satisﬁed for (27) on the combinatorial view.
(29) Every boy   W [called B  [idDe B  father]]
      
antecedent
and
every [teacher]F   W [called B  [idDe B  father]]
      
∼P
Another example making the same point is (30), where in addition we see that
the strict reading in (30a) is indeed blocked by the focus on the pronoun. The lack
of the strict reading in (29a) is probably predicted by both the variables view ad the
combinatorial view, but not important at this point.
(30) a. J ∗Johni called hisi mother and Billj called [HISi]F mother.
b. Johni called hisi mother and Billj called [HISj]F mother.
Irene Heim (p.c.) points out that examples like (31) where the ranges of
the quantiﬁers binding the two pronouns overlap don’t allow focussing of the sloppy
pronoun in the second conjunct. The diﬀerence between (31) and (27) is unexpected.
The observation might indicate that contrastiveness of a sloppy pronoun requires
more than a diﬀerent index. An diﬀerent way of thinking about (31) might be to ask
205the question whether the semantic relationship of the two quantiﬁers aﬀects whether
a focus domain that doesn’t include the quantiﬁer can be considered. At this point,
I leave the issue brought up by (31) open.
(31) I ∗I expected every student to call his father, but only every YOUNG student
called HIS father.
The ﬁrst argument for the variables view, was based on the observation that
pronouns with diﬀerent binders can contrast. This was shown to be unexpected on
the combinatorial view, while on the variables view the diﬀerence in indices provides
the necessary contrast.
4.1.2 Forcing Index Identity
The second argument for variables is an attempt to force a focus domain that in-
cludes a sloppy pronoun, but not its antecedent. As was argued above, the variables
approach predicts that in this case the sloppy pronoun must be focussed, while the
combinatorial view predicts that the sloppy pronoun need not be—in fact, because
of the Avoid F principle, must not be—focussed.
In the examples of sloppy readings considered so far, it was always possible to
extend the domain of focus such that it includes the antecedent of the pronoun. To
construct an example where this isn’t the case, I again rely on ideas of Schwarzschild
(1998). The ﬁrst relevant observation of Schwarzschild, is that in cases like (32) the
answer to the question must obligatorily be a focus domain, since otherwise no focus
206would be required in the answer. I propose for the moment to capture this observation
by the condition (32). If every sentence in a discourse must be a focus domain, the
identity requirement applies and forces new material to be focussed.
(32) Who praised who?
M ∗Mary praised John.
[ ∗[MARY]F praised John.
[Mary]F praised [John]F
(33) Every sentence in a discourse must be a focus domain.
The condition (33) is derived from other conditions below, but the empirical gener-
alization behind (33) seems correct, and the arguments in the following rely just on
(33).
The second important observation of Schwarzschild (1998) is that accent place-
ment within a focussed VP is sensitive to the same constraints as elsewhere. Consider
Schwarzschild’s (1998) contrast between (34) and (35). In both examples the VP must
be focussed since the question is asking for the VP-information. Nevertheless, the
pitch accent must be placed on John in (34b) and on praised in (35b).
(34) a. What did Mary do?
b. She [praised JOHN]F?
(35) a. What did John’s mother do?
b. She [PRAISED John]F?
207Another class cases of Schwarzschild (1998) showing that the placement of the pitch
accent inside an F-marked constituent is aﬀected by the discourse is illustrated by
the dialogue in (36). Only the pitch accent on Donca is required in (36c). But, the
the object of wreck must also be F-marked, because otherwise the entire sentence
(36c) isn’t a licit focus domain: If the object wasn’t F-marked, an antecedent of the
form Bill wrecked the convertible X would be necessary to license the entire sentence
as a focus domain. Since such a sentence is not part of the context but by (33) the
whole sentence (36c) must a focus domain, either both the subject and the verb, or
the object must be F-marked. Because only the object contains a pitch accent, I
conclude that the object is F-marked in (36c).
(36) a. John drove the convertible that Barry liked.
b. Aha. And Bill wrecked a boat?
c. No, Bill wrecked [the convertible that DONCA liked]F       
∼P
One conclusion, Schwarzschild (1998) draws from facts like (34), (35), and (36) con-
cerns the relationship between pitch accent and F-marking. Namely, he proposes
that it’s necessary and suﬃcient for the phonetic realization of F-marking that an
F-marked phrase contains a pitch accent, with the one exception stated in (37) for
examples like (34b), which is however irrelevant for the following.
(37) Phonological Realization of F-marking: Every F-marked phrase must
contain a pitch accent. (except for an F-marked verb whose complement is
208also F-marked and contains a pitch accent)
Condition (37) leaves it open on which word within a complex F-marked phrase the
pitch accent falls. But, the placement of pitch in a complex F-marked phrase is de-
termined by the preceeding discourse, in a similar way that determines the placement
of pitch within matrix sentences. For example, it’s impossible in the context of (36c)
to place the pitch accent on the verb liked.
(38) N ∗No, Bill wrecked [the convertible that Donca LIKed]F
The focus domain mark on the entire sentence doesn’t make any prediction concerning
pitch placement within the F-marked phrase, because the eﬀect of the F-marking on
the object is to make the information in its scope irrelevant to the focus domain it’s
part of. In the deﬁnition of the presuppositional skeleton (81) in section 3.3 the F-
marked constituents of a focus domain were replaced by variables for this reason. For
the same reason, any focus domain mark that includes the entire F-marked object
in (36c) will not distinguish between (36c) and (38). Therefore, there must be a
focus domain within the F-marked object to capture Schwarzschild’s observation that
the placement of pitch accent within an F-marked constituent is determined by the
same discourse considerations that determine pitch placement otherwise. There are a
number of possibilities to spell this insight out more precisely I present Schwarzschild’s
account of (36) ﬁrst, but am ultimately going to draw slightly diﬀerent conclusions
which are closer to Truckenbrodt’s (1995).
Schwarzschild (1998) proposes that all non-F-marked constituents are focus
209domains. Furthermore, Schwarzschild states the Avoid-F principle as a global con-
dition, that requires minimization of F-marking by looking at the entire sentence up
to the requirement that non F-marked constituents must satisfy the identity condi-
tion. Together, the two assumption explain the paradigms in (34), (35) and (36),
as Schwarzschild shows in detail. Consider, for example (36) repeated in (39). As
already argued, the object in (39c) must be F-marked. However, it remains open
whether the subconstituents of the F-marked object are also F-marked. Because of
Avoid-F, F-marking is to be avoided here too. And since the antecedent the convert-
ible that Barry liked is part of the discourse, F-marking is only required on the noun
Donca, which must receive the pitch accent. In (39c), I indicated the two F-marked
constituents and all the focus domains that Schwarzschild’s proposal predicts. Notice
though that one attractive aspect of Schwarzschild’s proposal is that focus domains
need not be indicated, because the presence of a focus domain is indicated by the
absence of an F-mark.
(39) a. John drove the convertible that Barry liked.
b. Aha. And Bill wrecked a boat?
c. Bill     
YP
wrecked       
YP
[the     
YP
convertible       
YP
[DONca]F liked       
YP       
YP       
YP
]F
      
YP       
YP
Going back to sloppy readings, Schwarzschild’s (1998) proposal is only com-
patible with the combinatorial view of binding. Consider as an example of a sloppy
210reading (40) (repeated from (22)). In the second conjunct of (40), only the noun
teacher must be focussed. Therefore, one of the many focus domains Schwarzschild’s
proposal predicts is the one indicated in (40). But, as argued above, ∼P in (40)
doesn’t have an antecedent on the variables view of binding, while the ﬁrst conjunct
provides an antecedent on the combinatorial view of binding. I take this consequence
of Schwarzschild’s (1998) proposal to be undesirable because of the evidence presented
in the previous section against the combinatorial view of binding.
(40) Every boyi called hisi father and every [TEAcherj]F called hisj father
      
∼P
A second argument against Schwarzschild’s (1998) statement of Avoid F and
the distribution of focus domains is the optionality of focus that was observed in
the previous section. (41) repeats the example from (43a) and (27) where focus on
the sloppy pronoun his is optional. If Avoid F attempts to minimize the number of
F-marks for the entire sentence, F-marking of the sloppy in (41) is predicted to be
impossible, because the alternative Focus structure without this F-mark is possible.
(41) Every boyi called hisi father and every TEAcherj called hisj/HISj father.
For these two reasons, I adopt a diﬀerent proposal concerning the distribution
of ∼Ps than Schwarzschild. Recall that the evidence in (34) to (36) shows that
non-focussed material within a complex phrase requires a discourse antecedent like
that of non-focussed material outside of an F-marked constituent. For destressed
material outside of any F-marked constituent this requirement was captured by the
211generalization (33), which, however, was insensitive to the focus structure internal to
a complex F-marked phrase. It is therefore natural to consider the generalization (42)
analogous to (33), which forces all complex F-marked phrases to be focus domains.5
(42) Every complex F-marked phrase is a focus domain.
However, (42) makes the wrong prediction for (35) (repeated in (43)). Consider the
∼P indicated in (43b). It requires an antecedent of the form V John, which arguably
the discourse (43a) doesn’t provide an antecedent for.
(43) a. What did John’s mother do?
b. She [[PRAISED]F John
      
∼P
]F
      
∼P
It seems that in (43b), a focus domain is required inside the F-marked phrase, but
need not include more than the object John. Hence, I assume that the requirement
for a ∼P is related to the presence non-F-marked phrase, just like in Schwarzschild’s
(1998) proposal. But, in contrast to Schwarzschild’s proposal, I assume that it’s
suﬃcient for destressed material to occur in the scope (or domain) of a ∼P without
any F-marks intervening. To capture the fact that an intervening F-mark interrupts
the licensing between a ∼P and a destressed phrase, I deﬁne the notion of immediate
scope in (45). For the licensing of destressed (i.e. non-F-marked) material, I propose
5The restriction to complex F-marked phrases, is needed because imposing (42) on F-marked
terminals would lead to circularity: If an F-marked terminal was a focus domain, this focus domain
would require domain F-marking of the terminal within this focus. This F-marking would create
another even smaller focus domain, which would bring about further requirements ad inﬁnitum.
212the condition in (44).
(44) Every non-F-marked phrase must be in the immediate scope of a ∼P.
( 4 5 ) Xi si nt h eimmediate scope of ∼P if there’s no F-mark dominating X, but
not dominating ∼P( a n dn oo t h e r∼-mark dominating X, but not dominating
∼P)6
The condition (44) accounts for the facts in (34) to (36), while allowing both
a variables and a combinatorial account of simple examples of sloppy readings like
(22). Consider ﬁrst (35) (repeated in (43) and (46)). Because praised is F-marked
in (46b), it doesn’t need to be in the immediate scope of a ∼P. Therefore, the ∼P
inside of the complex F-marked constituent needs to only include John, as indicated
in (46b).
(46) a. What did John’s mother do?
b. She [[PRAISED]F John       
∼P
]F
      
∼P
Next, consider (36) (repeated in (47)). One possibility of licensing all destressed
constituents is the one indicated in (47). There are a number of other possible distri-
butions of focus domains that condition (44) permits, but in all of them there is at
least one focus domain within the complex F-marked constituent.
6The requirement that the be no intervening ∼-mark is unnecessary at this point. I include it
though because then immediate scope expresses the intuition that the ∼P that X is in the immediate
scope of is the primary one where the discourse requirement of a destressed ∼P is veriﬁed. The
requirement does play a role below.
213(47) a. John drove the convertible that Barry liked.
b. Aha. And Bill wrecked a boat?
c. No, Bill wrecked [the convertible that DONCA liked       
∼P
]F
      
∼P
Thirdly, reconsider (22) (repeated in (48)) under the licensing condition (44). For
the second conjunct of (48), (44) allows the focus domain structure indicated; namely
only one focus domain that contains the sloppy pronoun and its antecedent. As shown
above, the focus structure in (48) is predicted to satisfy the identity requirement of
∼P on both the variables and the combinatorial view of binding.
(48) Every boyi called hisi father and every [TEAcherj]F called hisj father
      
∼P
I return now to the question of whether the combinatorial or the variables
view of binding is more accurate. In this section so far, it’s shown that Schwarzschild
(1998) conclusions about the distribution of focus domains are only compatible with
the combinatorial view, but a slightly diﬀerent view of his facts allows us to maintain
either the variables or the combinatorial view. The other important result of the
discussion above, is that a destressed phrase that occurs in an F-marked constituent
must be in the scope of a ∼P that is smaller than the F-marked constituent. In
a sense, F-marked constituents are an upper boundary for the extension of focus
domains. I show now that this result together with the variables view makes a new
prediction about the availability of sloppy readings that is borne out.
214Recall that the variables approach requires that a destressed sloppy pronoun is
licensed in a focus domain that also includes the binder. In the examples considered so
far, it was always possible to choose a focus domain big enough to license a destressed
sloppy pronoun. The result of the discussion of Schwarzschild’s (1998) data, that F-
marking limits the extension of focus domains, can block licensing of a sloppy pronoun.
The prediction is that a sloppy pronoun that’s part of a F-marked constituent which
doesn’t include the binder requires F-marking.
To test the prediction, I use discourses similar to Schwarzschild’s (1998) ex-
ample (36), but with a pronominal dependency. Clear examples aren’t easy to create.
However, all my consultants agreed on the example (6), repeated in (49), from the
introduction. With pitch accent only on left, (49d) isn’t possible in the discourse (49).
(49) a. A: Who cut the carrots?
b. B: John didn’t. Hei broke hisi right hand.
c. A: Did Mary cut the carrots?
d. B: No. ∗Maryj cut herj LEFT hand.
I show ﬁrst that (49d) must have a focus structure like (50), in the discourse above.
The reasoning is analogous to that in (36) above: Because Mary cut is destressed, it
must be part of a focus domain with (49c) as its antecedent. But, then the object
her left hand must be F-marked. Condition (44) forces another focus domain internal
to the F-marked object to exist, because the destressed words her and hand must be
licensed by such a focus domain. Hence, there must be focus domain that contains
215her, but not its antecedent Mary. If we assume that there is a preference to choose a
big focus domain, this forces the focus domain shown in (50).7
(50) B: No. ∗Maryj cut [herj [LEFT]F hand
      
∼P
]F
      
∼P
Then, (49d) is an example where the sloppy pronoun is in a focus domain that the
antecedent isn’t part of. As discussed above, the variables view predicts such an
example to be impossible, while the combinatorial view predicts it be acceptable. If
the judgement on (49d) is the one indicated, it therefore argues for the variables view.
As mentioned above, the judgement on (49d) is diﬀerent when her is stressed.
This is also predicted by the variables view, because the focus makes the index of the
sloppy pronoun irrelevant for the identity condition on focus domains, as discussed
in the previous subsection.
(51) B: No. Maryj cut [[HERj]F [LEFT]F hand
      
∼P
]F
      
∼P
Another important control are the strict readings in (52). (52a) and (52b) are accept-
able with the same focus structure that was impossible for the sloppy reading in (50).
For the licensing of (52b), it either needs to assumed that the antecedent John cut
his hand has an alternative representation where his isn’t bound by the antecedent
7In (49d), if her and LEFT hand form separate focus domains, with Mary the antecedent of the
focus domain of her, the example would be predicted to be acceptable even on the variables view.
At the end of this section I argue that this possibility is blocked by a condition of Truckenbrodt
(1995) that requires the maximalization of ∼Ps. The other examples I discuss in the following don’t
allow such a focus structure.
216(Keenan 1971, Sag 1976:125, Reinhart 1981) or, as Rooth (1992b) suggests, that the
antecedent has an entailment of the right form to license (52b), e.g. Somebody cut his
hand, such that indirect identity in the sense of section 3.2 is satisﬁed.
(52) a. B: No. Maryj cut [hisi [LEFT]F hand
      
∼P
]F
      
∼P
b. D: No. Maryj cut [Johni’s [LEFT]F hand
      
∼P
]F
      
∼P
The following two examples, illustrate the same point that (6) made. The
example in (53) is initially quite hard to imagine as a discourse. But, once this
diﬃculty is overcome most of my consultants agreed to the indicated judgment.
(53) a. A: John didn’t wash the dishes. John damaged the car his father was
leasing.
b. B: Aha. Did Mary wash the dishes?
c. A: No. ∗Mary washed the car her father was SELLING.
Again, it’s instructive to compare (53c) with diﬀerent pitch placements. The pitch
placements in (54) improve the example.
(54) a. A: No. Mary washed the car HER father was SELLING.
b. A: No. MARY WASHed the car her father was SELLING.
The contrast between (53c) and the alternatives in (54) is predicted by the variables
217view of dependencies. Look at the focus structures of the three examples, as given
in (55). (55a) and (55b) are analogous to the previous example. (54b) as shown in
(55c) can be licensed with one focus domain that includes both the antecedent and
the sloppy pronoun. This ∼P can be licensed under identity to (53a).
(55) a. M ∗Mary washed [the car her father was [selling]F       
∼P
]F
      
∼P
b. Mary washed [the car [her]F father was [selling]F       
∼P
]F
      
∼P
c. [Mary]F [washed]F the car her father was [selling]F       
∼P
The example in (56), shows a preference in the predicted direction; namely that his
needs to be stressed. But, the judgment is even less clear than that in the previous
two examples. I suspect that to make (56) a more coherent discourse some people
assume that (56b) indicates that every American suspects something that his teacher
is something. If (56b) carries such an implicature with it, it could license the focus
structure in (57) for (56c). Hence, those people are expected to ﬁnd (56c) acceptable.
(56) a. A: Every Canadian believes that his teacher is a genius.
b. B: Is that so? Well, every American suspects something.
c. A: You’re right. (∗)Every American suspects that his teacher is an ALIEN
(57) Every American suspects that his teacher is an [ALIEN]F       
∼P
218This concludes the argument for the variables view, that is the main point
of this section. The remainder of this section contains two digressions. The ﬁrst
digression is about how the idea of Truckenbrodt (1995) that the domain of focus
need to maximal could be incorporated into the version of Schwarzschild’s (1998)
system developed above. In particular, I argue that Truckenbrodt’s condition can
predict some cases where Kennedy’s puzzle seemed to arise with A-movement and
how it rules out the confound mentioned in footnote 7 above. The second digression
contains some remarks towards a potential third argument for the variables view.
Namely, it shows that it renders the parallel dependencies requirement (45) for page
(45) partially redundant. However, it shows also that, at this point, two subcases of
the parallel dependencies requirement remain.
Developing an idea of Rooth (1992a:114), Truckenbrodt (1995) argues that
focus domains are also relevant for the phonology of focus and phonological phrasing.
Furthermore, Truckenbrodt assumes that normally the focus domain surrounding a
focussed phrase is extended to include as much destressed material as possible—the
domain of a focus must be maximalized (Truckenbrodt 1995:126–30). Some of the
examples above are relevant to the question of how the domain maximalization idea
can be incorporated into the set of assumptions argued for above.
The ﬁrst relevant point is that the domain maximalization condition cannot
compare all possible ways of placing focus domains. The reason is the same that led
me to abandon an Avoid F condition that compares all possible ways of placing Focus
domains and F-marks. Namely, examples like (58a) (repeated from (5)) where focus
is optional on a sloppy pronoun. As argued above, there must be two focus domains
219in (58a), one surrounding the sloppy pronoun his, but not including the binder of it,
and one containing the entire clause. (58b), on the other hand, contains only one
focus domain—the one indicated. If the focus domain maximalization condition was
to force (58b) to only have the one focus domain of (58a), (58a) would be predicted
to violate Avoid F. Therefore, the two focus domains in (58a) must be permitted.
(58) a. Every boyi is riding hisi bike and every MANj is riding [HISj]F bike
      
∼P       
∼P
b. Every boyi is riding hisi bike and every MANj is riding hisj bike
      
∼P
Nevertheless, Truckenbrodt’s intuition that focus domains can be too small
or rather too vacuous seems to right in other cases. I propose therefore that the
domain maximalization requirement only applies to focus domains that are trivial
in the sense of (59). At this point, the deﬁnition of immediate scope given in (45)
becomes important again: Recall that something is in the immediate scope of a focus
domain if no F-mark nor ∼-mark dominates it that is inside of the focus domain.
(59) A focus domain ∼P is trivial if either there is no F-mark in the immediate
scope of ∼P or there is no destressed material in the immediate scope of ∼P.
Notice that at least in (35) (repeated in (60)) a trivial focus domain was argued to
be possible. However, even increasing the scope of ∼P2 in (60b) wouldn’t lead to a
greater immediate scope of ∼P, because the sister of ∼P is focussed.
220(60) a. What did John’s mother do?
b. She [[PRAISED]F John       
∼P2
]F
      
∼P1
Therefore, I assume that a trivial ∼P is blocked if an alternative focus structure is
possible where the ∼P has more in its immediate scope. In the two cases I talk about
now, the domain maximalization blocks a trivial ∼P to be the sister of another ∼P
or be immediately dominated by another ∼P. The ﬁrst case is illustrated by (61)
(cf. footnote 7). In (61), ∼P2 is trivial, because it only contains destressed material.
Hence, I assume that (61) is blocked because of the possibility to replace ∼P2 and
∼P3 with one focus domain.
(61) B: No. ∗Maryj cut [herj     
∼P2
[LEFT]F hand
      
∼P3
]F
      
∼P1
The second case, are examples like (62) (repeated from (33b) on page 113). The
ill-formedness of examples like (62) was left unexplained in the earlier discussion.
Consider now the focus structure for (62) given: ∼P1 and ∼P2 are both trivial.
(62) [ ∗[Every man who said George would t buy some salmon
      
antecedent1
]F did  buy some salmon 
      
∼P1       
∼P2
Therefore the restriction on trivial focus domains proposed above requires instead the
focus structure in (63) where ∼P1 contains its antecedent. It is conceivable that this
conﬁguration is either ungrammatical, or at least hard to parse.
221(63) [ ∗[Every man who said George would t buy some salmon
      
antecedent1
]F did  buy some salmon 
      
∼P1
This analysis of (62) lacks a lot of detail at the moment. Nevertheless, I believe that
it does look promising in the light of contrasts like those in (64) and similar ones in
Heim (1997a).
(64) a. E ∗?Every man who wants George to leave should  leave .
b. E ?Every man who wants George to leave did last time.
c. E ?Every man who did wants George to leave.
The remaining paragraphs of this section point towards another potential ar-
gument for the variables view. Namely, I show that the variables view predicts some
cases of the parallel dependencies generalization in (65) (repeated with minor modiﬁ-
cations from (45) on 122) as Rooth (1992b) points out in passing, while the combina-
torial view makes no prediction in this respect. The argument is very weak, though,
since the variables view doesn’t capture all cases that (65) account for, and therefore
the condition (65) is still needed. I mention it largely because I feel that the variables
view at least gives us a handle on the parallel depedencies requirement, and I hope
that the Rooth’s account can be extended to all cases of the parallel dependencies
condition. Another reason to mention it, is that to show that the instances of fo-
cus index sloppiness where the parallel dependencies requirement was seen to apply
belong to those cases that follow from the variables view.
222(65) Parallel Dependencies: If a dependent isn’t identical in reference to the cor-
responding dependent in the antecedent, it must stand in the same structural
relationship to its binder as the corresponding dependent in the antecedent.
Consider the contrast in (66) (repeated from (44) on page (44)), which provides direct
evidence for (65). The sloppy interpretation in (66a), which satisﬁes (65), is possible,
while the sloppy reading indicated in (66b), which doesn’t satisfy (65) is blocked.
(66) a. First, John told Maryi I was bad-mouthing heri,
and then Sue told Janej Iw a s bad-mouthing herj 
b. F ∗F i r s t ,J o h nt o l dMaryi I was bad-mouthing heri,
and then Suej told Jane I was  bad-mouthing herj 
The semantic representation of the second conjunct of (66b) on the variables view—to
be explicit, I assume λ-calculus in (67)—is given in (67). On the variables view, the
minimal focus domain that can be invoked for the licensing of deletion is one that
includes the binder of the variable x.
(67) Sue λx told Jane I was badmouthing x
      
elided VP       
minimal ∼P
What is a possible antecedent for the minimal ∼P indicated in (67)? The fact this
it must be identical in meaning to the this ∼P modulo the focussed parts of ∼P
restricts the possible antecedents to predicates. Furthermore, I claim the structure
223of the antecedent predicate needs to eﬀectively correspond to the structure of (67).
The semantic contribution to ∼P of the parts (67) that aren’t focussed must be
exactly matched by a potential antecedent predicate, while for the focussed parts
of (67) the antecedent must contain material that makes an equivalent contribution
to its meaning. Since there are few cases where examples with diﬀerent structures
have exactly the same meaning, the semantic identity requirement eﬀectively limits
potential antecedents of (67) to predicates with the same internal structure. This
can be assumed in the account of the parallel dependencies condition without loss
of generality because the discussion of (46) on page (46) shows that if there are
cases where predicates with diﬀerent structure are semantically identical, the parallel
dependencies condition is expected to be obviated. But, if the antecedent predicate
has the same structure, this means speciﬁcally that the variable in the same structural
position. In other words, the variables view predicts that any potential antecendent
of ∼P in (67), is a predicate denoting phrase that is structurally isomorphic to (67)
and where the variable predicated over appears in the same structural position as x
does in (67). This predicts that no antecedent is available in (66) for the ∼P indicated
in (67).
Before considering other potential choices of ∼P in (67), notice that while the
prediction of the variables view pointed out in the previous paragraph doesn’t block
all cases accounted for by the parallel dependencies requirement. The diﬀerence is
that the prediction just stated only requires that the antecedent predicate contain
a variable in the same position as ∼P, but it doesn’t require that there be a direct
dependency between the two positions. The parallel dependencies requirement, how-
224ever, requires a direct dependency in this antecedent. As Fox (1998c) points out,
examples that show that the stronger requirement of the parallel dependencies con-
dition is necessary are those known in the literature as Dahl’s puzzle like (68a). The
absence of the interpretation paraphrased in (68b) is the crucial fact, which shows
that the representation sketched in (68c) impossible.
(68) a. Max said that he saw his mother and Oscar did  say that he saw his
mother ,t o o .
b. Max said that Max saw Max’s mother and Oscar said that Max saw Oscar’s
mother, too.
c. Max said that he likes his mother
Now, return to the discussion of (66b) and consider the choice of focus domain
as in (69), where the argument of the λ-operator that binds the variable x is also
part of the focus domain. The considerations in the following carry over to any focus
domain which contains the argument of the relevant λ-operator, also in examples
where the focus domain contains other additional material than this argument. Again
the question is: What is a possible antecedent for the ∼P indicated in (69)?
(69) Sue λx told Jane I was badmouthing x
      
elided VP       
∼P
The same considerations as above show that all the possible antecedents of ∼P that
need to be considered correspond to (69) in structure. Furthermore, it can be argued
225that the structural positions occupied to x, which refers to Sue,a n dSue must also
have be identical in reference in the antecedent, in the cases to consider for the
derivation of the parallel dependencies requirement. Since in the cases where the
parallel dependencies condition applies the reference of the correspondent of x must
be diﬀerent from that of x, only this situation needs to be considered. But, this
diﬀerence in reference will block identity, unless it’s circumvented by focus in ∼P.
Since the pronoun corresponding to x in (66b) cannot be focussed, the only way
focus can aﬀect the reference of x is to focus Sue in (69). Since in all elements of the
focus set of (69) the reference of the position of Sue and that of the position of x are
identical, this is required for the antecedent of ∼P as well. In other words, the two
positions of the dependency of (69) must have the same reference in any potential
antecedent of (69).
The prediction of the variables view just deduced again comes close to ren-
dering the parallel dependencies requirement redundant, but doesn’t fully succeed.
For the example (66b), the prediction explains that no antecedent is available for the
focus domain chosen in (69). There are, however, again examples that show that the
stronger requirement of the parallel dependencies condition is needed. Again, Dahl’s
puzzle represents one class of such examples. An additional class of cases that Rooth
(1992b) discusses, are examples like (70) where the two positions in the antecedent
have the same reference, but no dependency exists between the two positions.
(70) 5 ∗5 is (obviously) less than or equal to 5, and (of course) 7 is  less than or equal
to 7 ,t o o .
226Summing up this last point, the variables view covers a substantial amount of
cases that are the empirical basis of the parallel dependencies requirement. At this
point though the prediction of the variables view doesn’t cover the cases (69) and
(70), and therefore the parallel dependencies requirement is still needed.
4.2 Predicates or Formulas
The previous section argued that the variables view of dependencies is correct, and
that the indices of unbound variables matter for semantic identity of phrases. As
mentioned in the introduction, the variables view itself can be spelled out along the
lines of two diﬀerent mathematical models. One view, the formulas view, adopts the
assumption of ﬁrst order logic that every quantiﬁer can bind a variable. The other
view, the predicates view, follows λ-calculus (Church 1932, 1933) in assuming that
there is only one operator, λ, that can bind a variable.
Both positions are quite popular in linguistics: for example, Larson and Se-
gal (1995) assume and present in detail the formulas view, while Heim and Kratzer
(1998) explicate the predicates view. Heim (1997a) contrasts the two views, and ar-
gues that they diﬀer in their predictions in the case of ACD constructions. In this
section, I summarize Heim’s argumentation, but then argue based on the new data
of the previous chapter 3 for the opposite conclusion of Heim’s paper; namely, for the
predicates view. I then give another argument for the predicates view, based on the
distribution of i-within-i reference.
For the example (71), the diﬀerence between the two views is represented by
227the sketches of semantic representations in (72). In (72a), which exempliﬁes the
formulas view, the quantiﬁer whichx takes two formulas with the unbound variable x
as its arguments. On the predicates view, exempliﬁed by (72b), the two arguments
of the quantiﬁer are predicates, the lexical predicate book and the derived predicate
λx did John read [x, book].
(71) Which book did John read?
(72) a. Whichx [x book] [did John read [x,b o o k ] ]
b. [Which book] λx did John read [x,b o o k ]
On both views, binding requires a new semantic composition principle. On the for-
mulas view, the rule has to apply to structures consisting of a quantiﬁer and its two
arguments. If we assume, that which is essentially an existential quantiﬁer (see the
following chapter), and example of such an composition rule is given in (73), and it
illustrates the general schema.
(73)
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
CP
    
whichx RN
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
g =1i ﬀa na exists such that [[R]] g[x →a] =1a n d[ [ N]] g[x →a] =
1
On the predicates view, quantiﬁers themselves don’t require a special composition
rule; quantiﬁers can be understood as functions that take two predicates as an argu-
ment and yield a truth value. However, the λ-marking requires the special interpre-
tation rule in (74) that binds a variable and creates a predicate.
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⎡
⎢
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⎣
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⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥
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⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
g is interpreted as the function a  → [[Y ]] g[x →a]
The ﬁrst argument for the predicates view has to do again with Kennedy’s
puzzle, as repeated in (75) from (2) on page 95.
(75) a. P ∗Polly visited every town in a country Eric did  visit .
b. Polly visited every town Eric did  visit .
Consider ﬁrst the semantic representation in (76), which the formulas approach pre-
dicts for the examples. As shown in (75), the variable index of the trace in the elided
VP is diﬀerent from that of the corresponding VP in the antecedent only in (76a),
which is the representation of the ungrammatical (75a).
(76) a. e ∗everyx [x town in [ay [y country] [Eric visited [y, country]
      
elided VP
]]] [Polly visited
[x, town]]
b. everyx [x town Eric visited [x,t o w n ]
      
elided VP
] [Polly visited [x]town]
Since the indices of the two traces in (76a) are diﬀerent, the parallel dependencies
requirement must be satisﬁed by the two. This is however not the case, as the
discussion of (122) on page 173 showed.
On the predicates approach, the semantic representations of (75) are those
given in (77). In both (77a) and (77b), the variables of the trace positions diﬀer, and
in both cases there binders are in parallel positions.
229(77) a. [ ∗[every town in a country λy Eric visited [y, country]
      
elided VP
] λx Polly visited [x,
town]
b. [every town λy Eric visited [y,t o w n ]
      
elided VP
] λx Polly visited [x,t o w n ]
Therefore, (75a) is predicted to violate the parallel dependencies requirement only
on the formulas approach. Heim (1997a) argues based on this observation for the
formulas approach. Since it predicts (75a) to be ill-formed, she concludes that it’s
right. But, in the light of the facts observed in the previous chapter, it turns out
that Heim’s observation actually can be used for an argument against the formulas
approach.
In the previous chapter I showed that (75a) is ruled out by the semantic content
of the trace position. Therefore the fact that the formulas approach also rules it out,
says little in favor of the formulas approach. In fact, it was shown with (5) on page
(5), repeated in (78), all that’s wrong with Kennedy’s example is the semantic content
of the trace.
(78) John visited a town that’s near the town Mary did  visit .
Namely, (78) has the same structure as Kennedy’s example above. The only diﬀerence
between the two examples is the lexical content of the trace position. Since (78)
is acceptable, it argues against the formulas approach which would predict it to
violate the parallel dependencies condition. As shown above, (78) is predicted to be
grammatical on the predicates approach.
230Heim (1997b) mentions two other cases where ACD is possible, but index
identity is not expected on the formulas view. Namely, comparatives as in (79a) and
partitives in (79b). The same point as for (78) can be made for the examples in (79).
(79) a. John can run faster than Mary can  run fast .
b. Bill visited the three oldest cities out of the ones that Mary had advised
him to  visit t .
The second argument for the formulas approach is based on the distribution
of i-within-i reference. I use the term i-within-i reference in the following way: A
pronoun exhibits i-within-i reference with a determiner D if the pronoun covaries
in reference with the quantiﬁcation of the determiner D and occurs inside the DP
that determiner D projects. Chomsky (1981:212,229) observes the argument-adjunct
distinction with respect to i-within-i reference illustrated in (80). If the pronominal
anaphor itself occurs in the NP-part of the determiner a it cannot exhibit i-within-i
reference with this determiner as shown by (80a). If the pronoun occurs in a relative
clause adjoined to the NP-part it can refer i-within-i. The contrast in (80) shows that
an adjunct occurring inside the NP-part of a DP doesn’t allow i-within-i reference. In
example (81a) from Vergnaud (1974:31) the pronoun him occurs in a relative clause,
but one that is adjoined to an argument inside the NP-part of the relevant determiner.
i-within-i reference is impossible in (81a), while it’s possible in (81b) where the second
DP itself occurs inside a relative clause adjoined to the NP-part of the ﬁrst DP.
231(80) a. K ∗Kai drew [a picture of itselfi/iti]i
b. Kai drew [a picture showing itselfi]i
(81) a. t ∗the son of the woman who killed him was a Nazi (Vergnaud 1974:(62i))
b. the guy buried near the woman who killed him was a Nazi
The generalization illustrated is that i-within-i with a pronoun and a deter-
miner D is possible if and only if the pronoun occurs outside the NP-part of the the
DP projected by D. This is an argument for the predicates because the predicates
approach predicts precisely this generalization, while the formulas approach doesn’t.
First, witness the failure of the formulas approach which is already noted in Higgin-
botham (1983:416–18) and Jacobson (1994). Recall that, on the formulas approach,
both arguments of a quantiﬁer must be open formulas containing a variable. For this
reason, the NP-complement on the formulas approach must contain a subject posi-
tion that contains a variable the quantiﬁcational determiner can bind. But, if this
subject position can be bound by the determiner, it’s predicted that the determiner
should also be able to bind variables elsewhere in the NP-part of its complement.
Hence, (82) is predicted to be a well-formed semantic representation on the formulas
approach, but the DP it corresponds to in (80a) is ill-formed.
(82) a ∗ax [x picture of x]
The predicates approach predicts the distribution of i-within-i correctly: Recall that
the two arguments of a quantiﬁer are predicates and that the quantiﬁer itself doesn’t
232bind a variable. Since the NP-part of a DP is a lexical predicate, it’s not necessary
to postulate a subject position in the NP-part. In fact, on the predicates approach,
it’s natural to postulate that there’s no subject position in the NP-part of a DP
that covaries with the determiners quantiﬁcation. Then, the representation of illicit
i-within-i reference is that in (83) (for (80a)), which is ruled out because x isn’t
bound.
(83) a ∗a [picture of x] λx...
Since relative clauses are derived predicates, they are predicted to allow i-within-i
reference on the predicates approach. Recall that derived predicates are created by
the λ-operator. Since the λ-operator can bind variables in its scope, representations
like (84) for (80b) are well-formed.
(84) a [[picture] [λx x showing x]]
I conclude that the distribution of i-within-i reference is only predicted by the predi-
cates approach, and therefore argues for it. Notice, by the way, that the combinatorial
view of binding also doesn’t predict the distribution of i-within-i reference, as Jacob-
son (1994) shows. On the combinatorial view, there is no diﬀerence between derived
predicates and lexical predicates. In addition to the two arguments for the predicates
view presented in this section, I know of two additional arguments for predicates:
Sauerland (1998) presents an argument based on the existence of polyadic quantiﬁ-
cation, and Nissenbaum (1998) presents an argument based on the distribution of
233parasitic gaps. Nissenbaum’s (1998) argument is the most ambitious; he claims the
existence of λ-operators as independent syntactic heads. While the other three ar-
guments only provide evidence that the complement of a moved phrase as well as
relative clauses are interpreted as predicates, they’re compatible with Nissenbaum’s
(1998) stronger claim.
It should be mentioned that the predicates view also predicts that an argument
of a lexical predicate cannot bind a pronoun in its scope. In (85a), Mary doesn’t
bind the pronoun her, because only the argument of a derived predicate can bind any
pronouns. Hence, the subject must have moved as in (85b) for it to bind the pronoun.
But, since it seems that many and maybe all DPs must move a short distance for
case reasons, this prediction is maybe not as bothersome as it looks at ﬁrst.
(85) a. M ∗Mary likes herx bicycle.
b. Mary λx likes herx bicycle.
4.3 Summary
This sections investigates the contribution a dependent element to the meaning of a
constituent that doesn’t contain the binder of it. The tool that is employed to study
this question is the semantics of focus and destressing. Hence, the examples consid-
ered mainly head the abstract structure in (86). The question that focus semantics
can answer for a conﬁguration like (86) is whether the semantic contribution of the
dependents to the antecedent and the focus domain are the same or not.
234(86) binder ...
antecedent       
... dependent ... ... binder ...
focus domain (∼P)
      
... dependent ...
The results show that the answer to the question depends on how much ma-
terial intervenes between the the binder and ∼P. One generalization that ﬁts the
results is the following: If the focus domain ∼P is smaller the the sister of the binder,
the semantic contributions of the dependents diﬀer between the two domains; if the
focus domain ∼P is the sister of the binder, the semantic contributions of the two
dependents are the same.
This generalization is predicted if λ-calculus is chosen as the mathematical
model for the semantics of dependencies. The two other models considered, combi-
natorial logic and extended predicate calculus, were shown to predict substantially
diﬀerent generalizations which could are inconsistent with the data presented above.
Namely, the combinatorial logic model predicts that the contributions of the depen-
dents to the domains should always be identical, while the extended predicate calculus
model predicts that the contributions should always be identical.
235236Chapter 5
Interpreting Moved Quantiﬁers
The previous chapter argued, that the interpretation of chains involves a mechanism
that has the essential properties of variable binding. Still, for many of the structures
considered in the chapters 2 and 3, it’s not intuitively obvious how the interpretation
procedure applies to a chain to yield the correct meaning. For example, consider
(1) (repeated from (34) on page 50). The LF-representation of (1a) is given in (1b),
with the operator and the trace of the relevant chains marked. It is clear that the
variable x cannot refer to a single individual in (1b), because there need not be an
single individual paper such Mary told every student to revise it, for (1a) to be a
sensible question. But then, the question is what the variable x does refer to in the
interpretation of (1b).
(1) a. [Which paper of hisk that Maryj was given]i did shej tell every studentk to
revise ti?
237b. [Which [λz Maryj was given [z]]]
      
operator
λx did shej tell every student
λw [w]t or e v i s e[ x, paper of hisw]
      
trace
Another interesting observation about (1b) is that the semantic division of questioned
information and known information that the surface syntax of English suggests is not
transparent in the LF-syntax. For example in (2b), the answer matches the question
except for the wh-phrase. But, in an LF-representation like (1b) the wh-phrase and
the rest of the question don’t form separate constituents, as they seem to do on the
surface in (2a).
(2) a. Q: Which friend of her’s did Mary invite.
b. A: Mary invited Bill.
With non-interrogative DPs, an example of the kind of semantic representation
entertained is given in (3), repeated from (13) from page 39. The semantic represen-
tation of (3a) argued for is (3b). The main feature of (3b) that seems counterintuitive
are the three occurrences of book of Irene’s. It occurs in the trace position inside the
relative clause, in the trace position of quantiﬁer raising and in the operator position
of quantiﬁer. In fact the matching analysis of relative clauses predicts that it also
occurs in the operator position of the relative clause. To interpret the NP-part or
any other segment of the restrictor in more than one position seems redundant. But,
chapters 2 and 3 showed that the NP-part is often interpreted in the the trace position
and section 3.3.3 provided an argument that the NP-part was also represented in the
238operator position is relevant at LF.
(3) a. In the end, I asked him to teach the book of Irene’s that David wanted me
to  ask him to teach 
b.
 
t h eb o o ko fI r e n e ’ sλy that Davidi wanted me to teach [y, book of Irene’s]
 
      
operator
λx I asked him to teach [x, book of Irene’s]
      
trace
The most fundamental problem for interpretation seems to be the one posed
by (1), and in a more condensed way by (4), namely that the variable x in (4b)
cannot be understood as referring to an individual. One solution for this problem
was proposed by Engdahl (1980). She proposes that the variable in (4b) ranges over
choice functions. Since Engdahl’s (1980) solution for (4a) relies on representations like
(4b) I directly adopt it for the case of interrogative quantiﬁers. Therefore, Engdahl’s
proposal is presented in some detail in section 5.1.
(4) a. Which friend of heri’s did every studenti invite?
b. Which λx did every studenti invite [x, friend of herselfi]
I show then that Engdahl’s proposal doesn’t straightforwardly carry over to all non-
interrogative quantiﬁers. Rather than concluding that therefore the semantics of in-
terrogative and non-interrogative quantiﬁers is fundamentally, I show that it’s possible
to modify Engdahl’s proposal such that all quantiﬁers can be explained as involving
quantiﬁcation over choice functions. At the end of section 5.1 I present an account for
239the problem mentioned above that parts of the moved quantiﬁers must be interpreted
in other positions of the chain than the trace position.
Section 5.1 develops Engdahl’s proposal. I ﬁrst present Engdahl’s proposal and
then go on to show that Engdahl’s choice function can be extended to cover all the
constructions considered in the previous chapters. The three main diﬃculties for this
extension are the following: First, the fact that interrogative DPs seem to have, as
we will see, always existential quantiﬁcational force, whereas non-interrogative DPs
can be headed by determiners with a diﬀerent quantiﬁcational force. The second
diﬃculty is how to incorporate the contribution of material in the operator position.
And, ﬁnally I address the interpretation of intermediate traces.
Section 5.2 points out one important prediction of the choice function approach
developed in 5.1, namely that it predicts many weak crossover eﬀects. The prediction
arises from the the type diﬀerence between pronoun and the variables involved in the
interpretation of chains, when choice functions are used.
5.1 A Choice Function Approach to All Quantiﬁers
The goal of this section is to develop a general interpretation procedure for all DP-
chains making use of the insights of the previous chapters. Since many of the DPs
considered in the previous chapters are wh-phrases, one task of the semantics is
to account for wh-words in questions in a similar way as for other quantiﬁcational
determiners. Hence, I start the section by summarizing Karttunen’s (1977) semantics
of questions which treats wh-words as existential quantiﬁers.
240It turns out that it’s easiest to talk about the meaning of a question when
it occurs as the complement of agree on—I owe this insight to Lahiri 1991:16–25
and Rullmann and Beck 1997. In other environments, the meaning of questions is
obscured either by the diﬃculty of understanding the semantic contribution of speech
acts (in the case of matrix questions) or by the factivity of the question-embedding
verb (in the case of other question-embedding verbs). In this section, I only consider
the contribution to meaning of a question that appears as the complement of agree
on, and refer to the specialized literature for the reduction of other cases to this one
(Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984, Berman 1991, Lahiri 1991, Dayal 1996, and Hagstrom
1998).
Consider now the example in (5). What is the contribution of the embedded
question which student Lisa invited to the meaning of (5)?
(5) Bill agrees with John on which student Lisa invited.
Assume that Bill and John both know the concept student fully and correctly. Then
the truth of (5) implies, that for any student x, (6a) and (6b) must have the same
truth value. And conversely, if for any student x, the sentences in (6) both have the
same truth value, (5) would be considered true.
(6) a. Bill believes that Lisa invited x
b. John believes that Lisa invited x
If this intuition is any guide, the semantics of agree on involves quantiﬁcation. I adopt
241the proposal of Lahiri (1991) that agree on involves quantiﬁcation over propositions.
Then, the question must specify the range of propositions agree on quantiﬁes over.
For (5), the semantics of agree on could be given as in (7). This meaning of agree on
leads to a certain view of the meaning of questions, which is due to Hamblin (1958,
1973). Namely, questions are essentially descriptions of a set of propositions—the set
of propositions agree on quantiﬁes over.
(7) If Bill believes p, then John believes p and vice versa for all propositions p of
t h ef o r ms p e c i ﬁ e db ywhich student Lisa invited
The remaining question is what set of propositions a speciﬁc questions is the
description of. In the above example, the propositions quantiﬁed over are of the form
Lisa invited x where x is a student.1 Hence, a proposition p is quantiﬁed over if there
is a student x such that p is the proposition “Lisa invited x”. In this paraphrase,
the contribution of the wh-word which seems to introduce existential quantiﬁcation
over students. This is, in fact, one popular view of the meaning of wh-words since
Karttunen (1977) and is supported also by the morphological similarity amongst wh-
words and indeﬁnite determiners in many languages (see for example Cheng 1991 and
Hagstrom 1998). It is now possible to isolate the contributions that the elements of a
question make towards its meaning on Karttunen’s (1977) approach, as given in the
tree. The three interpretation rules needed are given in (9).
1The example also has a presupposition that Bill and John both believe that Lisa invited only
one student. This is not relevant for the point here and I’ll ignore it. It is though an interesting
aspect of the semantics of questions and I refer to Schwarz (1993) and Dayal (1996) for discussion.
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CP

    
λp C 
 
    
which student
∃[[student]]
C 
 
   
λx C 
  
C[+wh]
λq.p = q
IP
(9) a. [[C[+wh]]] = [λq.p = q]
b. [[which]] = ∃
c. λp is introduced at CP-level to bind p in C[+wh]
Note that while the interpretation rules (9a) and (9b) specify the meaning of lexical
entries, (9c) is unusual as a rule of the translation from syntactic logical form into
a more semantic form of representation for two reasons. For one, it’s speciﬁc to
questions but isn’t a rule specifying a lexical entry. Secondly, (9c) must introduce a
binder λp for the unbound proposition variable that (9a) introduced; hence, (9c) is
not a strictly local rule. However, as far as I know, there’s at present no satisfying
way around this undesirable feature of the semantics of questions.
With the semantics of wh-determiners in (9) in mind, look at Engdahl’s exam-
ple. In (10), it’s given as the complement of agree on. What is the set of propositions
243agree on could quantify over in (10)?
(10) Bill agrees with John on which friend of heri’s every studenti invited?
In a neutral context, the meaning of (10) can be elaborated in the following way:
If John and Bill both know which individuals are students and who is friends with
whom, the truth of (10) entails that for any x and y,i fx is a student and y is a friend
of x, (11a) and (11b) have the same truth value.2 Conversely, if (11a) and (11b) have
the same truth value for any pair of x and y with x a student x and y af r i e n do fx,
(10) would be considered true.
(11) a. Bill believes that x invited a y.
b. John believes that x invited a y.
This paraphrase of (10) using (11) seems to suggest that the subject universal every
student takes scope outside of the proposition p that’s quantiﬁed over in the inter-
pretation of (10). This, however, cannot generally be the explanation of examples
like (10).3 While there might be cases where a universal quantiﬁer can take scope
outside of a question (cf. Higginbotham and May 1980, Groenendijk and Stokhof
1984, Chierchia 1993, Moltmann and Szabolcsi 1994), examples like Engdahl’s are
possible when the relevant quantiﬁer cannot take scope outside of the question. In
2In a marked context, for example when preceded by a discussion of three kinds of typical friend
relationships, boy-friend, oldest friend and grad-school buddy, (10) can be true even when the
entailment to (11) doesn’t hold.
3The argument in the following is I believe due to Engdahl (1986). I haven’t been able to verify
this, however.
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tion’s complementizer position by a ﬁnite clause boundary. Furthermore, the higher
question-internal subject position in (12) is occupied by the quantiﬁer a professor.
Since (12) requires that there must be a single professor such that John and Bill be-
lieve that he claimed that every student invited somebody for it to have any answer, a
professor takes obligatorily scope over every student. This is expected because of the
ﬁnite clause boundary. But, if every student cannot take scope over a professor,i tc a n
also not take scope over the +wh-Comp that c-commands a professor. Nevertheless,
the binding of the variable in the fronted wh-phrase is possible in (12). Hence, this
kind of binding doesn’t require quantiﬁcation to a position outside of the question.
(12) They agree on which friend of heri’s a professor claimed that every studenti
invited. (a   every, ∗every   a)
Since at least the interpretation example (12) involves a mechanism other scoping the
quantiﬁer to a position outside of the questions, I assume that (10), as well, is inter-
pretable without scoping the subject quantiﬁer to a position above the interrogative
quantiﬁer. Then the propositions described by the question in (10) must be of the
form in (13), where y is a place-holder for the interpretation of the trace. Consider
the proposition of the form in (13) if y was restricted to individuals in its interpre-
tation. Then, (13) would entail that every student invited the same person, namely
y. But, that entailment is wrong since for the truth of (10) it’s not necessary that
every student invited the same person. Hence, y must be able to refer to diﬀerent
245individuals covarying with the quantiﬁcation of the subject. In a way, p in (13) must
be equivalent to a conjunction of propositions of the form “x invites y” entertained
earlier.
(13) p = ‘every student invited y’
Since y cannot be the individual variable that intuition would favor, many less in-
tuitive possibilities are now open. But, the results of chapter 2, I believe, narrow
the options down signiﬁcantly, leaving the proposal of Engdahl (1980) as perhaps the
most natural candidate. Recall at this point the conclusion of section 2.2; namely,
that the trace position in Engdahl’s example must contain the NP-part of the wh-
phrase. Hence, the propositions described by the questions in (10) must actually be
of the form in (14), where y is the variable bound by the wh-word.
(14) p = ‘every studenti invited [y,f r i e n do fh e r i’s]’
The meaning of the NP-part in the trace position covaries with the quantiﬁer that
binds her. For one given student that’s quantiﬁed over by the subject—let’s call her
Mary—the NP-part friend of her’s denotes the property friend of Mary’s that the
NP-part denotes. As shown above, the question meaning involves propositions of the
form “x invited z” with z b e i n gaf r i e n do fx.I fy in (14) selects one of the individuals
that have the property the NP-part denotes, namely being a friend of Mary’s, the
result is a proposition of the form “Mary invited z”, with z a friend of Mary’s.
Engdahl’s (1980) choice function proposal captures the intuition just expressed,
246that the variable bound by the wh-word selects an individual that satisﬁes the prop-
erty the NP-part expresses. A choice function is a function that assigns to properties
individuals which have this property. Formally, this is deﬁned in (15). Sometimes,
I’ll use the abbreviation CF for either the set of choice functions or the term choice
function.
(15) f of type   e,t ,e  is a Choice Function if x(f(x)) = 1 for all x ∈ domain(f)
For Engdahl’s example (repeated in (16a)) this results in the interpretation repre-
sented by (16b) and paraphrased in (16c).
(16) a. which friend of heri’s every studenti invited?
b. λp∃λf( f ∈ D  e,t ,t  and f is a CF and ∀y ∈{ students}:y invited f(friends(y))
c. There is an f such that p means: for every student x, x invited the one
that f chooses for the property friends of x’s
The choice function f could, for example, always select the oldest of the people having
a certain property. For this f, the proposition p described by (16b) is “Every student
invited her oldest friend”. But, the selections by f made could also not correspond
to any natural deﬁnite description, for example f could choose the oldest friend for
one student, the youngest friend for another, and a friend that’s neither the oldest
nor the youngest for a third student.4
4One problem of Engdahl’s approach is exempliﬁed by the case where two students have exactly
the same friends. The properties of being a friend of these two students are extensionally identical,
and therefore the choice function should select the same individual for both the students. The
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other questions where the wh-phrase doesn’t contain a bound variable, if the NP-part
wasn’t interpreted in the head of the chain. Consider the representation (17b) for
the example (17a) (repeated from (5)). In (17b), the NP-part in the trace position
doesn’t vary with any quantiﬁer in the sentence, hence the choice function f is only
applied to the property student for which it selects a student. Hence, the proposition
(17b) describes are exactly those of the form “Lisa invited x”, with x being a student.
But, given the argument in section 3.3.3 that the NP-part can appear in both the
operator and the trace position, the representation of (17a) is probably (17c) rather
than (17b). If this is correct, Engdahl account must be slightly modiﬁed in the way
shown below.
(17) a. Bill agrees with John on which student Lisa invited?
b. which λf Lisa invited [f, student]
c. [which student] λf Lisa invited [f, student]
In the area of non-interrogative quantiﬁers, Engdahl’s (1980) proposal has
been widely adopted for wide scope indeﬁnites (Reinhart 1994, 1997, Kratzer 1995,
1998, Ruys 1993, Winter 1997 and Matthewson 1998). In this case, the syntactic
processes involved are diﬀerent, namely the existential quantiﬁer is not related to the
problem arises more sharply in examples like (i) where the property denoted by the NP-part, ancestor
of her’s, is necessarily the same for each person quantiﬁed over. I believe the problem indicates that
the formal notion of property isn’t ﬁne-grained enough to reﬂect how the denotation of the NP-part
is conceptualized in such cases (cf. Kratzer 1998).
(i) Which ancestor of heri’s did every common daughteri of John and Mary like best?
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further arguments in Ruys’s (1993). Hence, the question of whether the NP-part of
the indeﬁnite also occurs in the operator position doesn’t arise.
(18) a. Mary will leave if we invite a philosopher.
b. ∃ [λf M a r yw i l ll e a v ei fw ei n v i t e[ f, philosopher]]
Both interrogative quantiﬁers and indeﬁnites involve existential quantiﬁcation,
as motivated above for questions. With universal quantiﬁers, quantiﬁcation over
choice functions also works straightforwardly, at least if the occurrence of the NP-
part in the operator position, is ignored as von Stechow (1996) ﬁrst pointed out.5
Consider the example (19a) assuming (19b) as its semantic representation. For (19b)
to be true, any way of selecting one of the cliﬀs must be one such that a girl is climbing
the selected cliﬀ. This is suﬃcient to the intuitive meaning of (19a), namely that for
every cliﬀ there’s a girl who is climbing it.
(19) a. A (diﬀerent) girl is climbing every cliﬀ.
b. every λf a girl is climbing [f, cliﬀ]
In addition to the problem of material occurring in the operator position, a
generalization of the choice functions to the analysis of all quantiﬁers faces other
signiﬁcant problems. Consider (20a) with the cardinal quantiﬁer two taking wide
scope over the subject, assuming (20b) as its semantic representation. I show now
5Kai von Fintel (p.c.) drew my attention to this part of von Stechow’s paper.
249that (20a) is predicted to be true in a situation where there is only one cliﬀ that a
boy is climbing.
(20) a. A (diﬀerent) boy is climbing two cliﬀs.
b. two λf a boy is climbing [f, cliﬀ]
Assume that College Rock is the only cliﬀ that a boy is climbing. Then, f and g in
(21) are two diﬀerent choice functions that make the predicate ‘λf a boy is climbing
[f, cliﬀ]’ true. Hence, (20b) is predicted to be true in a situation where College Rock
is the only cliﬀ climbed by a boy. But, this prediction is of course undesirable.
(21) f([[‘cliﬀs’]]) = College Rock, f([[mountains]]) = Everest
g([[‘cliﬀs’]]) = College Rock, g([[mountains]]) = Zugspitze
A similar problem arises also with the proportional quantiﬁer most in example (22):
The predicate over functions in (22b) will be true of inﬁnitely many functions f
even if only one girl is climbing a cliﬀ. Hence, it’s not easily possible to determine
the proportion that would be required for (22a) to be true. More generally, all
quantiﬁers for the interpretation of which the cardinality of the domain is important
are problematic for the choice function proposal as developed so far because the
cardinality of the set of choice functions that satisfy a predicate is typically either
zero or inﬁnite.6 For existential and also universal quantiﬁers this property of choice
6For the truth of the kind of predicate arising in linguistic examples only the values of the choice
function for a ﬁnite set of properties is relevant. Under these circumstances, for example, the number
of choice functions satisfying the predicate will always be zero or inﬁnite.
250functions isn’t problematic, but for most other quantiﬁers it is.
(22) a. A girl is climbing most cliﬀs.
b. most λf a girl is climbing [f, cliﬀ]
There are probably many more ways out of the problem posed by (20). In the
following, I discuss two of them. The ﬁrst one is to restrict quantiﬁcation to choice
function that vary over choice functions that are minimal in their domains. Imposing
this requirement on the choice functions considered ensures that two diﬀerent ones of
the choice functions consider diﬀer in their value for a property actually considered
in the evaluation of the sentence under consideration. To refute this approach, I
show then a second problem that arises when quantiﬁcation over choice functions
is extended to all non-interrogative quantiﬁers. The second solution I present is to
assume that two choice functions are only considered diﬀerent if they are pointwise
diﬀerent—they diﬀer in value for every property in their domain. This solution can
account for both (21) and the second problem discussed below.
The ﬁrst way out of the problem of (20) is to restrict the domain of the choice
functions looked at to the properties that are ‘really relevant’. ‘Really relevant’ are
only the values of the choice function for those properties that it’s actually applied to
in the evaluation of the sentence in question. For example, in (22b), f is only evaluated
for the one property: cliﬀ. I assume that in (22) only choice functions deﬁned for this
one property are quantiﬁed over. The number of such choice functions is the same as
the number of cliﬀs, because the number of ways to select one element from one set
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functions, it’s possible to deﬁne cardinal and proportional quantiﬁers in a way that
yields the right interpretation for (21) and (22).
Recall, though, that in example (10) above, the choice function must be deﬁned
for more than one property: Because the argument of the choice function contains
a bound variable, the choice function must at least be deﬁned for all the diﬀerent
properties that arise given the values the bound variable ranges over. Since it is
desirable to postulate only one interpretation mechanism for all kinds of DPs, this
case must be allowed by the restriction imposed on the set of choice functions a
quantiﬁer quantiﬁes over. This is captured by the deﬁnition in (23).
(23) min(C)={f ∈ C |∀ g ∈ C:domain(g)  ⊂ domain(f)}
The general way to draw the restriction, hence, seems to be to restrict quantiﬁcation to
choice functions that have a minimal domain such that the argument of the quantiﬁer
are deﬁned. The meaning of quantiﬁers can be given by the general schema in (25),
which is exempliﬁed in (24) for two, most and which.
(24) a. [[two]](S) is true if and only if two diﬀerent elements of min(domain(f))
make S(f) true.
b. [[most]](S) is true if and only if more than half of the elements of min(domain(f))
make S(f) true.
c. [[which]](S) is true if and only if one f ∈ min(domain(f)) makes S(f) true
252(25) [[Q]](S)=1 if and only if Q-many of min(domain(S)) are in {f | S(f)=1}
Going back to the example (20), repeated in (26), the correct interpretations
are now predicted. The minimal choice functions that the λf predicate in (26b) is
deﬁned for, are those that have only the predicate cliﬀ in their domain. As argued
above, the existence of two such choice functions is equivalent to the existence of two
cliﬀs which a boy is climbing. Notice that whenever the content of the trace position
doesn’t contain a bound variable, the choice functions quantiﬁed over are predicted
to be ones with a singleton domain.
(26) a. A (diﬀerent) boy is climbing two cliﬀs.
b. two λf a boy is climbing [f, cliﬀ]
Next, consider again the interpretation of Engdahl’s example (27) (repeated
from (10)). The minimal choice functions that the λf-predicate in (27b) is deﬁned
for are those that are deﬁned for exactly all of the predicates friend(y) for the values
of y quantiﬁed over.
(27) a. ... which friend of heri’s every studenti invited?
b. λp∃λf( f ∈ D  e,t ,t  and f is a CF and ∀y ∈{ students}:y invited f(friends(y))
c. There is an f such that p means: for every student x, x invited the one
that f chooses from the set of friends of x’s
Because the semantics given for (27) is general to all DPs, the question arises
253whether the possibility that a bound variable in the lexical content of the trace can
generally lead to quantiﬁcation over choice functions with a domain of cardinality
greater than one. The question is what kind of interpretation would be predicted for
such a case. In the case of an indeﬁnite quantiﬁer, the resulting reading would be
equivalent to a narrow scope reading. But, consider a possible wide scope construal
of (28a) with the counting quantiﬁer two taking scope over every. The semantic
representation of (28a) I’m entertaining is shown in (28b).
(28) a. Every student brought two relatives of hisi.
b. two λx every studenti brought [x, relatives of hisi]
The reading (28b) is predicted to have according to the previous section is I claim not
available for (28a): Consider a situation with two students, one of which, brought two
relatives of his, Lynn and Eve, but the other, Bill, brought only one, Sue. Intuitively,
(28a) is false in such a situation. But, there are then two choice functions that
make the λx-predicate in (28b) true—namely, f, which selects Lynn for the property
relatives of John and Sue for the property relative of Bill,a n dg, which selects Eve
for the property relatives of John and Sue for the property relative of Bill. Hence,
(28b) is predicted to be true, which is incorrect.
The problem arises generally in the situation in (29), when Qb is a strong
quantiﬁer, and Qa is a quantiﬁer sensitive to the cardinality of its domain. It’s
generally diﬃcult to obtain wide scope of one strong quantiﬁer over another, but
seems to be marginally possible in examples like (30) (cf. Beghelli 1993, 1995, Sato-
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(29) Qa λx... [Qb NP]i ...[x, ... proi ...]
(30) Every student read exactly two books.
The problem brought to light by (28) and (30) is not a problem speciﬁc to
the approach I’m developing here. Rather it seems to arise by necessity from the
assumption that all DPs have a uniform semantics. These uniform semantics need to
provide an account for examples like Engdahl’s (10), where a bound variable occurs
inside a wh-quantiﬁer. But, then the question whether this kind of binding is also
possible with examples involving other quantiﬁers is unavoidable, and probably some
representation equivalent to (29) must be allowed. Instead of giving up the idea of
a uniform DP-semantics as Engdahl (1980) and others do, I want to maintain that
representations like (29) are possible. But then, the interpretation of (28) cannot be
the one given above. I propose that counting quantiﬁers individuate choice functions
diﬀerently than assumed above. If we assume that the quantiﬁer two requires that
there are two choice functions that are diﬀerent in their value on every argument they
have in common, deﬁned as the pointwise diﬀerent relation in (31), (28b) is correctly
predicted to be false in the situation laid out above.
(31) f is pointwise diﬀerent from g if and only if
∀x ∈ domain(f) ∩ domain(g):f(x)  = g(x)
More generally, it’s true that, for any set S of ﬁnite sets, the maximum number of
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possible pair is equal to the cardinality of the smallest set s ∈ S. Therefore, if counting
quantiﬁers require the choice functions that satisfy their domain to be pointwise
diﬀerent, even representations like (29) are interpreted correctly. This approach can
also accommodate proportional quantiﬁers if it’s assumed that here the maximum
number of pointwise diﬀerent choice functions that make the scope of the quantiﬁer
true is compared to the maximum number of pointwise diﬀerent choice functions that
make it false. Therefore, individuating choice functions with the pointwise diﬀerent
relation makes it possible to maintain a uniform semantics for interrogative and non-
interrogative determiners.
Notice that the pointwise diﬀerent requirement renders the restriction to min-
imal choice functions superﬂuous. Recall, that the observation that lead to the in-
troduction of the minimality requirement was the following. An example like (32a)
(repeated from (20)) with the representation in (32b) is predicted to true if the two
choice functions f and g deﬁned by (33) are considered. However, the requirement
that the choice functions considered in the interpretation of a quantiﬁer must be
pointwise diﬀerent doesn’t permit the consideration of f and g as deﬁned in (33).
Therefore, the pointwise diﬀerent requirement can replace the minimality condition.
(32) a. A (diﬀerent) boy is climbing two cliﬀs.
b. two λf a boy is climbing [f, cliﬀ]
(33) f([[‘cliﬀs’]]) = College Rock, f([[mountains]]) = Everest
g([[‘cliﬀs’]]) = College Rock, g([[mountains]]) = Zugspitze
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sitions other than the lowest trace position. At this time, what I can say about the
issue is mostly mapping out the issues that arise and to show that the account is not
incoherent because of these issues. To begin with, recall the problem: The schema
for the deﬁnition of quantiﬁers in (25) above assumes that only the operator is inter-
preted in the operator position of a chain. In chapter 2, I argued that this assumption
is incorrect: Both NP-parts and relative clauses can occur in the operator position
of a chain. The potential occurence of NP-parts in the operator position was argued
for in section 3.3.3. Recall that also relative clauses, according to chapters 2 and 3,
can occur in the operator position of a chain as well, and in contrast to the NP-part
don’t even need to be repeated in the trace position. One of the arguments given in
section 2.2 for this conclusion is Freidin’s (1986) observation that Condition C can
be obviated by over wh-movement in examples like (34) (repeated from (20) on page
44). The relative clause in (34) cannot occur in the trace position since its subject
doesn’t trigger a Condition C violation in this position.
(34) [Which argument that Johni had criticized]j did hei accept tj in the end?
It turns out that a relative clause in the operator position is actually easier
to interpret there, then the NP-part is. The reason is that, as argued in section 2.4
relatives clauses usually contain an internal head. Recall that the matching analysis
of relative clauses proposed in section 2.4 claims that the relative clause internal
trace position is occupied by the NP-part of the relative clause head. Hence, the
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trace position also contains an NP-part, it seems natural to interpret relative clauses
as predicates of choice functions in the same way as it was proposed for the sister
of a moved quantiﬁer above. The relative clause in (35) then denotes a predicate of
choice functions that is true if the choice function assigns to the property argument
an argument that John had criticized. Hence, if the choice functions that which
quantiﬁes over in (35) is restricted to those that satisfy the predicate the relative
provides, the correct interpretation results in (35).
(35) [which argument λy Johni had criticized [y, argument]] λx did hei accept [x,
argument] in the end.
Generally, if a relative clauses has a non-empty internal head, it is interpreted as a
predicate of choice functions. And, the relative clause is true if the choice function
selects an individual that intuitively would make the relative clause true. Hence,
relative clauses that have an internal head can be combined with the operator they
share a position with as restrictors of the operator. The new deﬁnition schema for
quantiﬁers is given in next.
(36) [[Q]](S)=1 if and only if Q-many pointwise diﬀerent choice functions of
min(domain(S)) ∩{ f | R(f)=1 } are in {f | S(f)=1 }
The NP-part is not as easily interpretable in the operator position as a rela-
tive clause is because the NP-part denotes a predicate of individuals, not of choice
258functions. This mismatch in semantic types seems to arise naturally from the con-
siderations above. Namely, the discussion of Engdahl’s example (10) above showed
that derived predicates with lexical material in an internal position must be, at least
in some cases, be interpreted with a variable of type other than that of individuals.
Hence, they denote a predicate of something other then individuals. The NP-part,
on the other hand, must be a predicate of individuals since it can occur as an NP, for
example, in a copular construction like (37).
(37) John is a student.
At this point, there doesn’t seem to be an elegant way to let the NP-part in the
operator position contribute to the interpretation of the chain. One way of making
it interpretable is to assume that a predicate of individuals can be converted into a
(trivial) predicate of choice functions by the type shifting rule in (38). Then, the NP-
part in the operator position can be interpreted in the same way the relative clause
was interpreted.
(38) pet −→ λf et e(f(p)=f(p))
The type-mismatch problem arises not only with the NP-part, which on the approach
taken here seems to be redundant in the operator position anyway, but also for those
relative clauses that don’t contain an internal head. Recall that for examples like (39a)
(repeated from (34) on page 50), the NP-part of the moved phrase has to reconstruct
because it contains a bound variable, but the relative clause has to be represented in
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in section 2.4, the fact that matching in a matching relative clause applies at LF
predicts for (39a) the LF-representation in (39b) where the NP-part isn’t represented
in the relative clause internal trace position. But then, the null hypothesis is that the
relative clause in (39b) is interpreted as a predicate of individuals. If this is right, the
type-shifting rule in (38) must apply for (39b) to be interpretable.
(39) a. [Which paper of hisk that Maryj was given]i did shej tell every studentk to
revise ti?
b.
 
Which [λz Maryj was given [z]]
 
λx did shej tell every studenti to revise
[x, paper of hisi]?
A type-shifting rule like (38) is also required in the other direction, because
just like the NP-part isn’t interpretable as a predicate of individuals in the operator
position, a relative clause isn’t interpretable in the trace position as a predicate of
choice functions. One argument for this are examples like (40a) where the relative
clause contains a bound pronoun. The LF-representation predicted for (40a) is given
in (40b). The relative clause in (40b) is predicted to be interpreted as a predicate
of choice functions that is true if the value for the property paper is a paper that
relevant student hej read. In (40b), however, the interpretation of the relative clause
must be a property of individual, so that it can serve as the argument of the choice
function variable x. Hence, I assume that some kind of type-shifting can apply, like
the rule given in (41). For the relative clause in (40b) the rule in (41) results in a
260predicate that’s true of a paper if hej read it, which is appropriate.
(40) a. [Which paper that hej read]i did every studentj like ti?
b. [which paper] λx every studentj liked [x,p a p e rλy hej read [y,p a p e r ] ]
(41) If ∀f ∈ domain(P) ∀p ∈ domain(f): p(x) and domain(P)  = ∅,
P   et e t −→ λx (P(fx)=1 ) ,w h e r efx any f ∈ domain(P) with ∃p:f(p)=x
With the type-shifting rule (41), the predicate that is the argument of which paper
in (40b) requires that the choice function x be deﬁned for the properties paper that
he likes for each of the students. However, the NP-part, in the operator position is
interpreted as a predicate of choice functions that requires that they are deﬁned for
the property paper. It’s easy to see the interpretation assigned to (41b) is nevertheless
correct. But, the fact that sometimes the content of traces that in some sense belong
to the same operator have diﬀerent lexical content, does give rise to a problem in the
following.
Finally, material interpreted in intermediate traces requires the type-shifting
just mentioned, but also raises the other problem just hinted at. Consider the example
in (42a), repeated from (31) on page 48, and its LF-representation in (42b). The
intermediate trace of the chain in (42b) contains the relative clause and the NP-part
while the lowest trace and the operator position of the chain contain only the NP-part.
Notice that the higher part of the chain in (42b), the operator and the intermediate
trace, resembles the chain in (40), and the same interpretation procedure can apply.
But, how does the predicate created by λy that contains the lowest trace, contribute
261to the interpretation?
(42) a. [Which paper that hek gave to Maryj]i did every studentk think t 
i that shej
would like ti?
b. [Which paper]
      
operator
λx every studenti think [x,p a p e r ,λz hei gave [z,p a p e r ]t oM a r y j]
      
intermediate trace
λy shej would like [y,p a p e r ]
      
lowest trace
For the moment, I pursue an approach in line with the structure given in (42b). Then,
the natural proposal seems to be to apply the λy-predicate to the choice function x.
But, this predicts the wrong interpretation for (42b): The denotation of the trace in
the λy-predicate is the value the choice function y assigns to the property paper. But,
the denotation of the trace in the intermediate position is the value x assigns to the
property paper hei gave to Mary. Now, consider a situation where there are papers
that every student gave to Mary, but no student thinks Mary would like the paper he
gave her. Rather, each student thinks Mary would like the paper P, which nobody
gave her. Intuitively, (41) should have no correct answer in such a situation. But, for
a choice function that assigns to the property paper the value P,t h eλx-predicate in
(42b) is true.
The problem with (42b), on the above account of how it’s interpreted, is
that there is no relationship as what the choice functions quantiﬁed over assign to the
lowest trace that contains just the NP-part and to the intermediate trace that contains
the NP-part and the relative clause. To remedy this problem, the λy-predicate in
(42b) must apply not to the choice function x, but to the result of applying x to the
262content of the intermediate trace. Since, this is an individual, another type shifting
rule is needed. Namely, one like (43), which assigns to an individual x a choice
function that chooses x for all properties that of x.
(43) ζe −→ xζ where xζ is the choice function with
domain(xζ)={pet | p(ζ)=1 } and x(p)=ζ for all p
5.2 Predictions of the Approach
The main prediction of the approach to the interpretation of quantiﬁers developed
in the previous section is, of course, that it assigns the right interpretation to all
the structures that were hypothesized in chapters 2 and 3. The approach makes
two further predictions which are worth mentioning. The ﬁrst prediction concern
weak crossover eﬀects: I show that the bijection principle of Koopman and Sportiche
(1982), which is one well-known generalization about weak crossover eﬀects, follows
from the proposal of the previous section. The predictions stems from the fact that
chains with lexical content in the trace position were seen to involve a variable of
a higher type than that of individuals. This predicts eﬀectively that A-bar chains,
which generally do have lexical content in the trace position, and A-chains, which
don’t, diﬀer with respect to the type of the variable involved. It seems natural to
relate the possibility to bind a pronoun to this diﬀerent in type. The other prediction
I point out below concerns the question what a chain with lexical content in the trace
position can be headed by.
The account of weak crossover eﬀects is predicted in the following way. A
263consequence of the system developed in the previous section is that all dependencies
where the trace position has lexical content involve binding of a variable of a type
other than the type e of individuals. It’s shown above that the higher type is required
in case the lexical content of the restrictor contains a pronoun that is bound only the
trace position, as in examples like (44) (repeated from (4)) for which Engdahl’s (1980)
choice function proposal was adopted. For all other chains with lexical material in
the trace position the motivation to use a higher type was also seen to provide an
account for the the appearance of lexical material in the trace position, and therefore
renders all other potential accounts using a lower type superﬂuous.
(44) Which friend of heri’s did every studenti invite?
I believe that the proposed higher type is corroborated by the following analysis of
weak crossover eﬀects. Weak crossover eﬀects are cases where the a moved DP cannot
bind a pronoun from its derived position. Consider, for example, the contrasts in (45)
and (46). Only the a)-examples, where the trace position of the wh-word c-commands
the pronoun his allow binding.
(45) a. Whoi fed hisi dog? (Wasow 1972:135)
b. W ∗?Whoi was hisi dog fed by?
(46) a. Which boyi received a postcard from hisi sister?
b. W ??Which boyi did hisi sister send a postcard to?
I show now that the weak crossover eﬀects in (45) and (46) is in fact predicted by
264the approach outlined in the previous section. Recall from section 2.3 that A-bar
movement chains require that the NP-part is present in the trace position. Therefore,
the examples in (45) and (46) have LF-representations where the trace position has
lexical content. For example, (47) shows the LF-representation for (46b). In (47),
the variable f must range over choice functions for the chain to be interpretable. But
then, it seems plausible that the operator binding this choice function variable cannot
also bind a pronoun, since pronouns are plausibly of the type e of individuals.
(47) [ ??[Which boy] λf did hisf sister send a postcard to [f,b o y ]
The remaining question for the account of (45) and (46) is why binding of the pronoun
by the wh-quantiﬁer seems possible in (45a) and (46a). Recall, though, from the
discussion of (85) on page (85) that a special mechanism must be postulated to
explain why a DP that doesn’t seem to have moved and therefore is not by virtue
of this movement the argument of a λ-predicate can nevertheless act as a binder, a
problem that Heim and Kratzer (1998) also point out for the predicates approach.
Whatever is the answer to this question, will allow the subject trace in (45a) and
(46a) to act as a binder. Speciﬁcally the mechanism allowing the binding could be a
short, string-vacuous A-movement step preceding the A-bar movement.
A-movement is predicted to obviate weak crossover because it doesn’t require
that the NP-part be represented in the trace position. That A-movement does obviate
weak crossover is, of course, well known, and illustrated here by (48).
(48) Which girli seemed to heri brother to be a good player.
265Therefore, this account of weak cross over predicts that a pronoun can only
be bound if it’s c-command by a trace in an A-position. This is, in eﬀect, equivalent
to the bijection principle of Koopman and Sportiche (1982), since the lowest trace of
any NP occupies an A-position. It should be mentioned, though, that the account
also inherits all potential problems that of the bijection principle (see Saﬁr 1984).
The second prediction of the approach developed in section 5.1 is a restriction
to essentially chains headed by a quantiﬁcational DP. This restriction seems to maybe
reﬂect the particular data considered in section there; namely, data involving DP-
chains headed by a quantiﬁcational determiner. While this is possible, I present one
argument in section 6.1 that the restriction is in some sense real.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, I provided interpretation rules that assign the right interpretation to
all the examples of the previous chapters. The main tenet of the system laid out in this
section was that all determiner phrases involve the same interpretation principles. It
was shown that this assumption lead to the account of Engdahl (1980), which involves
a variable ranging over choice function to express the semantic dependency in a chain.
Engdahl’s proposal, which was originally only intended for interrogative quan-
tiﬁers, which all have existential force, is shown to raise problems when it’s carried
over to cardinal non-interrogative quantiﬁers. Both problems can be solved, however,
if it’s assumed that the lexical entries of quantiﬁers are such that two choice functions
quantiﬁed are only considered diﬀerent it they are pointwise diﬀerent.
266The choice function proposal developed in 5.1 was seen to predict the eﬀect of
the weak crossover condition.
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Conclusion/Outlook
This conclusion doesn’t provide a summary of what was accomplished in the preceding
chapters. An overview of the thesis is given in section 1.2. Rather, it contains
two tentative remarks concerning the completeness of the account presented in the
previous chapters for the interpretation of chains.
My aim is here to make the claim plausible that the account of the syntax-
semantics interface developed in this thesis covers all cases of chains that arise. The
two sections look at the two cases that, at ﬁrst, seem to show that this completeness
claim is wrong assuming. I present, in each case, an analysis that is compatible
with the completeness claim and then argue with new facts that this new analysis
is superior to the ﬁrst analysis that isn’t compatible with completeness. This result
constitutes the strongest support for the exhaustiveness claim that seems possible. It
is, obviously, always possible that the system developed proves incomplete in other
respects, either ones I overlooked or ones that are discovered in the future.
The restriction of the account discussed in section 6.1 is was pointed out at
269the end of section 5.2: The syntactic and semantic rules presented consider only the
case of a chain headed by a quantiﬁcational DP and at least the mechanism that
interprets chains with lexical content in the trace position, cannot straightforwardly
account for any other case. Section 6.1 summarizes one argument and presents a
second argument that only traces of type e (and maybe other non-functional types
like t) arise at the level of logical form. This result is actually even stronger than the
restriction just mentioned, since the interpretation of chains where the trace is of a
higher type than e but has no lexical content seems possible. Therefore, the result
implies that that the restriction of the account addressed is unproblematic.
Section 6.2 concerns the restriction of the account to cases of a DP-chain where
the quantiﬁcational determiner is interpreted in the head position of the chain. I show
ﬁrst that this restriction does actually make the account of the syntax-semantics inter-
face properties of chains easier. I then develop a new account for scope reconstruction
phenomena that assumes that in scope reconstruction cases movement is actually not
seen by interpretation at all, but takes place in the PF-branch of grammar. This ac-
count is seen to predict a generalization about the availability of scope reconstruction
that is otherwise unexplained.
6.1 The Type of Traces
This section argues that the type of the trace position of a chain must be the type of
individuals e.1 If this claim is correct, it entails that only the two types of variables
1With respect to type of truth values t, there is to my knowledge no evidence that t is diﬀerent
from e, and the distinction drawn between the two types seems to be merely for expository purposes.
270inside a trace that are proposed in chapter 5 arise. Namely, the type of individuals
if the trace doesn’t have any lexical content and the type of choice functions if the
trace has lexical content.
A restriction on the types of traces is ﬁrst proposed by Heycock (1995), Beck
(1996) and Fox (1998b). While the proposals and the evidence diﬀer, all three present
evidence only for the existence of traces of type e. Heycock (1995), in eﬀect, proposes
a restriction to type e. The evidence Fox (1998b) uses to argue for the restriction,
for example, involves an interaction between scope reconstruction of A-moved quan-
tiﬁers and Condition C. He points out that in examples like (1) scope reconstruction
is blocked (see also 1997, and Sportiche 1996). This correlation is unexpected, if the
type of the variable corresponding to the A-trace could be the type of generalized
quantiﬁers  e,et  because this type achieves the eﬀect of narrow scope while syntac-
tically representing the A-moved quantiﬁer in the higher position (von Stechow 1993,
Cresti 1995, Rullmann 1995, Chierchia 1995). In contrast, the interaction between
Condition C and scope reconstruction is predicted if the trace position can only cor-
respond to a variable of type e. Then, the moved quantiﬁer must be syntactically
represented in the trace position for narrow scope. Therefore, the interaction between
Condition C and scope reconstruction argues for a restriction on the type of traces.
The data in section 6.2, where scope reconstruction is discussed, provide another ar-
gument to assume that to achieve scope reconstruction by means of a higher type
trace must be blocked.
The same seems to be true for degrees.
271(1) A student of Davidi’s seems to himi to be at the party. (∃ seem, seem  
∃) (Fox 1998a:(46a))
In this section, I present further empirical evidence for a restriction of the
type of traces to the type e from quantiﬁer ﬂoat in Japanese. In this construction,
there’s a trace position associated with the moved nominal phrase in the complement
position of the numeral quantiﬁer. I claim that the type of this complement position
can be either e or et resulting in two distinct interpretations, and show that the
interpretations associated with the higher type et require that the moved nominal
phrase be interpreted entirely in the complement position of the quantiﬁer.
The argument relies on a new account of the partitive/cardinal ambiguity
found with cardinal ﬂoating quantiﬁers in Japanese (Kitagawa and Kuroda 1992,
Ishii 1997). Ishii (1997) observes that if the direct object that a ﬂoating quantiﬁer is
associated with occupies a VP-adjoined position, only the partitive interpretation is
available: example (2) is infelicitous in a situation where only three books are salient.
(2) John-wa
JohnTOP
[urenokotta
left unsold
hon-o]i
booksACC
Mary-ni
MaryDAT
[t1 san-satu]
three-CL
ageta
gave
‘John gave Mary three (of the) unsold books.’ (partitive, ∗cardinal)
Ishii (1997) also notes that examples like (3), where the nominal phrase associated
with the ﬂoated quantiﬁer occupies an IP-adjoined position, allow both a partitive
and a cardinal interpretation. (Actually, it seems impossible to assess the presence of
the partitive interpretation in examples like (3) if a cardinal interpretation is available,
272since the former entails the latter.)
(3) [Urenokotta
left unsold
hon-o]i
booksACC
John-wa
JohnTOP
Mary-ni
MaryDAT
[t1 san-satu]
three-CL
ageta
gave
‘John gave Mary three (of the) unsold books.’ (partitive, cardinal)
I claim that the cardinal interpretation of (3) requires reconstruction of the
nominal phrase urenokotta hon-o to a the complement position of the quantiﬁer san-
satu. In support of this claim, I show that the availability of the cardinal reading
correlates with the availability of reconstruction in two cases. The ﬁrst is (4). In
contrast to (3), (4) doesn’t allow a cardinal interpretation. Since reconstruction is
blocked by Condition C in (4), reconstruction is required for a cardinal interpretation.
(4) [Mary-gaj
MaryNOM
sukina
likes
hon-o]i
booksACC
John-wa
JohnTOP
kanozyo-nij
herDAT
[t1 san-satu]
three-Cl
ageta
gave
‘John gave Mary three of the books she liked.’ (partitive, ∗cardinal)
The second correlation between the availability of reconstruction is involves a paral-
lelism of the data in (5) to the contrast between (2) and (3). Saito (1992) shows that
scrambling to a VP-adjoined position cannot reconstruct for anaphor binding, while
IP-adjoined scrambling can. The contrast in (5) shows that Saito’s observation also
holds for scrambling that strands a ﬂoated quantiﬁer in the base position.
(5) a. John-ga
JohnNOM
[Hanako-to
Hanako-and
Mary-ni]i
Mary-to
otagaii-no
each otherGEN
hon-o
bookACC
ni-satu
two-Cl
ageta
gave
‘John gave Hanako and Mary two books of each other’s.’
273b. J ∗John-ga
JohnNOM
[otagaii-no
each otherGEN
hon-o]j
bookACC
[Hanako-to
Hanako-and
Mary-ni]i
MaryDAT
[t2 ni-satu]
two-Cl
ageta
gave
c. [otagaii-no
each otherGEN
hon-o]j
bookACC
John-ga
JohnNOM
[Hanako-to
Hanako-and
Mary-ni]i
Mary-to
[t2 ni-satu]
two-Cl
ageta
gave
Examples (2) and (3) showed that only scrambling to an IP-adjoined position allows
a cardinal interpretation. Hence, the availability of reconstruction (in (5)) again
correlates with the availability of the cardinal interpretation. I conclude that the
cardinal interpretation requires reconstruction.
At this point, the generalization is the following: If the sister of the ﬂoated
quantiﬁer is a trace at LF, only the partitive reading is available. How does this
generalization relate to the type of the trace. I claim that the cardinal interpretation
of a numeral requires a complement of type  e,t , the type of ﬁrst order properties.
The partitive interpretation of a numeral, on the other hand, takes a complement of
type e, the type of individuals. This is suggested by the English examples in (6):
(6) three books       
 e,t 
vs. three of the books       
e
If we assume that, in Japanese as well, the diﬀerence between the cardinal and the
partitive interpretation is represented by the type of the complement of the (ﬂoated)
quantiﬁer, the generalization I arrived at above follows from the restriction of traces
to be of type e straightforwardly: If, at LF, the trace that’s the sister of the ﬂoat-
ing quantiﬁer is visible at LF, it must be interpreted as of type e and, therefore,
only the partitive interpretation is available. Hence, the Japanese facts support the
generalization that traces must be of type e.
274An alternative explanation of the above generalization would be the following.
Assume that ﬂoating quantiﬁer constructions can either be generated by movement
or base-generated with a pronominal element pro occupying the complement position
of the quantiﬁer (Kitagawa and Kuroda 1992). Furthermore, assume that when the
complement of the quantiﬁer is pro, only the partitive interpretation is available, and
the if Q-ﬂoat is generated by movement, this movement must reconstruct. Then the
facts above follow, without appeal to the condition on the type of traces. But, the
following facts argue that Q-ﬂoat must always be generated by movement (see also
Miyagawa 1989). The argument is based on the ungrammaticality of (7), where the
ﬂoating quantiﬁer is contained in a fronted VP, while the associated NP is stranded.
(7) [ ∗[Mary-ni
MaryDAT
[t1 san-satu]
three-CL
age-sae]j
give-even
[Urenokotta
left unsold
hon-o]i
booksACC
John-wa
JohnTOP
t2 sita
did
Notice that material stranded by VP-fronting can bind a variable in the fronted VP,
as shown in (8). Therefore, the ungrammaticality of (7) argues that the relation
of the associate of the ﬂoated quantiﬁer and quantiﬁer is not just one of binding,
but one derived by movement. Under this assumption, the ungrammaticality of (7)
follows from the proper binding condition (or recent proposals to derive proper binding
condition eﬀects from shortest attract; Takano 1993, Kitahara 1994, Yatsushiro 1997).
(8) [Mary-ni
MaryDAT
zibuni-no
selfGEN
hon-o
bookACC
san-satu
three-CL
age-sae]j
give-even
daremoi-ga
everybodyNOM
t2 sita
did
‘Give three books of his to Mary, everybody did.’
I conclude that trace may only be of type e. Hence, there are only two types
275possible for the variable in a chain: e if the trace has no lexical content and (et)e,t h e
type of choice functions if the trace has lexical content.
6.2 Scope (or Total) Reconstruction
The restriction of the interpretation procedure for chains considered in this section
is that the moved quantiﬁcational determiner must be interpreted in the operator
position of the chain. I have made this assumption throughout and will argue below
that it allows the account to be simpler than otherwise possible. The main case where
the assumption seems to be wrong are cases of scope reconstruction like (9) under
the interpretation where two takes scope below likely (see (11) below).
(9) [Two people from New York]i are likely to ti win the lottery next weekend.
That the quantiﬁcation determiner of a moved DP must be interpreted in the higher
of position follows from an assumption argued for in section 4.2. There I argued that
the sister of a moved constituent is always interpreted as a λ-predicate. This implies
that at least parts of the moved constituent are interpreted in the derived position,
since otherwise this λ-predicate wouldn’t have any argument. But, if any part of
a moved chain is interpreted in the operator position the determiner head must be
interpreted there. Hence, it follows that at least the D-head of a moved DP is always
interpreted in the derived position.2
2This argument is weakened, however, that the facts below argue that, for example for VP-
fronting, an interpretive mechanism must apply where all material is interpreted in the trace position.
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A-chains. Speciﬁcally, I mean by scope reconstruction cases where all material of
the moved phrase seems to contribute to interpretation only in the trace position.
Saito (1992), for example, uses the term total reconstruction for such cases. The type
of scope reconstruction seems to be mainly available with A-movement. I propose
that A-movement can take place in the PF-branch of the derivation and therefore
be not noticed at the LF-interface. The argument for this proposal is based on the
unavailability of reconstruction when the A-moved element doesn’t c-commands its
trace in the overt form as ﬁrst observed by Barss (1986). As I show, only the PF-
movement analysis straightforwardly predicts this restriction on reconstruction.
In the remainder of the introduction, I summarize test for whether scope re-
constructions is possible in A-chains. May (1977) ﬁrst notice scope reconstructions
in A-chains looking at quantiﬁer scope. He observed that in raising constructions
the raised subject is scopally ambiguous with respect to a scope bearing element
that intervenes between the trace of the raised subject and its overt position. This
is illustrated by the examples (10a) and (11a), where the two diﬀerent readings are
paraphrased in b. and c. In (10a), the wide scope reading (paraphrase (10b)) is
salient because our world knowledge about skiing competitions at the Olympic games
tells us that the possibility of there being two gold medal winners in one compe-
tition is vanishingly small. In (11a), on the other hand, the narrow scope reading
paraphrased in (11c) is the only one compatible with our world knowledge that, in
a lottery, it’s never the case that a particular individual has more than a very small
chance of winning.
277(10) a. [Two Germans]i are likely to ti win the Gold Medal in this skiing race.
b. Two Germans have a good chance of winning. (two   likely)
c. T #There is a good chance that two Germans will win. (likely   two)
(11) a. [Two people from New York]i are likely to ti win the lottery next weekend.
b. T #Two New Yorkers have a good chance of winning. (two   likely)
c. There is a good chance that two New Yorkers will win. (likely   two)
These following three tests for scope reconstruction which rely on grammaticality
judgments are used below. The ﬁrst of test uses negative polarity licensing in addi-
tion to Scope as a test for the scope reconstruction (Linebarger 1980, 1987). As is well
known, a negative polarity item (henceforth NPI) must be c-commanded by negation
or a downward entailing operator. What Linebarger shows is that the scope recon-
struction of an A-chain can feed NPI-licensing. This is illustrated in (12). Neither in
(12a) nor in (12b) does the negation c-command the NPI anything in the overt form.
Nevertheless, the NPI in (12a) can be licensed and the NPI-licensing seems to force a
scopal construal where negation takes scope over the subject. Given that there is an
A-trace of the subject below negation, it seems reasonable to assume that the scope
reconstruction of the subject A-chain feeds NPI-licensing in (12a).
(12) a. [A doctor who knows anything about acupuncture]i isn’t ti available.
b. [ ∗[A doctor who knows anything about acupuncture]i is ti available.
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This is illustrated in (13a), which contrast with example (13b), where there’s no nega-
tion c-commanding the A-trace, as well as with (13c), where negation is present, but
the A-trace is not c-commanded by it.
(13) a. [A doctor with any reputation]i is likely not to be ti available.
b. [ ∗[A doctor with any reputation]i is likely to be ti available.
c. [ ∗[A doctor with any reputation]i is ti anxious for John not to be available.
A second test for the availability of a narrow scope interpretation using gram-
maticality was discovered by Burzio (1986).3 It uses binomial each as test. The
contrast between (14a) and (14b) shows that normally binomial each must be c-
commanded by a distributive noun phrase in the overt form.
(14) a. The athletes demanded one translator each.
b. O ∗One translator each welcomed the athletes.
As Burzio notes, there’s one exception to this generalization which is illustrated in
(15): Binomial each attached to the direct object can be licensed by a distributive to-
phrase and, as Saﬁr and Stowell (1987) point out certain other prepositional phrases.4
(15) The Olympic Committee assigned one translator each to the athletes.
3Richard Kayne (p.c.) ﬁrst drew my attention to Burzio’s work.
4As David Pesetsky (p.c.) pointed out to me, licensing of direct object binomial each by the
following PP might itself involve a scope reconstruction of an A-chain, assuming the direct object
moved from a position below the goal-PP to its surface position. See Pesetsky (1994:221) and
footnote 11 on page 58 for corroborating data.
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tion in an A-chain can feed each-licensing in the pre-PP position before a prepositional
phrase. This is shown in (16) for A-movement in passives, and in (17) for two-step
A-movement, one step being movement to the subject position of a passive and the
second step being movement to the subject position of a raising construction.
(16) a. [One translator each]i was assigned ti to the athletes.
b. [ ∗[One translator each] gave a speech to the athletes.
(17) a. [One translator each]i is likely to ti be assigned ti to the athletes.
b. [ ∗[One translator each]i is likely to ti give a speech to the athletes.
6.2.1 A PF-movement Account of Scope Reconstruction
The existence of a scope reconstruction in A-chains being established, consider the
proposals that have been made to derive the narrow scope interpretation. The three
proposals I know of are LF-lowering (May 1977, 1985, Chomsky 1995), the Copy The-
ory of movement (Wasow 1972:139, Burzio 1986, Chomsky 1993, Hornstein 1995) and
Semantic Reconstruction (von Stechow 1993, Cresti 1995, Rullmann 1995, Chierchia
1995). I don’t have room to summarize these proposals here in detail—in a nutshell,
LF-lowering assumes that covert movement doesn’t have to be to a c-commanding
position in the tree and thereby can undo the eﬀect of overt raising. The Copy
Theory of movement assumes instead that a full copy of the moved phrase is left in
the trace position and the interpretive component of grammar can look at this lower
copy rather than the higher one. Semantic Reconstruction, ﬁnally, assumes that the
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which leads to a scope reconstruction. All three proposals have in common that they
assume that overt A-movement is followed by an invisible undoing operation as the
traditional term ‘scope reconstruction’ for the scope reconstruction suggests. I, as
already mentioned, believe that the term ‘reconstruction’ is misleading and propose
that no undoing of movement is necessary. Rather, I propose that A-movement in
the cases of a narrow interpretation, is not seen by the interpretive component of
grammar because it takes place in the PF-branch of grammar.
The question that needs to be answered by any account of narrow interpreta-
tion phenomena in A-chains is the following: What is the derivation of the PF-LF-pair
in (18)?5
(18) PF:
LF:
Two people are
are
likely
likely
to
to two people
win
win
the
the
lottery
lottery
My answer to this question relies on the T-model of grammar (also sometimes called
the Y-model or inverted Y-model) of Chomsky and Lasnik (1977), which I assume
here in the form given in Chomsky (1995). The T-model embodies three partially
interrelated assumptions: One, it assumes that complex representations are built up
and modiﬁed by simple operations, generalized transformations, which are inherently
ordered. Two, it assumes that operations can apply either having an eﬀect on both
LF and PF, or their eﬀect can be limited to only LF, or only to PF. Three, there is
link between the ordering of operations and where they have an eﬀect: namely the
5The PF-representations here and in the following are given in the form before real phonology
has applied.
281operations that are visible only to one of LF or PF follow operations that are visible
to both. All three assumptions together have the consequence that LF-PF pairs are
derived by a partially ordered set of transformations that has the graphical shape
s h o w ni n( 1 9 ) . 6
(19) T-model (Chomsky and Lasnik 1977)
PF LF
Stem
Split
PF-Interface LF-Interface



 



 
For the moment, assumption the of the T-model, that an operation can have an
eﬀect at only one of the interfaces if it applies in one of the branches, is what we
need. This allows us to analyze LF-PF mismatches as operations that apply in one
of the branches. It seems natural to propose that (18) is derived by PF-movement
of two people from the embedded subject position. This is the derivation I propose
generally derives scope reconstructions in A-chains. In other words, I propose that
A-movement in general can optionally take place in the PF-branch of the derivation,
instead of taking place in the stem. For an illustration, consider (20).
6The T-model incorporates an additional assumption, namely that operations which take more
than one simple representations as input (in Chomsky 1995 the only operation of this type is Merge)
must have an eﬀect at both LF and PF. This assumption derives that there is exactly one Split
point in the derivation of one LF-PF pair and that the branch segments of any derivation are totally
ordered. This assumption, however, is not important for anything I’ll say in the following.
282(20) [Two people]x are likely to tx win the lottery.
The proposal is that (20) has two possible derivations. In one derivation raising of
two people takes place in the stem and therefore the result of raising is visible to both
LF and PF. This derivation therefore gives rise to wide scope of two people over likely.
Crucially, I assume that there’s no way raising in the stem can be covertly undone.
So, this derivation yields only the wide scope interpretation. The second derivation
is one where raising of two people is takes place at PF, and its application is visible
only to PF, but not to LF. This derivation leads to a narrow scope interpretation of
two people below likely, because raising is not seen by the LF-interface.7
One immediate ramiﬁcation the PF-movement proposal makes concerns the
level at which it is veriﬁed that obligatory overt movements have indeed taken place.
The PF-movement approach is incompatible with the view taken for example by
Chomsky (1995) that this veriﬁcation only takes place at LF. Rather, PF must be
the level where the veriﬁcation takes place for overt movement. At least, the mor-
phological requirement that triggers raising in (20)—the EPP-feature if current work
on the topic is to be believed—must be checked at PF. This consequence however, as
far as I can see, doesn’t cause any new problems; on the contrary, it now follows that
the EPP must universally be satisﬁed overtly (cf. Chomsky 1995).
7It is technically conceivable, that in a derivation where raising is delayed until PF, quantiﬁer
raising applies in the LF-branch to bring about the wide scope interpretation. I don’t have any
evidence bearing on this possibility.
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In this section, I show that the PF-movement approach predicts a generalization
Barss (1986) ﬁrst hinted at regarding the availability of scope reconstructions, and
then argue that the generalization is indeed true. This generalization is the following
Scope Freezing Generalization (SFG).
(21) SFG: A moved quantiﬁer QP cannot be interpreted in an A-trace position, if
the trace isn’t c-commanded by the overt position of QP.
The SFG blocks a scope reconstruction in cases where the trace left by A-movement
is inside a a constituent that subsequently undergoes movement itself. One such case
is example (22) from Barss (1986), who based solely on (22) suggests an analysis that
would account for the SFG. I address Barss’s account of the SFG at the end of this
section.
(22) [How likely to tQP address every rally]wh is [some politician]QP twh?( s o m e  likely,
∗likely some)
Barss (1986) presents only the example (22) in support of the SFG. In the following, I
present some more. The kind of constructions that are relevant to testing the SFG are
ones where subsequent A-bar movement destroys the c-command relationship between
an A moved phrase and its trace, as it happened in (22). Example (23a) shows that
such a stranded A-moved phrase is capable of taking scope below a c-commanding
quantiﬁer. (23b) shows that the stranded phrase can also take scope below a c-
284commanding likely. Therefore, the lack of narrow scope of the stranded phrase in
(22) and the examples in the following must be due to the lack of c-command.
(23) a. [Every journalist]∀ asked [how likely to t∃ address every rally]wh [some
politician]∃ is twh.( ∀ ∃, ∃ ∀)
b. John is likely1 to ﬁnd out [how likely2 to t∃ address every rally]wh [some
politician]∃ is twh. (likely1  ∃ , ∃  likely1)
The judgment in Barss’s (1986) example can be sharpened by using each-
licensing as introduced above as a test. As we see in (24), Barss’s judgment now
shows up as a grammaticality contrast: (24a) shows again that the scope reconstruc-
tion can feed each licensing. In (24b), where the SFG correctly blocks the narrow
interpretation, each cannot be licensed. (24c), on the other hand, without each is
grammatical, but it only has the reading with scope of one over likely.
(24) a. [One translator each]QP is likely to be assigned tQP to the athletes.
b. [ ∗[How likely to be assigned tQP to the athletes]wh is [one translator each]QP
twh?
c. [How likely to be assigned tQP to the athletes]wh is [one translator]QP twh?
In (22) and (24) it was wh-movement that destroyed the c-command relationship
between the A-moved QP and its trace. The contrasts in (25) and (26) show that
other types of A-bar movement, namely topicalization in (25) and though-raising in
285(26), have the same eﬀect.8
(25) a. ... ∗... and [likely to be assigned tQP to the athletes]top [one translator each]QP
is ttop.
b. ... and [likely to be assigned tQP to the athletes]top [one translator]QP is
ttop.
(26) a. [ ∗[Likely to be assigned tQP to the athletes]tr though [one translator each]QP
is ttr, there were still complaints.
b. [Likely to be assigned tQP to the athletes]tr though [one translator each]QP
is ttr, there were still complaints.
While in questions NPIs are independently licensed, with topicalization and
though raising we can also use NPI-licensing as a test for the availability of a scope
reconstruction. As the data in (27) and (28) show, the result from NPI-licensing
conﬁrms the each-licensing data.
(27) a. ... ∗... and [certain to be not tQP available]top, [a doctor with any reputation]QP
was ttop.
b. ... and [certain to be not tQP available]top, [a doctor from cardiology]QP
was ttop.
8Examples of VP-fronting like (25) are best if they are preceded by the same sentence with a
non-fronted VP as in (i). The dots preceding all examples of VP-topicalization serve as a reminder
to look at them in such a context.
(i) Martin said that one translator (each) is likely to be assigned to the athletes and, likely to
be assigned to the athletes, one translator (∗each) is.
286(28) a. [ ∗[Certain to be not tQP available]tr though [a doctor with any reputation]QP
is ttr, patients were waiting.
b. [Certain to be not tQP available]tr though [a doctor from cardiology]QP is
ttr, patients were waiting.
A-movement of subjects has been argued to take place not only in raising
constructions, but also with all other subjects from the VP-internal underlying subject
position to the EPP-position. Hornstein (1995) and Johnson and Tomioka (1997)
argue that inverse scope of the object over the subject in English transitive clauses
requires a scope reconstruction of the subject chain from the VP-internal subject
position to its overt position. Therefore, the SFG predicts that A-bar movement of
the VP will block inverse scope in transitive clauses. In fact, this prediction seems to
be a well-known fact (Fox, p.c. referring to Truckenbrodt, p.c.), though I don’t know
who ﬁrst made this observation nor whether this has ever been made in print. The
contrasts in (29) and (30) show the prediction. While (29a) and (30a) allow inverse
scope, this interpretation is not available in (29b) and (30b).
(29) a. ... and [a policeman]QP tQP stood in front of every bank. (∀ ∃, ∃ ∀)
b. ... and [tQP stand in front of every bank]top [a policeman]QP did ttop.( ∀ ∃,
∗∃ ∀)
(30) a. Though [enough of us]QP were tQP defending every gate, the enemy broke
through. (enough ∀, ∀ enough)
287b. [tQP Defending every gate]tr, though [enough of us]QP were ttop, the enemy
broke through. (enough ∀, ∗∀ enough)
In sum, the SFG seems be corroborated by a number of tests. I show now that
the SFG is a consequence of the PF-movement analysis of narrow scope phenomena in
conjunction with the three assumptions in (31). Each of these additional assumptions
are independently motivated. I assume that assumption (31a), that wh-movement
and other types of A-bar movement take place in the stem, follows from the nature of
A-bar movement. The c-command condition on movement in (31b) could follow from
a better understanding of movement as discussed by Chomsky (1995). I also discuss
this assumption in section below in the context of a quantiﬁer lowering analysis. Of
the T-architecture, I will make use of the order it imposes on the operations in a
derivation; speciﬁcally, that movement in the PF-branch takes place after movement
in the stem.
(31) a. Overt A-bar movement must take place in the stem.
b. c-command: Movement must target a position that c-commands the mov-
ing item. (Chomsky 1995)
c. T-architecture: PF-movement must take place later than stem movement.
(Chomsky and Lasnik 1977)
Consider now the derivations of a structure like (30) that would lead to narrow and
wide scope respectively. First, look at a potential derivation for narrow scope in (32).
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place in the stem by assumption (31a). Assuming the T-model, the derivation in (32)
is forced. It violates either the EPP or the c-command condition on movement.
(32) Failing Derivation for Narrow Scope
  

  
 
QP
     
 
QP

wh-mvmt.
  

  	
  

  
 
t
  
twh

QP
EPP
*

 PF
LF
For wide scope, on the other hand, EPP-raising takes place in the stem, and can
therefore precede wh-movement, as shown in (33). As the derivation in (33) shows,
the EPP can be satisﬁed without incurring a violation of the c-command condition.
(33) Derivation for Wide Scope
  

     
 
tQP 
EPP
QP


  

  
 
tQP
  
QP   
 
tQP

wh-mvmt.
  

  	
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LF
I conclude that the SFG is a consequence of the PF-movement approach to
narrow scope phenomena. Before I begin to consider alternatives views of scope
reconstruction that actually explain the SFG, note that both the copy theory as
well a semantic approaches to scope reconstruction phenomena in A chains seem to
oﬀer no perspective in accounting for SFG in an insightful way. On either account
the operation bringing about the scope reconstruction is diﬀerent from movement,
and therefore a sensitivity of this operation to c-command would have to stipulated.
289The strength of the PF-movement account, in this respect, is that the c-command
sensitivity of movement is an independently argued for property of movement which
carries over to PF-movement.
Now, consider two alternative explanations that might be given for the SFG.
Note here, that the evidence for the SFG came entirely from examples with the
structure in (34).
(34)      
 A-bar mvmt.

A mvmt.
The ﬁrst potential explanation of the SFG was brought to my attention by David
Pesetsky and ˇ Zelko Boˇ skovi´ c, and is based on two assumptions of Lasnik and Saito
(1992): One, the generalized proper binding condition (GPBC), that traces must not
be unbound at any point of the derivation, and two, the assumption that a control
analysis is optionally possible in all raising constructions. These two assumptions
force a control analysis for all examples that have the structure in (34) as Lasnik
and Saito (1992:140-42) point out. control structures generally don’t allow scope
reconstruction, Lasnik and Saito’s (1992) analysis of structures of type (34) predicts
the SFG.
However, the assumptions underlying this account are at best controversial.
As Takano (1993), Kitahara (1994), and M¨ uller (1996) show, the GPBC is not correct
in the form suggested by Lasnik and Saito (1992) and a empirically more accurate
condition accounting for all data attributed to the GPBC follows from the general
economy condition shortest attract. But, this condition allows a raising analysis for
290structure such as (34). Moreover, the assumption that a control analysis is possible for
raising structures misses some distinctions between the two: As Wurmbrand (1998)
points out, real control can be ‘imperfect’ as in (35a): The PRO can refer to a plural
entity that the subject is a member of. Raising on the other hand doesn’t allow
‘imperfect’ readings, as (35b) shows.
(35) a. The mayor decided to PROthey gather in the lobby.
b. T ∗The mayor was likely to PROthey gather in the lobby.
The second alternative account of the SFG is the analysis Barss (1986) gives
for the example (22). He relies on a Q-lowering analysis of scope reconstruction
phenomena in A-chains and proposes that the c-command condition on movement
cannot only be satisﬁed by the landing site c-commanding the origin site, but is also
satisﬁed if the origin site c-commands the landing site. This modiﬁed, symmetric,
c-command condition allows lowering, but only to a position that is c-commanded by
the origin site. Barss (1986) claims that his account blocks lowering in a structure like
(34) because the landing site inside the fronted constituent here isn’t c-commanded
by the origin site.
It is ﬁrst not clear that Barss’s (1986) account actually predict the SFG.
Consider a derivation, where the position inside the fronted constituent is reached
by two steps of movement: The ﬁrst step raises the raised subject to a position
above the fronted constituent, and the second step lowers the subject into the fronted
constituent. This derivation doesn’t violate Barss’s weakened c-command condition.
291Secondly, Barss’s (1986) account inherits the problems that Q-lowering has.
In particular, the absence of overt lowering will need to be explained, which is not
trivial in many cases: Consider e.g. Japanese scrambling: Saito (1992) shows that
in Japanese a wh-phrase can be scrambled to a position outside of its scope domain
as in (36a). He therefore argues that Japanese scrambling can be freely undone.
Nevertheless, it is still impossible to scramble a phrase to a lower position in Japanese
as the ungrammaticality of (36b) attests.
(36) a. dono
which
hon-oi
book
Masao-ga
MasaoNOM
Hanako-ga
HanakoNOM
ti tosyokan-kara
library-from
karidasita
checked-out
ka
Q
siritagatteiru
want-to-know
‘Masao wants to know which book Hanako checked out from the library.’
b. H ∗Hanako-ga
HanakoNOM
ti Masao-ga
MasaoNOM
Taro-nii
TaroDAT
waratta-to
laughed-that
omowa-seta
believe-made
Finally, it seems to me quite likely that a strict c-command condition on
movement could easily be derived as a consequence of more general principles of
syntactic derivations—an issue that has received a lot of attention in recent work (cf.
Chomsky 1995). The symmetric c-command condition of Barss (1986), on the other
hand, seems to be a mere stipulation at this point, and it would be more natural
to assume no such restriction on lowering. Therefore, I conclude that c-command is
a general property of all movement. But then, the PF-movement account of scope
reconstruction in A chains is the only account of the SFG left.
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